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Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting
Requirements Versus the Clergy Privilege
and Free Exercise of Religion
Mary Harter Mitchell*
The choice between jailing clergy and giving up evidence of

child abuse must be a dire one. This Article asks whether that
choice faces the law. Pastor John Mellish, a Nazarene minister
in Florida, recently went to jail for refusing to divulge information confided to him by an ex-policeman later accused of child
abuse.' The minister claimed that the clergy privilege provided
him with a legal excuse for not divulging communications confided to him in his professional capacity.2 This dramatic incident uncovers a tension in the law between the old clergy4
privilege3 and new requirements of disclosure of child abuse.
*

Associate Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.

1. Ostling, Confuence and the Clergy, TIME, Oct. 1, 1984, at 66. On September 30, 1985, the author viewed a report on the same Florida case on CBS
television's program, 60 Minutes. The case is being appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth District. See Comment, Duties In Conflict: Must PsychotherapistsReport Child Abuse Inflicted By Clients and Confided in Therapy?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 653-54 (1985) (discussing case).
Cf.Commonwealth v. Kane, 388 Mass. 128, 135-37, 445 N.E.2d 598, 602-03 (1983)
(priest held in contempt for refusing to testify at confider's trial for child
abuse and murder despite confider's consent to disclosure).
2. The bylaws of the Church of the Nazarene forbid a minister to divulge
anything disclosed to him in confidence. Duin, A PastorFacesLegal Action for
Refusing to Break a Confidence, 28 CHRIsTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 5, 1984, at 80, 85.
The minister stated: "[Tihe question would always be on the mind of
parishioners as to whether I would tell on them in something else." Id. at 80.
3. This privilege has several names: the priest-penitent privilege, the
clergyman-penitent privilege, the confessor-confessant privilege, the ministerial privilege, etc. This Article uses the term clergy privilege to avoid a narrow gender or denominational reference. To avoid similar chauvinisms, this
Article also uses the term cleric to denote a single member of any denomination's clergy. To avoid begging a key question, see infra text accompanying
notes 141-52, this Article refers to the person who consults a cleric as the confider rather than the penitent.
4. A similar tension exists between the clergy privilege and other abuse
reporting requirements. Although reporting requirements are not usually included in spouse abuse statutes, such requirements are common, and controversial, in statutes addressed to abuse of the elderly and other dependent
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Such a tension in so important a juncture of law demands attention and invites reconsideration of the scope and derivation
of the clergy privilege5 because many clergy, caught between
seemingly conflicting laws, are anxious for guidance as to their
6
legal rights.

This Article exposes the superficiality of characterizing the
conflict between the clergy privilege and child abuse reporting
requirements as a choice between protecting secrets and protecting children. Instead, the Article recasts the conflict in
terms that are more evincive of the true interests at stake. Part
I reviews states' child abuse reporting requirements, and Part
II surveys the development and present status of the clergy
privilege. Part III then focuses on the troubling intersection of
these two lines of law. Finally, Part IV considers the argument
that the clergy privilege is grounded in a cleric's constitutional
right freely to practice his religion. 7 Although this Article focuses on the clergy's duty to report child abuse, much of its discussion, especially of the free exercise issue, would also apply
to clergy's participation at later proceedings.
adults. See Faulkner, Mandating the Reporting of Suspected Cases of Elder
Abuse: An Inappropriate,Ineffective and Ageist Response to the Abuse of
Older Adults, 16 FAM. L.Q. 69, 70 n.4 (1982) (arguing that mandatory reporting
statutes may tend to portray the elderly as infantile and exacerbate the social
and economic problems they face).
5. The tension has seldom been discussed. But see Op. Tex. Att'y Gen.
No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985) (superficial discussion followed by conclusion that
reporting requirement prevails); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE:

PRIVILEGED CLERGY COMMUNICATION AND

THE LAw 175-78 (2d ed.

1983) ("Clearly this trend in child protection legislation represents a considerable danger to the clergy-penitent privilege .... ." Id, at 177.).
6. See, e.g., E. KENNEDY, CRISIS COUNSELING 55 (1981) (commenting that
professionals are uncertain about questions of confidentiality); Foster, Privileged Communications: When PsychiatristsEnvy the Clergy, 30 J. PASTORAL
CARE 116, 119 (1976) (discussing a pastor's dilemma); Smith, The Pastoron the
Witness Stand. Toward a Religious Privilege in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1
(1984) (noting that without a guarantee of confidentiality, a cleric would have
to guard against being informed of some matters). See also Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985) (child abuse reporting statute applicable to
clergy).
7. This Article addresses the dilemma confronting a cleric who does not
want to report suspected abuse because reporting would violate a professional
confidence. Thus, the Article does not consider the law's application to clergy
who are willing to report but who confront either an objection by the confider
or a rule of law declaring clergy incompetent to disclose confidential communications. This Article focuses on the issue of when the cleric, rather than the
confider, may claim the privilege.
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I. CHILD ABUSE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Child abuse in this country is staggeringly rife and tragically important.8 Every state9 has a statute aimed at discovering and stopping child abuse and every statute includes a
reporting requirement.1 0 These reporting requirements differ
as to matters such as who must report and what must be reported, but they are similar in many ways, and in all jurisdictions the reporting requirement is a key part of the statutory
8. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVs., PUB. No. 81-30325, NATIONAL
STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT.
STUDY FINDINGS 39 (1981).
9. Although the text refers to states, this survey also includes the statutes of the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands.
10. See ALA. CODE §§ 26-14-1 to -13 (1986); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-.070
(1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3619 to -3620 (1978 & Supp. 1986); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42-807 to -819 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1116511174 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-10-101 to -117 (1978 &
Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38a-f (1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 901909 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2101 to -2107 (1981); FLA. STAT. §§ 415.501-.514
(1985 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 3501 to -7 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1601 to -1629 (Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
23, 11 2051-2061.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-11-1 to -22
(Burns 1980 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE §§ 232.67-.77 (1984 & Supp. 1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1521 to -1526 (Supp. 1985) and KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3101 to
-3111 (1983); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 40014017 (Supp. 1986); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-901 to -912 (1984 & Supp.
1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 51a-51f (Law. Co-op. 1975 & Supp. 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.621-.636 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT.
§ 626.556 (1986); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-353, -355, & 43-23-9 (1981 & Supp.
1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 210.110-.167 (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-3-101 to 208 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-711 to -717 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 432B.010-.320 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 169-C:1 to :39 (Supp. 1986);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.8 .20 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32-1-15 to -16 (1986); N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW §§ 411-420 (McKinney 1983 &
Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-542 to -551 (1981 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 50-25.1-02 to -14 (1982 & Supp. 1985); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421
(Anderson Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 845-848 (Supp. 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 418.740-.775 (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2201-2224 (Purdon Supp.
1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 40-11-1 to -16 (1984 & Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-480 to -560 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-10-10 to
-18 (1984 & Supp. 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 37-1-401 to -413 (1984 & Supp.
1986); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 34.01-.08 (Vernon 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-3b-1 to -16 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 681-689 (Supp. 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.1 to .13 (1980 & Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 26.44.010-.070 (1985 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-1 to -8 (1986); WIs.
STAT. § 48.981 (1979-1980); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-3-201 to -210 (1986); AM. SAMOA
CODE ANN. §§ 45.2001 to 45.2032 (1986); GUAM PENAL CODE §§ 273a-273e (1970
& Supp. 1974); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 8, §§ 401-437 (Supp. 1985); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, §§ 2532-2540 (Supp. 1985).
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A.

EVOLUTION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

The history of special child abuse legislation begins in the
early 1960s, 1 2 and from the beginning reporting requirements

have been central. In 1962, the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) held a national conference to discuss child abuse and, in 1963, HEW
published a landmark report and model statute to address the
problem of child abuse. 13 The model statute required physicians
to report suspected cases of abuse and designated as a misdemeanor a physician's knowing and willful failure to report.14
11. For an excellent summary of state child protection statutes, see I.
SLOAN, CHILD ABUSE: GOVERNING LAW & LEGISLATION (Legal Almanac Series
No. 79, 1983) (containing a lengthy survey of the reporting requirements in all
jurisdictions and reference charts). See also Fraser, A Glance at the Past, A
Gaze at the Present,A Glimpse at the Future: A CriticalAnalysis of the Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 641 (1978)
(chronological review of the child abuse reporting statutes and factors influencing reporting reforms); Mawdsley & Permuth, Child Abuse Reporting: A
Searchfor an Acceptable Balancing of Interests,9 NOLPE SCH.L.J. 115 (1981)
(surveying child abuse reporting statutes); Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A
Review of the Literature,8 FAM. L.Q. 245, 269-76 (1974) (summary of persons
required to report under state laws); Contemporary Studies Project, Iowa Professionals and the Child Abuse Reporting Statute-A Case of Success, 65 IOWA
L. REV. 1273, 1289-94 (1980) (summary of the Iowa statute); John, Child
Abuse-The Battered Child Syndrome, 2 AM. JuR. 2D Proofof Facts, §§ 14-24,
at 415-26 (1974 & Supp. 1986) (survey of common elements of reporting laws).
12. These legal developments followed in the wake of much public attention to the problem of abused children. This attention, in turn, resulted partly
from improvements in medical diagnostic techniques that permitted doctors to
detect cases of pattern abuse. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 15. In 1962, the influential Journal of the American Medical Association published a landmark article on diagnosing the "battered child syndrome." See Kempe, Silverman,
Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered-ChildSyndrome, 181 J. A.M.A.
17 (1962); see also Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408-10, 551 P.2d 389, 393,
131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73 (1976) (discussing growing awareness by medical profession of battered child syndrome).
13. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE,
THE ABUSED CHILD: PRINCIPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR LEGISLATION
ON REPORTING OF THE PHYSICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963). Soon thereafter two
other groups proposed model statutes. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 66, 67-68 (1965); Smith & Meyer, Child Abuse
Reporting Laws and Psychotherapy: A Time for Reconsideration,7 INT'L J.L.
& PSYCHIATRY 351, 353 n.13 (1984).
14. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 13, at 11, 13. The report explained
why the statute singled out physicians:
Children who have suffered physical abuse at the hands of parents or
other persons responsible for their care and protection are most frequently brought or come to the attention of physicians, either in pri-
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The model statute also expressly abrogated both the physicianpatient and the husband-wife privileges for all judicial proceedings resulting from a report of abuse. 15
This federal prodding came at a time of heightened public
concern about child abuse. 16 With remarkable swiftness, all
states adopted some form of child protection statute with a reporting requirement by the end of 1967.17 These early statutes
generally limited the reporting requirements to physicians and
required reports of only physical abuse.18 Since the 1960s, however, most states have amended their statutes at least once. 19
The trend of these amendments has been to expand both the
reportable circumstances and the classes of persons who must
report.20
B.

PURPOSE OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The obvious purpose of child protection statutes is, as most

vate practice or at hospitals, for care and treatment. Physicians,
because of the nature of the injuries and the case histories of these
children, are in an optimum position to form reasonable, preliminary
judgments as to how the injuries occurred.
Id. at 5-6.
15. Id. at 12-13.
16. See Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I. Historical Overview,
Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L. REv. 293, 328-32 (1972) (public
interest heightened during 1960s).
17. Faulkner, supra note 4, at 75 ("Between 1963 and 1967 all fifty states
adopted some form of child protection statute.").
18. See Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 11, at 1287-88.
19. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 23; Contemporary Studies Project, supra
note 11, at 1287-88.
A strong impetus for the states to expand their reporting requirements
came from the federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107
(1982 & Supp. 1985)). This statute authorizes federal funding for state child
abuse programs, but only if the state has a statute that requires reporting of
known and suspected cases of abuse and neglect. Id. § 4(b)(2)(A). The federal
statute's definition of abuse and neglect includes mental and physical injury,
sexual abuse or exploitation, and neglect. Id. § 3. The statute also requires
funded states to demonstrate prompt and extensive procedures for following
up on reports. Id. § 4(b)(2)(D).
20. Today, most states' expanded definitions of abuse include not just
physical abuse, but also mental or emotional abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect.
See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 17-22; see also infra text accompanying notes
33-36. This Article will use the term "child abuse" to include any type of reportable abuse, neglect, or exploitation of children. Furthermore, most states
now seek reports from physicians as well as from various professionals in such
fields as health, education, law enforcement, social work, and religion. See I.
SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-27; see also infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
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statutes expressly state, to protect children.2 ' Within the statutory scheme, reporting requirements are meant to be finders.
Their role is to call official attention to possible cases of child
abuse and thus trigger a state investigation. If the investigation
substantiates the suspicion of abuse, the state stands equipped
to follow up with a variety of statutory interventions, including
removing the child from the home, administering social services, terminating parental rights in the child, and bringing criminal action against the abuser.2 2
C.

ELEMENTS OF CURRENT REPORTING STATUTES

Statutory child abuse reporting requirements tend to share
common characteristics. The statutes typically address who
must report, reportable conditions, reporters' immunity, penalties for the failure to report, and the abrogation or application
of certain privileges.
1.

Who Must Report

The statutes vary considerably in their designations of persons required to report.2 3 Aiming at persons likely to encounter abused children, most statutes require reporting by various
professionals in the fields of health, education, law enforcement, and social work.2 4 All statutes, for example, require phy21. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 16-17.
22. See id. at 50-66, 75-88; Weisberg & Wald, Confidentiality Laws and
State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory
Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 149-51 (1984). Reporting requirements therefore
presuppose adequate follow-up measures. "[The proposed model statute] presupposes the existence in the States of adequate, applicable legal and social
machinery-laws, enforcement, and social welfare agencies and courts-and
that these will be put in motion by the making of the required reports." CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 13, at 9. See infra notes 456, 473 and accompanying text.
23. Many statutes have separate lists for persons who must report and
those who may report cases of suspected abuse. Another common approach is
to require certain listed professionals to report but to add that "any other person" may also report. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-27 (table showing, by
jurisdiction, who must report and who may report); Mawdsley & Permuth,
supra note 11, at 116-18. Where clergy may but are not required to report the
law creates no tension between the reporting statute and the clergy's right to
claim a privilege.
24. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-27 (chart for all states). Many statutes address institutional "chain of command" problems with a provision allowing a staff person merely to report to his supervisor rather than directly to
the government. Indiana's statute is typical:
If an individual is required to make a report under this chapter in his
capacity as a member of the staff of a medical or other public or pri-
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sicians to report,25 many statutes list particular medical
practitioners, 26 and about half of the statutes require reporting
by coroners or medical examiners.2 7 Similarly, almost all child
abuse reporting statutes include a provision requiring reports
from law enforcement officials and school personnel. 28 Several
statutes require reporting by attorneys, day-care staff, and foster care providers. 29 Many statutes list Christian Science practitioners specifically or religious healers generally among those
required to report,30 and a few jurisdictions expressly require
clergy to report.31 Finally, many statutes, in addition to or instead of listing those persons required to report, simply impose
the duty to report on "any person" who suspects child abuse. 32
2.

Reportable Conditions

Statutory definitions of reportable abuse vary.33 All definitions include physical abuse 34 and most include neglect, mental
vate institution, school, facility, or agency, he shall immediately notify
the individual in charge of the institution, school, facility, or agency,
or his designated agent, who also becomes responsible to report or
cause a report to be made. Nothing in this section is intended to relieve individuals of their obligation to report on their own behalf, unless a report has already been made to the best of the individual's
belief.
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-3(b) (Burns 1980).
25. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 22.
26. The particular medical practitioners required to report can include
dentists, residents, interns, surgeons, osteopaths, chiropractors, nurses, and
hospital personnel. Id at 24-27.
27. Id at 23.
28. Id. at 26-27.
29. Id In addition, some state statutes contain unique provisions, such as
a new amendment to California's statute that requires reports from commercial film processors. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(c) (West Supp. 1987).
30. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-25.
31. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-38(b) (1985) ("clergyman"); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-353, -23-9 (1981 & Supp. 1986) ("minister"); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 432B.220(2)(d) (1985) ("clergyman . . . unless he has acquired the
knowledge of the abuse or neglect from the offender during a confession");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (Supp. 1986) ("priest, minister, or rabbi").
Missouri deleted "minister" from its list in 1982. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115
note (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1986).
32. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-25, 69.
33. Id. at 17-22.
34. See id. Many states' child abuse statutes provide that abuse or neglect
does not include failure to provide a child with medical treatment if the parents' religion calls for spiritual rather than medical treatment. Some states,
however, limit this exception to treatment by Christian Science practitioners
or to treatment in accordance with the tenets of a recognized church or denomination. See id. at 42.43. Nevertheless, if the lack of medical treatment
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or emotional abuse, and sexual abuse or exploitation. 3 5 The reporter is not required to know that abuse has occurred; all that
is required is a belief or a reasonable suspicion that a child has
36
been abused.
seriously threatens the child's life or health, a state may have authority to intervene and provide needed medical care. See id. at 43.
35. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 17-22, 66-68, 105-15.
36. Id at 18. At one time, two states, Maine and Maryland, provided express exceptions to their duty to report. These exceptions, although now deleted in both states, are nevertheless instructive. Maryland's statute stated
that a report would not be required if
[e]fforts are being made or will be made to alleviate the conditions or
circumstances which may cause the child to be considered a neglected
child .. .[or where] . ..reporting would inhibit the child, parent,
guardian, or custodian from seeking assistance in the future and
thereby be detrimental to the child's welfare.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 6(c) (1978) (deleted in 1983) (emphasis added).
Similarly, Maine's statute once stated:
A person shall not be required to report when the factual basis for
knowing or suspecting abuse or neglect comes from treatment of a
person responsible for the child, the treatment was sought by that
person for a problem of abuse or neglect and there is little threat of
serious harm to the child.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011(1)(c) (1980) (deleted in 1985).
Both states' exceptions seemed to acknowledge that, at least when the
child was not threatened with immediate serious harm, the child's long-range
best interests might be served better by continued help for the caretaker than
by reporting the abuse to a state agency. The suggestion was that "blowing the
whistle" might have ended a therapy that promised to alleviate the problem,
or to do at least as much good as would follow from a state investigation.
Significantly, both statutes limited their exceptions to situations where
the person seeking treatment or help was the child's caretaker. See ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011(1)(c) (1980) (deleted in 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art.
72A, § 6(c) (1978) (deleted in 1983). In other words, treatment for a noncaretaker abuser was not accorded the same deference as treatment for a caretaker abuser. If this distinction was deliberate, it would seem to indicate that
these exceptions to the reporting requirement did not rest primarily on a desire to help the abuser, but instead rested on the benefit to the child that
might result from help for the caretaker. The child's welfare was not being
subordinated to the welfare of the abuser; rather, the child's welfare itself was
thought, at least in some cases, to be served better by private therapies than by
state intervention. Such exceptions seem to have rested, at least partly, on a
desire to preserve the family.
Maryland has deleted its statutory exception, see M.D. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. §§ 5-903, 5-904 (1984 & Supp. 1986), and Maine has replaced its exception
with a longer provision that addresses similar concerns in a very different
manner, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011(1)(A) (Supp. 1986). Maine's
new provision, unlike its former one, is limited to "licensed mental health professionals," a term defined to include psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, licensed clinical social workers, and certified social workers. ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 4002(6)(A) (Supp. 1986). The provision concerns mental health
professionals who have reason to suspect that their patient either has abused
or is likely to abuse a child. Id. § 4011(1)(A). This new provision does not, as

1987]

CLERGY PRIVILEGE

Similarly, the specific information required of the reporter
varies from state to state.37 Typically, the statutes require information sufficient to identify the child, the child's parent or
guardian and the suspected abuser as well as information concerning the nature and extent of the harm suffered by the
child. 38 The reporter is usually required to describe and make
available evidence such as photographs and x-rays and to report
any other action the reporter has taken in the matter. For example, the reporter may be required to divulge whether the
did the former statute, exempt such a professional from reporting, but instead
gives that professional a right to participate in the decision as to how the report shall be pursued and what should be done regarding treatment and prosecution of the abuser. The state must consult with the mental health
professional and attempt to reach agreement as to how the report should be
pursued. If agreement is not reached, the professional may request a meeting.
The meeting must include the professional, a representative from the state department of human services, another mental health professional with expertise in child abuse, and, unless prosecution is unlikely, a representative of the
district attorney's office. At the meeting, these persons should make recommendations concerning treatment and prosecution of the person responsible
for the abuse. In making their recommendations, licensed mental health professionals are statutorily directed to "take into account" the nature and extent
of the abuse, the safety of the child and of the community, the needs of the
child and other family members for treatment, and the willingness of the
abuser to undergo treatment. I&L
Thus, Maine's new statute, like its former one, does acknowledge a counselor's legitimate professional concern about the effect of a report on his client's continued therapy. Maine's new approach to this concern, however,
differs from its former approach in significant ways. First, the new approach
eliminates the professional's decision to report-he or she must report. Id.
§ 4011(1) (A). The task of balancing continued treatment for the abuser
against official state intervention is, under the new approach, reassigned from
the professional alone to the state with the participationof the professional.
Id. § 4011(1)(A)(a-c). Also, the new approach extends to cases in which the
person being treated is not the child's caretaker. I& § 4011(1)(d). Finally, the
new approach is limited to cases of treatment by state-licensed professionals.
I& § 4011(1)(A). It does not acknowledge similar professional concerns by
nonlicensed professionals, such as clergy.
A cleric might determine that reporting a case of suspected abuse will do
more harm than good because counseling has already begun or because of
other promising but fragile efforts already underway to alleviate the problem.
Since the elimination of express statutory exceptions to accommodate such
concerns in Maine and Maryland, the cleric has no statutory excuse for failing
to report in those states. For additional discussion of the deleted Maine and
Maryland statutes, see infra text accompanying notes 501-03.
37. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 48. Statutes also vary as to whether the
report must be oral, written, or both and as to the public agencies or officials
to whom the report should be made. Typical provisions call for reports to local law enforcement officials, to local welfare units, or, in the case of a child's
death, to the coroner or district attorney. See id. at 45-50.
38. Id at 48.
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child has been removed from the home or whether anyone else
has been notified. 3 9
3. Reporter's Immunity
To protect reporters, all states allow for anonymous reporting.40 In addition, every state specifically provides immunity
for the reporter from criminal and civil liability resulting from
the report.41 Most states also extend the reporter's immunity
to liability for participation in later judicial proceedings on the
same matter.42 Although the reporter's good faith is a prerequisite to immunity in most jurisdictions,43 good faith is difficult to disprove and therefore is presumed in many states.44
4. Penalties for Failure to Report
The duty to report is indeed a duty,45 backed by criminal
penalties in most jurisdictions and additional civil liability in
some.4 6 Failure to report is usually a misdemeanor requiring a
willful or knowing failure to report 47 and is usually accompanied by the criminal penalties of a fine or a few days to a year
in jail. 48 Furthermore, a few states expressly provide a civil
cause of action for a child who is injured by abuse against the
person who failed to make a required report that might have
39. See id. at 35-38 (includes tables indicating which statutes authorize the
taking of x-rays and photographs and which authorize those things to be done
at public expense). Some persons may be required to take photographs or xrays or to detain the child in temporary custody. See id. at 38; N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 416 (McKinney 1983) (institutional employees shall cause photos to be

taken).
40. Mawdsley & Permuth, supra note 11, at 118.
41. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 31-35.
42. See id. In addition, many statutes provide immunity for temporary removal of a child from unsafe circumstances, see id. at 35, and some statutes
provide immunity for the taking of photographs or x-rays. See id. at 32-33, 3538.
43. See id. at 32-35.
44. See id.; Fraser, supra note 11, at 664.
45. The language of almost all statutes is "shall report."
46. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 43-45; cf. 60 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 51
(1975) (statute stating "shall make a report" is mandatory despite absence of
penalties for failure to report).
47. I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 44. "The requirement of proving a willful
failure to report beyond a reasonable doubt makes the likelihood of a successful prosecution very unlikely. Despite the widespread provision for penalties,
there are no reported cases of a criminal prosecution for failure to report an
abused or neglected child." Id.
48. Id
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49
led to prevention of that abuse.

5.

Statutory Abrogation of Privileges
Finally, all but six reporting statutes contain a provision

49. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-816 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10104(4) (1978 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE § 232.75 (1984); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.633 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 420 (McKinney

1983).
Even without an express provision for civil liability, a person who fails to
report might be liable in a civil action on behalf of persons injured as a result
of the failure to report. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 400, 551 P.2d 389,
394, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1976) (allowing a cause of action against a physician
for negligent failure to diagnose and report a case of battered child syndrome).
Another case against a doctor for failure to report child abuse was settled
before trial. See John, supra note 11, § 24. In the absence of an express statutory cause of action, the action might be brought for malpractice or negligence,
and the reporter's duty might be established by reference to the statutory
mandate, to the "reasonable person," or to both. See Isaacson, Child Abuse ReportingStatutes: The Casefor Holding PhysiciansCivilly Liablefor Failingto
Repor 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 743, 747-50 (1975) (discussing California tort law
approach to establishing standard of conduct); Note, Civil Liability for
Teacher's Negligent Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L.
REV. 183, 191-207 (1981) (discussing theories of civil liability); Note, Physician's
Liabilityfor Failure to Diagnose and Report Child Abuse, 23 WAYNE L. REV.
1187 (1977) (analyzing Landeros v. Flood); Comment, Civil Liabilityfor Failing to Report Child Abuse, 1977 DFT. C.L. REV. 135, 147-50 (discussing common
law and statutory duties to report); Comment, Torts: The Battered Child-A
Doctor's Civil Liability For Failure to Diagnose and Report 16 WASHBURN
L.J. 543, 546-48 (1977) (analyzing the claims of negligence and failure to comply with statutory reporting requirements in Landeros v. Flood).
A successful negligence or malpractice action against a cleric, however, is
unlikely. Despite much ballyhoo over the prospect of clergy malpractice litigation, clergy have not been held liable except in cases of flagrant misconduct.
One reason is the difficulty of determining an appropriate standard of care
without unconstitutional entanglement with religion. See generally Nally v.
Grace Community Church of the Valley, 157 Cal. App. 3d 912 (reversed and
deleted by order of California Supreme Court), 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 307-08
(1984) (recognizing action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for
counseling by clergyman and reasoning that freedom of clergy to act is not absolute); Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 47, 62-64 (1981) (setting a standard duty of
competence for the clergy); Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications
of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163, 176-84 (1981) ("Judicial review of
counseling by clergymen will inevitably draw the courts into the dangerous
ground of evaluating the truth or error of the counseling given."); Comment,
Made Out of Whole Cloth? A ConstitutionalAnalysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concep 19 CAL. W.L. REV. 507, 530-42 (1983) (judicial application of standard of care for clergy would not survive establishment clause and free
exercise clause tests); Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good
Samaritanor a Blessing in Disguise 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 223-35 (1985)
(discussing constitutional impediments to clergy malpractice actions) [hereinafter Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News].
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abrogating some privileges in the context of child abuse. 50 Most
statutes specifically abrogate the physician-patient and the husband-wife privileges. 51 A few states specifically abrogate privileges for psychotherapists, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses,
social workers, or counselors. 52 Many statutes abrogate certain
of these privileges by name and include all other "similar" privileges or "all professional privileges" except, interestingly, the
attorney-client privilege. 53 Finally, four statutes expressly abrogate the clergy privilege in the context of child abuse.M
On the other hand, some statutes expressly reaffirm particular privileges in the face of reporting requirements. Almost always, it is the attorney-client privilege that is preserved,
although three statutes do specifically reaffirm the clergy
55
privilege.
II.

THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE

Almost every jurisdiction recognizes some form of clergy
evidentiary privilege, usually by statute. 56 This section surveys
50.
51.
52.
53.
worthy

See I. SLOAN, supra'note 11, at 40-41 (table for all jurisdictions).
See id. at 40-41, 92-93.
See i&. at 38-41.
See id The express retention of the attorney-client privilege is notein light of the frequently conceded weakness of its rationale. See S.

STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.01 (1983) (although refer-

ences to this book are referred to throughout this Article as S. STONE & R.
LIEBMANN, the authors of TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES wish to acknowledge that
chapter 6, on clergy privilege, was authored by Michael G. Plantamura); 8 J.

WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See infra text accompanying note 472.
54. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-815 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 16-1620 (Supp.
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(F) (West 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.44.060(3) (1985).
55. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
56. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233
(1982) (civil); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(3) (1986) (criminal); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 28-1001, Rule 505 (1979); CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 912, 917, 1030-1034 (West
1966 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-146(b) (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981); FLA. STAT. § 90.505 (1985);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1986);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5
(Burns 1986); IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-429 (1983); KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 15:477-:478 (West 1981) (criminal) & LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
13:3734.1 (West Supp. 1986) (civil); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111
(1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (Law. Co-op. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN. §§ 600.2156 (West 1986) (rules of evidence) 767.5a (criminal); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02(1)(c) (1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1986); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 491.060(4) (1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-801 to -804 (1986); NEB. REV.
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these laws generally to provide background on the nature of
the clergy privilege and specifically to surface those features
likely to bring the privilege into collision with child abuse re57
porting requirements.
A.

HISTORY OF THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE 58

The clergy privilege originated in the seal of confession of
the Roman Catholic church. 59 For centuries, the Catholic seal
of confession has protected as inviolably secret the contents of a
penitent's auricular confession to a priest.60 Although historians have not located a precise origin for the seal, they have
STAT. § 27-506 (1985) (clergy generally); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 330-A:19 (certified pastoral counselors), 516.35 (privilege
for clergy generally) (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp.
1986) N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-53.2 (1986); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (Anderson Supp. 1985);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2505 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1985); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1985); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 19-13-16 to 18 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3)
(Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400
(1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060(3) (1985 & Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE
§ 48-2-10a (1986) (applies only to divorce); WIs. STAT. § 905.06 (1979-1980);
WYO. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977); ALASKA R. EvI. 506; DEL. R. EVID. 505; ME. R.
EvID. 505; N.J. R. EvID. 29; N.M. R. EViD. 506; N.D. R. EVID. 505; TEX. R. CRIM.
EVID. 505; UTAH R. EVID. 29; P.R. R. EvID. 28; V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 857
(1967).
57. For recent and thorough discussions of the clergy privilege, see S.
STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, at 359-76 (1983 & Supp. 1985); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5; Yellin, The History and CurrentStatus of the
C7ergy-PenitentPrivilege,23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983). See also Q. DONOGHUE & L. SHAPIRO, BLESS ME, FATHER, FOR I HAVE SINNED (1984) (popular
recent work on the Roman Catholic view of confession); see generally J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, §§ 2394-2396 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 56-80 (1963)
(discussing the common-law origins of the privilege and the scope of privilege
statutes); Smith, The Pastoron the Witness Stand: Toward A Religious Privilege in the Courts, 29 CATH. LAW. 1 (1984) (including chart of all statutes and
advocating a broad clergy privilege to facilitate pastoral counseling).
58. For a more detailed history of the clergy privilege, see W. TIEMANN &
J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 33-98; J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2394; Callahan,
Historical Inquiry into the Priest-PenitentPrivilege, 36 JURIST 328 (1976);
Yellin, supra note 57, at 96-108. See also Q. DONOGHUE & L. SHAPIRO, supra
note 57.
59. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.01.
60. "The sacramental seal is inviolable. Accordingly, it is absolutely
wrong for a confessor in any way to betray the penitent, for any reason whatsoever, whether by word or in any other fashion." THE CODE OF CANON LAW
IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION Canon 983 (Collins, London 1983). "The confessor is
wholly forbidden to use knowledge acquired in confession to the detriment of
the penitent, even when all danger of disclosure is excluded." Id. Canon 984.
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found references to the practice of secrecy from early records
of the Christian church. 61 In the fifth century, Pope Leo I acknowledged an already longstanding practice of secret confession,62 and in the ninth century, church law imposed
punishment on any priest who violated the seal.63 Historians
have also found frequent and specific references to the seal
64
from the twelfth century onward.
It is fairly certain that pre-Reformation English law recognized the secrecy of confession and did not require a priest to
violate the seal. 65 Many judges were clergymen, and the common law of England was strongly influenced by the law of the
church. 66 There is strong evidence that, after the Norman Conquest in 1066, English courts recognized a clergy privilege based
on the seal.67 With the English Reformation in the sixteenth
century, however, the basis for the clergy privilege began to
founder. For a time, the Anglican church, which had replaced
the Roman Catholic church as the established church of England, continued the practice of confession and the requirement
of secrecy. 68 As the new church discarded various "Romish"
practices, however, emphasis on the confessional dwindled and
69
confession to a cleric became optional in the Anglican church.
The law then ceased to recognize the clergy privilege.7 0 Some
historians place the termination of the privilege at the time of
See Regan & Macartney, Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAW. 3, 4-12 (1956) (elaborating on Roman Catholic position).
61. See Yellin, supra note 57, at 97-98.
62. W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 34-35.
63. Id. at 36.
64. Id. at 36-47.
65. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.01; W. TIEMANN & J.
BUSH, supra note 5, at 39-41; Yellin, supra note 57, at 96-101.
66. See F. POLLOCK & F. W. MAITLAND, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 13235 (2d ed. 1898); see also W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 47; Yellin,
supra note 57, at 96-101.
67. W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 39-47. Apparently, the law
after the Norman Invasion recognized an exception to the privilege for cases of
treason. Id. at 47. But see Garnet's Case, 2 Howell's State Trials 218, 242
(1606). In Garnet's Case, Father Garnet was found guilty, probably of misprision or treason, for refusing to divulge anything concerning his knowledge of
the failed Gunpowder Plot, a plot to assassinate King James I. Yellin, supra
note 57, at 99-101. The case can be read either as denying the existence of the
privilege or as applying an exception for treason. Id.
68. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 49-53; Yellin, supra note
57, at 101.
69. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 49-53; Yellin, supra note
57, at 102.
70. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.01; W. TIEMANN & J.
BUSH, supra note 5, at 53-54; Yellin, supra note 57, at 103.
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the English Reformation.7 1 Wigmore thought, however, that
the privilege survived until the Restoration. 72 In either case, a
line of English cases since the seventeenth century clearly refuses to recognize a clergy privilege. 73 Blackstone's Commentaries, written just before the American Revolution,7 4 mention no
such privilege. Thus, a clergy privilege was not part of the common law imported into this country, and most American courts
and commentators have announced that the privilege, if it ex75
ists, must rest on statute.
Interestingly, however, the first recorded case in this country addressing the issue of clergy privilege recognized such a
privilege based on neither common law nor statute, but on constitutional principles of freedom of religion. People v. Phillips,
decided by the New York Court of General Session in 1813, involved a Roman Catholic priest who had returned stolen goods
to their owner but then refused to testify to a grand jury as to
who had delivered those goods to him.76 The priest maintained
his refusal to testify at the criminal trial of the persons suspected of trafficking in the stolen goods. The priest rested his
objection on his church's seal of confession and the court in
Phillips upheld his right not to testify. 77 The court found a
privilege rooted in the priest's constitutional right, under New
78
York's constitution, to exercise freely his religion.
71. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 53-54; Yellin, supra note
57, at 102.
72. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2394.
73. See W. TIELMNN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 120-22; J. WIGMORE, supra
note 53, § 2394; Yellin, supra note 57, at 103.
74. W. BLACKSTONE, CoiENTARmEs (first edition published in 1765-1769).
75. See, e.g., Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d
413, 415 (4th Cir. 1984); Killingsworth v. Killingsworth, 283 Ala. 345, 351-52,
217 So. 2d 57, 63 (1968); Rancourt v. Waterville Urban Renewal Auth., 223
A.2d 303, 304 (Me. 1966); In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 603, 237 N.W. 589, 590
(1931); State v. Morehous, 97 N.J.L. 285, 295, 117 A. 296, 300 (1922); Keenan v.
Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); S. STONE & R. LiEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.02;
J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2394; Reese, supra note 57, at 56.
76. People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813) was never officially published. The records of a participating attorney are, however, reprinted in
Note, Privileged Communicationsto Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199 (1955), and
abstracted in 1 WESTERN L.J. 109 (1843). The abstract contains some material
not found in the reprint. The original records are available at the Court of
General Sessions of the County of New York.
77. See Note, supra note 76, at 201.
78. Id. at 209. New York's constitution provided that "'the free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this state, to all mankind.'" Id. at 207 (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII).
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Phillipsinvolved a Roman Catholic priest, and whether the
Phillips court would have extended the same privilege to nonCatholic clerics was unclear. 7 9 Four years after Phillips,in People v. Smith, another New York court found that no privilege
existed for a Protestant minister.80 The court in Smith failed
to clarify, however, whether its distinction was based on the
Catholic church's requirement of confession or its requirement
of secrecy.8 ' In any event, in 1828 the New York legislature,
cutting off this promising judicial evolution of a constitutional
doctrine of privilege, passed the nation's first statute recognizing the clergy privilege.8 2 The statute extended the privilege to
a "minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever" as to confessions "enjoined by the rules [or] practice of
such denomination."8 3 Following New York's lead, other states
passed similar statutes or court rules recognizing some version
84
of a clergy privilege.
In 1942, the American Law Institute adopted its Model
Code of Evidence. Rule 219 provided for a narrow "priest-penitent" privilege.8 5 The Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted in
79. Although the case's editor volunteered his opinion that the privilege
recognized in Phillips was confined to Catholic priests, see 1 WESTERN L.J.
supra note 76, at 113 (case abstract), the court did not expressly so limit its
holding. The court did, however, emphasize that for Roman Catholics, unlike
Protestants, penance is a sacrament and that failure to recognize the seal of
confession would "annihilate" an important branch of the Catholic religion.
See Note, supra note 76, at 207.
80. People v. Smith, 2 City Hall Rec. (Rogers) 77 (N.Y. 1817), unofficially
reported in Note, supra note 76, at 209.
81. Perhaps another material factual distinction, although one not noted
in Smith, is that the priest in Phillips had steadfastly refused to testify, see
Note, supra note 76, at 199-200; 1 WESTERN L.J., supra note 76, at 109-10,
whereas the minister in Smith expressed willingness to disclose if the court
allowed him. See Note, supra note 76, at 210-11.
82. "No minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination whatsoever,
shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his professional
character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of such
denomination." Note, supra note 76, at 213 (quoting N.Y. REV. STAT. Pt. 3, ch.
7, tit. 3, § 72 (1828)).
83. Id.
84. Reese, supra note 57, at 57.
85. Priest-Penitent Privilege; Definitions; Penitential Communications:
(1) As used in this Rule,
(a) "priest" means a priest, clergyman, minister of the gospel or
other officer of a church or of a religious denomination or organization, who in the course of its discipline or practice is authorized or accustomed to hear, and has a duty to keep secret, penitential
communications made by members of his church, denomination or organization;
(b) "penitent" means a member of a church or religious denomi-
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1953, incorporated the same provision.8 6 In 1974, however, the
National Commissioners of Uniform State Laws promulgated
new Uniform Rules of Evidence, including Rule 505, which contains a broader statement of privilege for confidential commu87
nications to clergy.
The federal government's recognition of a clergy privilege
has evolved slowly.8 8 As early as 1875, the Supreme Court acknowledged the privilege in dictum.8 9 Much later, in a concurring opinion from the District of Columbia Circuit in 1958,
Judge Fahy recognized a privilege as a matter of federal common law.90 In 1972, the Supreme Court approved, by an eightto-one vote, a version of the Federal Rules of Evidence that included thirteen specific rules regarding evidentiary privileges. 9 '
Among them was proposed Rule 506, a specific version of the
clergy privilege almost identical to Rule 505 of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence. 9 2 Congress, however, failed to enact the
nation or organization who has made a penitential communication to
a priest thereof;
(c) "penitential communication" means a confession of culpable
conduct made secretly and in confidence by a penitent to a priest in
the course of the discipline or practice of the church or religious denomination or organization of which the penitent is a member.
(2) A person, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent a witness from disclosing, a communication if he
claims the privilege and the judge finds that
(a) the communication was a penitential communication, and
(b) the witness is the penitent or the priest, and
(c) the claimant is the penitent, or the priest is making the
claim on behalf of an absent penitent.
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 219 (1942).
86. UNIF. R. EvID. 29 (1953) (now superseded). See W. TIEMANN & J.
BUSH, supra note 5, at 152; Reese, supra note 57, at 63.
87. UNIF. R. EVID. 505 (1974). Several states have adopted this version of
the clergy privilege. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
88. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMIAN, supra note 53, § 6.04.
89. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (dictum).
90. See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 276-81 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(Fahy, J., concurring) (admissibility of minister's testimony as to criminal defendant's confession of abusing her children). Judge Fahy based this recognition on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which allowed
federal courts to find privileges based on "the principles of the common law as
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (amended Nov. 20, 1972, effective 180
days after Jan. 2, 1975).
91. See FED. R. EVID. 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-61 (1972) (proposed Nov.
20, 1972, effective July 1, 1973).
92. Compare FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247-49 (1972) (proposed
Nov. 20, 1972, effective July 1, 1973) with infra text accompanying note 101.
The proposed federal rule replaced the last sentence of UNIF. R. EvID. 505
with the following- "The clergyman may claim the privilege on behalf of the
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specific rules of privilege, opting instead for the general and
flexible Rule 501.93 Congress preferred Rule 501 expressly be94
cause it enabled the rules of privilege to evolve case by case.
Nevertheless, proposed Rule 506, although never adopted, has
been considered a guiding formulation of the privilege and a
95
source of federal common law.

B.

CURRENT DEFINITION OF THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE

Today almost every jurisdiction recognizes some form of
clergy privilege. 96 The existence and scope of the privilege are
usually determined by statutes and by the few cases interpreting those statutes. The statutes, however, differ markedly from
state to state, so that there is no typical clergy privilege statute.
Colorado's, for example, is brief and narrow and limits the privilege to a clergyman or priest and to confessions.9 7 Conversely,
Maryland's statute is brief but broad, providing that a cleric in
an established church cannot be compelled to disclose any information told to him in confidence by a person seeking spiriperson. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary." FED. R. EVID. 506, 56 F.R.D. 183, 247 (1972) (proposed Nov. 20, 1972,
effective July 1, 1973).
93. The Federal Rules of Evidence state:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States
or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with
State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501. See Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, 1933-34 (1975) (setting
out FED. R. EVID. 501).
94. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980); Eckmann v.
Board of Educ. of Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17, 106 F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo.
1985); E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.1 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MCCORMICK].
95. See, e.g., In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (decided
before proposed rules rejected) (extending privilege to nonclergy draft counselors working under minister's direction). Cf Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM, 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978) (looking to proposed rules as support for
finding attorney-client privilege).
96. See supra note 56.
97. "A clergyman or priest shall not be examined without the consent of
the person making the confession as to any confession made to him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1973).
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tual solace.9 8 Indiana's brief statute bluntly declares clergy
incompetent as witnesses "as to confessions or admissions made
to them in [the] course of discipline enjoined by their respective
churches." 99 By contrast, the Kansas statute expends over 360
words detailing who counts as clergy, who counts as a penitent,
and what communications are privileged.10 0 There also are several states that base their statutes largely on Rule 505 of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence. 101
Federal courts also recognize a clergy privilege, but by
common law rather than by specific statute. Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides that in federal civil actions,
when an element of a claim or defense is determined by state
law, the existence and scope of a privilege shall be determined
by applicable state law.10 2 Rule 501 further provides that when
federal law is to be applied, courts should interpret that law "in
light of reason and experience.' 0 3 Reason and experience ap98. "A minister of the gospel, clergyman, or priest of an established
church of any denomination may not be compelled to testify on any matter in

relation to any confession or communication made to him in confidence by a
person seeking his spiritual advice or consolation." MD.CTS. & JuD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984).

99.
100.

IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986).
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983).

101. Rule 505 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence addresses religious privilege and reads:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science Practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as
spiritual advisor.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by
the person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The person who was the clergyman at the
time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim
the privilege but only on behalf of the communicant.
UNIF. R. Evin. 505 (1974). For examples of states following this format, see
ARK. STAT. ANI. § 28-1001 Rule 505 (1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp.
1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2505 (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 19-13-16 to -18 (1979); Wis. STAT. § 905.06 (19791980);ME. R. EviD. 505; N.M. R. EviD. 506.
102. FED. R. EviD. 501.
103. Id.
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pear to have led federal courts to recognize a clergy privilege.1 0 4
Thus, a federal civil court will look either to state law that almost always has a clergy privilege statute, or to federal common law that also recognizes the privilege. 10 5
These various versions of the clergy privilege make generalizations about the privilege difficult. Nevertheless, a brief
survey of the law of clergy privilege is necessary to show how
the privilege might conflict with child abuse reporting
requirements.
1.

Who is a Cleric

The statutes vary widely in their designations of those
clergy eligible to claim the privilege. 0 6 By label or by description, the statutes prescribe or imply the type of organization
with which the cleric must be affiliated, the cleric's office
within the qualifying organization, and the cleric's role at the
time entrusted with the confidential communication. The stat0 7
utes range from the simple and narrow mention of a "priest"'
or "priest or minister of the gospel"' 0 8 to lengthy definitional
sections prescribing the credentials, duties, and affiliation of eli104. See Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (first federal acknowledgment) (dictum); Eckmann v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorn School
Dist. No. 17, 106 F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Mullen v. United States, 263
F.2d 275, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring); In re Verplank, 329 F.
Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
105. See also MILITARY R. EvID. 503 (recognizing a version of clergy privilege for courts-martial); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 161-65 (discussing military version).
106. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMANN, supra note 53, §§ 6.05-.06; Reese, supra
note 57, at 64-66; Yellin, supra note 57, at 114-21. One court interpreting a
privilege statute has stated:
What is a "minister of the Gospel" within the meaning of this [Iowa's]
statute? The law as such sets up no standard or criterion. That question is left wholly to the recognition of the "denomination." The
word "minister," which in its original sense meant a mere servant, has
grown in many directions and into much dignity. Few English words
have a more varied meaning. In the religious world, it is often, if not
generally, used as referring to a pastor of the church and a preacher
of the Gospel. This meaning, however, is not applicable to all Christian denominations. Some of them have no pastors and recognize no
one as a minister in that sense, and yet all denominations recognize
the spiritual authority of the church, and provide a source of spiritual
advice and discipline.
Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 346-47, 161 N.W. 290, 292 (1917).
107. E.g., V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 857 (1967).
108. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973) ("priest or minister of the
gospel"). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Supp. 1986) (privilege extended to
Protestant ministers, Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox priests, Jewish
rabbis, and Christian or Jewish ministers "by whatever name called").

CLERGY PRIVILEGE
gible clerics.10 9 Many statutes refer simply to "a clergyman or
priest,"' 1 0 while other statutes include, rather vaguely, "religious practitioners." '' Another typical provision defines "clergyman" as "a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian
Science Practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization, or an individual reasonably believed so to be by
the person consulting him."' 1 2 Finally, a few statutes, following
Rule 505 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, include a person
reasonably believed to be a cleric by the person confiding in
him.1 13

Most statutes at least imply that the cleric must be officially affiliated with some religious organization. The very
terms "priest," "minister," and "cleric" arguably imply such
an affiliation. A few statutes seek to assure the cleric's affiliation with a religious organization by requiring that the cleric
109. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983) (defining "duly ordained minister
of religion" in 90 words and "regular minister of religion" in 50 words).
110. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-90-107(c) (1973); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT.
§ 1-12-101(a)(ii) (1977).
111. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1030 (West 1966); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1986) ("clergyman ... or practitioner authorized to
perform similar functions").
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2505(A)(1)
(1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 19-13-16(1) (1979); Wis. STAT. § 905.06
(1979-1980); ARK. R. EviD. 505(a)(1) (1979); ME. R. EVID.505(a)(1). This provision is based on UNIF. R. EviD. 505(a)(1) (1974). In addition, approximately
half the statutes specifically include rabbis. W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra
note 5, at 85-86. Approximately one-fourth of the statutes mention Christian
Science practitioners. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.05, at 364.
Several statutes exclude part-time, lay, or self-appointed ministers. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 90.505 (1985) (1976 law revision council note subsection 1 stating
clergy do not include "self-denominated" ministers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429
(1983) ("does not include a person who irregularly or incidentally preaches [or]
who does not regularly, as a vocation, teach and preach"); see also ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-166 (1986) ("limited to any person who regularly, as a vocation, devotes
a substantial portion of his time and abilities to the service of his respective
church or religious organization"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (1985) ("who is
settled in the work of the ministry"); see infra notes 114-20 and accompanying
text. The application of such statutes to Jehovah's Witnesses, who consider
each member a minister, is unclear. For criticism of these limitations, see Yellin, supra note 57, at 152-54 (arguing that narrow definitions exclude worthy
spiritual counselors). As a further limitation, two statutes impose a minimum
age requirement. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(a)(1) (1980) (over 18); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984) (over 18).
113. See ARK.STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 Rule 505 (1979); NEB.REV. STAT. § 27506 (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2505 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. §§ 1913-16 to -18 (1979); WIS. STAT. § 905.06 (1979-1980); ME. R. EvID. 505; N.M. R.
EvID. 506.
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4

or "accredited

a church body.

Several statutes seem to restrict the type of religious organization, albeit vaguely, by attaching such adjectives as
"bona fide,"20 7 "established," 1 1 "organized,"' 19 or "legally
1
cognizable.
Almost all statutes expressly require the communication to
114.

E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(a)(1) (1986).

E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (1985).
116. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (Anderson Supp. 1985).
117. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(a)(1) (1986).
118. E.g., id.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1986); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984); N.C. GEN. STAT.
115.

§ 8-53.2 (1986). "Established" could not, of course, mean nationally favored or
sponsored. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishment clause); infra text accompanying notes 283-328.
119. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986).
120. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(c) (Anderson Supp. 1985). See KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1983) ("established on the basis of a community of faith
and belief, doctrines and practices of a religious character"); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 24-1-206(a)(1) (1980) ("religious organization or denomination usually referred to as a church"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984) (same as TENN. CODE
ANN.).

Although many of these statutory classifications of religious personnel are
of dubious merit and questionable constitutionality, see infra text accompanying notes 295-305, few cases test the boundaries of the definitions of clergy. A
smattering of cases deal with the application of the privilege to various lay officials. See In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (religious social
worker not covered); Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F. Supp. 621, 627-28 (N.D. Iowa
1963), appeal dismissed, 323 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1963) (church tribunal communications covered); People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 426-27, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (ethics officer in Church of Scientology not
covered); Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201, 203-04 (1881) (elder and deacon not covered); Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 346-51, 161 N.W. 290, 292-93 (1917)
(ruling Presbyterian elders are ministers if the church so describes them and
confidential communications are privileged). See also W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH,
supra note 5, at 194-97 (privilege for growing lay counseling movement is
doubtful); Note, Catholic Sisters,Irregularly OrdainedWomen and the ClergyPenitent Privilege,9 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 523, 546-47 (1976) (arguing that spiritual counseling by a Roman Catholic nun should be protected under California
rules of evidence). Cf. Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. 1981)
(privilege not extended to nun acting as hospital administrator at time of communication). CompareIn re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 384-87, 279 A.2d 889,
891-93 (privilege not extended to Roman Catholic sister in a teaching order),
cert. denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1971) with Eckmann v. Board of Educ.
of Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17, 106 F.R.D. 70, 72-73 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (extending privilege to nun acting as "spiritual director" to confider). See also In
re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (extending privilege to nonclergy draft counselors working under minister's direction); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 13-1-22 (Supp. 1986) (privilege includes cleric's secretary, stenographer, or
clerk).

CLERGY PRIVILEGE
be confided to the cleric in his professional capacity.121 A few
statutes further specify the nature of a cleric's professional capacity, usually in terms of his capacity as spiritual advisor or
consoler. 2 2 Thus, communications are not privileged if made
to a cleric who, at the time, is acting only as friend, 23 business
associate, 24 public official, 125 or fortuitous bystander. 126 In
most of these cases, the line is easily drawn between the troubled soul and the manipulator of the privilege, and in most
cases several factors combine to place the communication
outside the ambit of the privilege. In other cases, however,
drawing the line threatens to entangle the state in the properly
religious matter of defining a cleric's professional role or delimiting the cleric's ministry. These cases raise the questions
whether it is a cleric's function to provide marriage counseling,1 27 draft counseling, 128 or moral support for a political pro121.
S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.11, at 372; Yellin, supra
note 57, at 121.
122. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(b) (1986) ("(1) to make a confession, (2) to
seek spiritual counsel or comfort, or (3) to enlist help or advice in connection
with a marital problem"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-477 (West 1981) ("seeking
his spiritual advice or consolation"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986) ("professional capacity as a spiritual advisor, confessor, counselor or comforter");
ME. R. EVID. 505(b) ("professional character as spiritual advisor").
123. See Burger v. State, 238 Ga.171, 172, 231 S.E.2d 769, 771 (1977) (statement to cleric, a "friend and frequent companion," of intent to kill wife and
her lover not privileged); Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628, 633
(Ky.) (no privilege for comments to a minister as a friend), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 868 (1978); Blossi v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 144 Iowa 697, 713, 123 N.W. 360,
367 (1909) (minister acting "as a friend and interpreter").
124. See United States v. Gordon, 493 F. Supp. 822, 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(business conversations with priest on leave from church not privileged), affd,
655 F.2d 478, 486 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Fuhrer, 100 Misc. 2d 315, 320-22, 419
N.Y.S.2d 426, 430-32 (1979) (privilege not applicable to questions to rabbi concerning drawing of checks while administrative employee of Yeshiva); Masquat v. Maguire, 638 P.2d 1105, 1106 (Okla. 1981) (no privilege for
communications between patient and Catholic nun contacted in capacity as
hospital administrator).
125. See Partridge v. Partridge, 220 Mo. 321, 325, 119 S.W. 415, 416 (1909)
(no privilege for priest when working as a notary public); Keenan v. Gigante,
47 N.Y.2d 160, 167, 390 N.E.2d 1151, 1154, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 230 (no privilege for
priest and city councilman who refused to testify on jail problems), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979); Fahlfeder v. Commonwealth, 80 Pa. Commw. 86, 8990, 470 A.2d 1130, 1132-33 (1984) (no privilege for clergy in capacity as volunteer parole supervisor).
126. See State v. Berry, 324 So. 2d 822, 829-29 (La. 1975) (no privilege for
admissions made to minister present when defendant came to pawn a watch
because primary purpose of visit not to seek spiritual advice), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 954 (1976).
127. See Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 94, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79
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test.' 29 In such sensitive and controversial contexts, the
religious community, sensing encroachment on its free exercise
of religion, bristles at the state's attempts to define ministerial
1 30
roles.
2.

Who is a "Confider"

Most statutes do not specify the person whose confidential
communications are protected.' 31 A few refer to the "penitent"' 32 or "confessant,"' 33 but most refer simply to "any person"'34 or use the passive voice to avoid defining the
confider. 135 Thus, in most states, any person who makes the
prescribed type of disclosure to the prescribed type of cleric
may claim the privilege. Although a few statutes seem to require that the confider be a member of the cleric's church, 136
few policy reasons support such a strict requirement and most
1 37
states probably would reject it.
(1965) (dicta that no privilege exists for rabbi marriage counseling under
statute).
128. See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (extending
privilege to draft counselors).
129. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 178-80 (discussing Lutheran minister's role at Wounded Knee protest of American Indian
Movement).
130. See id. at 111-16 (state definition of "church" or "minister" would constitute establishment of the groups meeting the definition); Note, supra note
120, at 525 (positing that "to deny the privilege is to prohibit the free exercise
of religion"). Cf.In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 386, 279 A.2d 889, 892
(finding teaching nun's ministry did not include religious functions of a priest),
cert. denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1971).
131. Kansas, however, is uniquely specific:
"[P]enitent" means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of God and who seeks or receives ... advice or assistance in
determining or discharging his or her moral obligations, or in obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429(a) (1983).

132. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1031 (West 1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-248(3) (Supp. 1986). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 219 (1942) (set out
supra note 85).
133. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255 (1985).
134. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-90-107(c) (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505
(1985).
135. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986).
136. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(3) (Supp. 1986); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 857 (1967). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 219 (1942) (set out
supra note 85).
137. "The clergyman's door should always be open; he should hear all who
come, regardless of their church affiliation." In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602,
604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931). Accord Kohloff v. Bronx Say. Bank, 37 Misc. 2d

1987]
3.

CLERGY PRIVILEGE

Nature of the Consultation

The clergy privilege originated to shield a specific and easily identifiable type of communication: auricular confession of
sin to a priest pursuant to the Roman Catholic sacrament of
penance. 3 8 Such limited scope is unthinkable in a religiously
pluralistic nation that is constitutionally forbidden to prefer

one religion over another.13 9 Consequently, regardless of the
privilege's origin, no modern statute limits the clergy privilege
to Roman Catholics. 140 Whether the privilege is nevertheless
restricted to penitential communications, however, is less clear.
By extending the privilege beyond its origins, the law assumes
the difficult task of distinguishing among types of consultations
with clergy.
The statutes run the gamut on the issue of whether the
clergy privilege is restricted to penitential communications.
Some statutes apparently do limit the privilege to penitential
communications' 4 1 by, for example, mentioning only "confessions" or "admissions."'14 2 One statute expressly restricts the
privilege to "a confession of culpable conduct."'1 43 The very
terms "penitent" and "priest-penitent privilege," used in many
statutes, imply a similar restriction. Other statutes go further
and sweep in any communications made for the purpose of
seeking spiritual advice or comfort. 4 4 Several other statutes
use the term "penitential communication" but proceed to de27, 27-28, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849, 846-47 (1962); Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d
17, 17-18, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846-47 (1961), appeal denied, 16 A.D.2d 735, 226
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962); Yellin, supra note 57, at 154-55. But cf. Alford v. Johnson,
103 Ark. 236, 238-39, 146 S.W. 516, 517-18 (1912) (nonmembership a factor);
Mitsunaga v. People, 54 Colo. 102, 109, 129 P. 241, 244 (1913) (same); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 560-61, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949) (same).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 58-75.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I (establishment clause). See infra text accompanying notes 283-328.
140. S. STONE & R. LIEBAAN, supra note 53, § 6.06, at 364.
141. That a communication was not penitential has influenced several
courts to deny the privilege. See, e.g., Lucy v. State, 443 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1983) (request for help not privileged if not penitent); Radecki v.
Schuckardt, 50 Ohio App. 2d 92, 97, 361 N.E.2d 543, 546 (1976) (not all conversations with a priest are privileged). See generally Smith, supra note 57, at
12-13 (judicial characterizations of communications based on religious
denominations).
142. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (Supp. 1986) ("any confession"); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986) ("confessions or admissions"); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986) ("confessions"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1607 (1973) ("religious confessional").
143. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 857 (1967).
144. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (1986) ("to seek spiritual counsel"); FLA.
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145
Many statfine that term without restrictions as to content.
to a cleric
communication
utes simply cover any confidential
in his professional capacity 146 or "necessary and proper to en147
able [the cleric] to discharge" his assigned functions.
The precise statutory language becomes crucial in deciding
whether the privilege takes in communications confided during
a counseling session. 148 Because most churches do not set aside
formal occasions for special private encounters labelled "confession,"'149 less formal consultation must be privileged if the privi150
lege is not in effect to be limited to Roman Catholics.
Obviously, the term "counseling" is much broader than "confession." Likewise, the content of counseling sessions often includes many theoretically distinguishable types of confidential
disclosure, including, for example, statements of the confider's
past conduct, confessions, expressions of penitence, expressions
of anger and other deeply felt emotions, solicitations of advice,
personal background information, and statements about the
wrongdoing of others.
Furthermore, most churches do not prescribe a ceremonial

STAT. § 90.505(1)(b) (1985) ("for the purpose of seeking spiritual advice and

counsel").
145. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032 (West 1966) ("'penitential communication' means a communication made in confidence, in the presence of no third
person... to a clergyman who ...is authorized or accustomed to hear such
communciations and . . .has a duty to keep such communications secret");
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 219 (1942) (" 'penitential communication'
means a confession of culpable conduct made secretly and in confidence").
146. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146b (1985) ("confidential communications
made to him in his professional capacity"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) ("any confession made to him, in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which
he belongs"); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1985) ("A member of the clergy shall
not.., be examined as to any confidential communication made to the member of the clergy in the member's professional character.").
147. IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1984).
148. See generally S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.12, at 373-74
(contrasting restrictive statutes that protect only penitential communications
with expansive statutes that protect all conversations by persons seeking spiritual advice); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 155-59, 191 (outlining the
confidant's role in marital and pastoral counseling); Reese, supra note 57, at
71-72 (distinguishing Catholic confession from marriage counseling); Yellin,
supra note 57, at 123-26 (arguing that marriage counseling falls within the
clergyman's professional character).
149. Knapp & VandeCreek, PrivilegedCommunicationfor PastoralCounseling: Factor Fancy?,39 J. PASTORAL CARE 293, 293 (1985); Comment, Cergy
Malpractice: Bad News, supra note 49, at 232.
150. See Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-Penitent Privilege-TheApplication of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PITT.L. REV. 27,
59-60 (1967) (discussing unconstitutionality of privilege so limited).
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order for the confidential encounter between a person and his
client. A typical counseling session will be an unpredictable,
often emotional, welter of several types of communication. It is
practically impossible to untangle the various strands of communication and make only some privileged. Even if some distinctions could be drawn, there are at least two reasons for the
law not to draw its distinctions too finely. First, the same information may be included in several intermingled types of communication. It makes little sense, for example, to shield a
person's confession of a sinful act but to unveil the subsequent
discussion of how the penitent might redress his wrongs. Second, even if a counseling session could be severalized by type of
communication, no good reason supports holding some types
privileged and others not. No rationale for the clergy privilege
is limited to penitential statements only.1 5 ' Therefore, as long
as the confider consults the cleric in the cleric's professional capacity and in confidence, the law should not put its ear to the
15 2
keyhole.
A few states expressly extend the privilege to counseling
generally 5 3 or to marriage or family counseling specifically;154
151. See infra notes 210-82 and accompanying text (discussing rationales
for the privilege). But see Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 149, at 293-96 (arguing that clergy's lack of training and experience in counseling is reason not
to extend privilege beyond confessions).
152. For similar reasons, the clergy privilege should shield the minister's

advice as well as the penitent's comments. A few statutes do indicate that the
privilege covers the discussion flowing in both directions. E.g., ALA. CODE
§ 12-21-166(b) (1986) (privilege extends to "anything said by either party");
MD.CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984) (privilege extends to "any
matter in relation to any confession or communication" made to cleric); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20A (Law. Co-op. 1986) (privilege extends to the cleric's
advice); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1986) (privilege extends to
"relations and communications between and among" the cleric and confider).
Most statutes, however, by their terms seem to protect only communications to
the cleric. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1986) ("confession made to" cleric); ARK. R. EVID. 505(b) ("communication by the person to
a clergyman").
153. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.505(1)(b) (1985) ("for the purpose of seeking spiritual counsel"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986) ("communications made to
him... as a counselor").

154. Alabama's statute, for example, extends to confidential communications "to seek spiritual counsel or comfort" or "to enlist help or advice in connection with a marital problem." ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(b) (1986). In 1981, the
New Jersey legislature added the following to its otherwise typical statute:
"nor shall [a cleric] be compelled to disclose the confidential relations and
communications between and among him and individuals, couples, families or
groups with respect to the exercise of his professional counselling role." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23 (West Supp. 1986). The District of Columbia statute
protects communications to a cleric "by either spouse, in connection with [any]
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others imply such an extension. In addition, statutes with
broad definitions of privileged communications, such as those
that cover any confidential communication to a cleric in his
professional capacity, 15 5 should cover counseling sessions.
Although such statutes' failure specifically to mention counseling may leave room for an argument that particular types of
counseling are not part of a cleric's professional capacity, the
better view is that most counseling, especially marriage coun156
In any event, a
seling, is a part of most clergy's ministry.
court should resist defining a cleric's ministry more narrowly
than it is defined by the cleric's church or by the cleric.
Although the statutes differ as to the types of consultations
that are protected, all versions of the clergy privilege require
effort to reconcile estranged spouses." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309(3) (1981).
Delaware's statute contained substantially the same provision before 1981.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4316(3) (1975), repealed by 63 Del. Laws ch. 62, § 1
(effective June 30, 1981).
155. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
156. "Marriage counselling seeking to preserve the sanctity of marriage is
most important and is definitely within the functions and duties of a minister.
It is to be encouraged rather than discouraged." Le Gore v. Le Gore, 31 Pa. D.
& C.2d 107, 108 (1963).
Although there is much authority for extending the privilege to counseling generally, the limited case authority is split on the question of extending
the privilege to marriage counseling involving both spouses. Compare Simrin
v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 94-95, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (1965) (no privilege under California's now superseded statute, but rabbi not compelled to
disclose because of agreement of confidentiality among all parties) with Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17, 18, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (1961) (privilege
applies), appeal dismissed 16 A.D.2d 735, 226 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1962). Such joint
marital counseling seems to run afoul of several requirements in the narrower
privilege statutes. First, it is not necessarily penitential. Second, it is not "confidential" if the presence of a third party destroys confidentiality, see infra
text accompanying notes 160-67. Third, it is seldom enjoined by the discipline
of a church. But see Reese, supra note 57, at 72 (Episcopal church requires
marital counseling if "marital unity is imperilled"). Yet a distinction between
counseling and confession seems unwisely artificial.
New Hampshire has defined a class of clergy that it designates "pastoral
counselors." See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:16-c (1984). To be state certified, a cleric must meet statutory education and training requirements. See id.
A client's communications to a pastoral counselor are privileged under the special privilege statute for certified psychologists. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330A:19 (Supp. 1986). The state code also includes a typical privilege statute for
uncertified clergy. See id. § 516.35 (privilege for clergy generally). The constitutionality of regulation of pastoral counseling is questionable. See Comment,
Clergy Malpractice: Bad News, supra note 49, at 242-44 ("[P]astoral counseling
although religiously motivated, is not absolutely protected [by] the first
amendment. The clergyman's first amendment protection is subject to be outweighed by the state's duty to protect its citizens." Id. at 253.).
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that the privileged communication be confidential. 57 The communication is considered confidential if the circumstances reasonably indicate the confider's expectation of secrecy. 15 If,
however, the confider did not expect or intend secrecy, the
privilege does not apply. 5 9
This requirement of an expectation of confidentiality leads
to a corollary rule: the presence of third persons during the
communication destroys the privilege. 60 Although this "third
person rule" is generally sound, it sometimes does, and arguably should, yield to exceptions for some types of third persons,
such as eavesdroppers, 16 1 custodians of persons in legal cus157. See, e.g., Lucy v. State, 443 So. 2d 1335, 1341 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (no
request for or implied confidentiality); State v. Burkett, 357 N.W.2d 632, 637
(Iowa 1984) (jail chaplain's conversations were intended to be confidential and
therefore privilege applies).
158. See Lucy, 443 So. 2d at 1341 ("[Ihe communicant must have intended
his communication to be confidential."); Hills v. State, 61 Neb. 589, 594-95, 85
N.W. 836, 837 (1901) (statement must be made "with the understanding, express or implied, that it should not be revealed to any one").
159. See United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) (letter to priest
not privileged in absence of express secrecy request); Bottoson v. State, 443 So.
2d 962, 965 (Fla. 1983) (no privilege for letter Yinister was asked to deliver),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); Wainscott v. Commonwealth, 562 S.W.2d 628,
632 (Ky.) (request that minister transmit confession to police reveals no intent
to keep secret), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978); Hills, 61 Neb. at 594-95, 85
N.W. at 837 (1901) (request that minister write confession letter shows lack of
confidential intent).
160. See United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1980) (no privilege for confession to minister in obvious presence of guard); State v. Berry,
324 So. 2d 822, 829 (La. 1975) (confession to minister in presence of two other
people), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 954 (1976) ; S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note
53, § 6.13, at 374 (noting that a prerequisite to the privilege is that the communication be privately stated and secret); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5,
at 107-08 (noting possible exception for very young children); id. at 142-45
(third person invalidates the privilege whether the communication relates to
that person's act or the communication was to be transmitted to the third
person).
161. Although precedent is slim, the presence of a third party apparently
vitiates the privilege even when the third party is an eavesdropper. See McCORMICK, supra note 94, § 74 (privileged communications must be secret); W.
TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 144 (communication overheard, whether
by accident or design, is not privileged). This result has been criticized, however, because every rationale for the clergy privilege applies with undiminished force even though someone has overheard the communication. See
MCCORMICK, supra note 94, § 74, at 75-76 (modern statutory trend is to preserve privilege when the communication has been accidently overheard or purposefully intercepted); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 144-45, 189-90
(arguing that justice requires that overheard communications be privileged).
Only the California statute, however, expressly protects against eavesdroppers
by requiring only that the privileged communication be made "in the presence
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tody,162 persons necessarily assisting the cleric 163 and cocounselees. When one of these types of persons hears the
communication, the confider's expectation of secrecy usually
16 4
remains undiminished.
The presence of a cocounselee raises issues especially likely
to arise in child abuse cases, where two or more family members might seek ministration together. If the third person rule
applies, communications to a cleric are not privileged if the conof no third person so far as the penitent is aware." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1032
(West 1966) (emphasis added).
162. A person who is incarcerated, under arrest, or civilly confined may be
too closely supervised to communicate with his cleric out of earshot of his custodian. Although precedent on this matter is slight, the two reported cases
disagree about the legal effect of the custodian's presence. The Ninth Circuit
held that the presence of a security guard destroyed the confidentiality of a
communication by a prisoner to the prison chaplain and, therefore, that the
clergy privilege did not apply. United States v. Webb, 615 F.2d 828, 828 (9th
Cir. 1980). A New York county court, however, held on similar facts that the
privilege applied. The court suggested that either arrangements should be
made to allow an arrested suspect to communicate privately with a cleric or
the custodial officer should "retreat to a safe distance" so as not to overhear.
People v. Brown, 82 Misc. 2d 115, 120, 368 N.Y.S.2d 645, 650-51 (1974). In
Brown, the arrested murder suspect had repeatedly refused during interrogation to confess the murder. He then telephoned his minister and immediately
blurted out, in the presence of a police officer, "Bishop Hicks, praise the Lord,
I need your prayers, I have killed a man." Id& at 650. The court held that
statement privileged. Id. at 651.
163. Arguably, there should also be an exception to the third person rule
for persons needed to assist the cleric in receiving the confider's words. See In
re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (lay draft counselors needed
to assist minister); Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 350, 161 N.W. 290, 293
(1917) (elders and deacons present); Yellin, supra note 57, at 150 (explicit provision preserving privilege for communications resolves ambiguity). Many
statutes do make exceptions for "persons present in furtherance of the communication." E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.505(1)(b) (1985) (communication "not intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of
the communication"); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1985) (" 'Confidential communication' means a communication made privately and not intended for further
disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the
communication."); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1979-1980) ("A communication is 'confidential' if made privately and not intended for further disclosure
except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication."). Mississippi's statute excepts the clergyman's secretary, stenographer,
and clerk. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22(4) (Supp. 1986). These exceptions, too,
seem consistent with the purpose of the confidentiality requirement.
164. Roman Catholic law, for example, extends the duty of secrecy to interpreters and all persons who may have acquired knowledge of confession in
any way. See 2 J. ABBO & J. HANNAH, THE SACRED CANONS 17 (1960) (translation of THE CODE OF CANON LAW Canon 889 (1918)). See also i&.at 18 (Canon
890 forbidding a confessor to use to the detriment of the penitent any knowledge acquired from confession even though there is no danger that the penitent or his sin will be known).
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fider seeks counsel jointly with someone else, for example, a
spouse. The reasons for the clergy privilege do not abate, however, when a cleric undertakes joint counseling. On the contrary, family counseling is often equally private but more
effective when the cleric can work with family members together.165 Thus, in this specialized context, the presence of a
third party should not vitiate the privilege. 166 Accordingly, by
expressly extending the privilege to marriage or family coun67
seling, a few statutes do seem to reach this result.
Another important issue in child abuse cases is whether
the clergy privilege extends to personal observations by the
cleric. An abused child might confide something to a minister
without mentioning abuse, yet the minister might observe suspicious symptoms of abuse. Similarly, a minister might notice
in an abuser some telltale demeanor that corroborates a suspicion. Although the statutes do not directly address the question
whether such observations are privileged, most of them specifically protect confessions, communications, or admissions and
thereby suggest by omission that there is no protection for
noncommunicative information acquired in the course of discussion. 168 Case law, although sparse and vague on this point,
suggests a distinction between a cleric's observation of communicative conduct, which is privileged, and his observation of
noncommunicative conduct, which is not. 16 9 Furthermore, a
165. See Cross, Privileged CommunicationsBetween Participantsin Group
Psychotherapy, 1970 L. & Soc. ORD. 191, 195; Smith, ConstitutionalPrivacy in
Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1, 51-52 (1980).
166. Cf. State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 133-34 (Minn. 1984) (group therapy within medical privilege).
167. See supra note 154.
168. But see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984) ("any information... obtained"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West 1981) ("any communication... or any information that [the cleric] may have gotten by reason of
such communication"). See generally S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53,
§ 6.09.
169. See, e.g., Snyder v. Poplett, 98 Ill. App. 3d 359, 363-64, 424 N.E.2d 396,
400 (1981) (not "all communications made to clergymen are necessarily protected from disclosure .... ."); State v. Kurtz, 564 S.W.2d 856, 860-61 (Mo. 1978)
(personal observations may be admissible as distinguished from direct communications); In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 76-77, 152 S.E.2d 317, 324 (North Carolina statute providing that no minister be required to testify in suit concerning
any information communicated to him does not justify refusal to be sworn and
testify in a criminal suit when no objection to proposed testimony is advanced), cert denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967). Contra Commonwealth v. Zezima,
365 Mass. 238, 341-42, 310 N.E.2d 590, 592 (1974) (scope of privilege extends beyond simple conversation). See also S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53,
§ 6.09; Yellin, supra note 57, at 151.
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cleric's observation of a person's condition or state of mind is
not privileged.1 7 0 Apparently, then, the privilege does not extend to a cleric's seeing the bruises or the flinching of an
abused child unless a person confiding in the cleric showed the
cleric these things to communicate a point.
Finally, many statutes require that the privileged communication be made "in the course of discipline enjoined by the
rule or practice of such [church or] denomination. '171 Such a
requirement has proven troublesome for several reasons. 172
First, many statutes fail to clarify whether the requirement re173
fers to the discipline of the confider's or the cleric's church.
Second, and related, many statutes fail to clarify whether the
requirement means that the church must require its members
to confess or simply require its clergy to hear confessions when
approached for that purpose. 174 Such sloppy drafting leaves unanswered the question of the privilege's application to most
confidential communications to most clergy! Few churches re175
quire their members to make private confessions to clergy;
probably none require their members to seek counseling.
Many, however, require, at least implicitly, that their clergy be
available to receive voluntary confessions or to counsel trou170.

For examples of cases finding a cleric's observations not privileged, see

Estate of Toomes, 54 Cal. 509, 516 (1880); Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App.
262, 268-69, 95 N.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1950); Kurtz, 564 S.W.2d at 860-61.
171. MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986). See also CAL. Evm.
CODE §§ 1032-1034 (West 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West 1979); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1982).
172. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.10; Reese, supra note
57, at 67-73; Yellin, supra note 57, at 126-37.
173. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns 1986) ("The following persons shall not be competent witnesses: ... Clergymen, as to confessions or admissions made to them in course of discipline enjoined by their respective
churches."); see also Ball v. State, 419 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (Ind.1981) (suggesting
confession must be pursuant to discipline of cleric's church).
174. Compare Sherman v. State, 170 Ark. 148, 151, 279 S.W. 353, 354 (1926)
(privilege not applicable unless church discipline requires members to confess
sins) with In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 605-06, 237 N.W. 589, 591 (1931) (privilege applies if church discipline either requires member to disclose or requires
the cleric to receive the communication).
175. A privilege limited to churches that require private confession to a
cleric would effectively be limited primarily to the Roman and Eastern Orthodox churches and possibly some Lutheran churches. For discussion of this issue and "mainline" denominations' requirements, see In re Estate of Soeder, 7
Ohio App. 2d 271, 300, 220 N.E.2d 547, 567-68 (1966); Reese, supra note 57, at
68; Smith, supra note 57, at 14; Yellin, supra note 57, at 128-30. Even the Roman Catholic church requires only one confession a year. Would subsequent
confessions therefore be not privileged? See Reese, supra note 57, at 68.

1987]

CLERGY PRIVILEGE

bled people. 176 Finally, however one interprets this disciplineenjoined requirement, it invites constitutional attack on the
clergy privilege by seeming to prefer unnecessarily churches
177
with a particular discipline.
Many jurisdictions have found ways to sidestep these
problems arising from ambiguous drafting. Some jurisdictions
have modified the requirement to that of a communication
made in the course of discipline or practice.178 Others have interpreted the discipline-enjoined requirement liberally. 179 Finally, some of the newer statutes simply drop the requirement
altogether. 8 0
C.

WHOSE PRIVILEGE?

The question who may waive the clergy privilege has
caused considerable confusion.' 8 ' Many statutes state, or sug176. Many requirements are implicit.
It is a matter of common knowledge, and we take judicial notice of
the fact, that such "discipline" is traditionally enjoined upon all clergymen by the practice of their respective churches. Under such "discipline" enjoined by such practice all faithful clergymen render such
help to the spiritually sick and cheerfully offer consolation to suppliants who come in response to the call of conscience.
In re Swenson, 183 Minn. at 605, 237 N.W. at 591. The Episcopal church officially requires its clergy to provide marriage counseling to troubled couples.
See Reese, supra note 57, at 72.
177. The requirement seems of questionable constitutionality, not only because of its discrimination among religious groups, see infra notes 295-305 and
accompanying text, but also because it requires a court to interpret church
rules to determine what church discipline requires. Stoyles, supranote 150, at
55; Yellin, supra note 57, at 150. See also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-05
(1979) (disadvantages of analyzing and examining church doctrine in property
disputes); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 (1969) ("special
problems arise . . . when [property] disputes implicate controversies over
church doctrine and practice"); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29
(1872) (discussing favoritism of one religion over another and concluding that
"the law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect").
178. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 1032 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. § 90.505 (1985).
179. See In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 605-06, 237 N.W. 589, 591 (1931).
180. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.255
(1985).
181. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMTAN, supra note 53, §§ 6.08, 6.14; W. TIEMANN
& J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 148-51, 192-94; Reese, supra note 57, at 78-79; Yellin, supra note 57, at 137-38.
The various versions of the clergy privilege produce four distinct schemes
of waiver. First, if the statute declares that clergy may not testify as to confidential communications, apparently no one may waive the privilege and the
rule is more a rule of competence than of privilege. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-14-5 (Burns Supp. 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2156 (West
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gest in various ways, that the clergy privilege "belongs" to the
confider because it is waivable only by her. Some statutes simply frame the privilege in terms of a prohibition on examining
clergy without the consent of the person making the confession
or unless that person waives the privilege.8 2 Many other statutes include provisions which allow the privilege to be claimed
by the confider, by the confider's guardian or conservator, or if
the confider is deceased, by her personal representative. According to those same provisions the clergyman to whom the
communication was made is presumed to have authority to
claim the privilege, but only on behalf of the communicant. 8 3
Supp. 1986). But see infra note 197. Second, if the statute says that a cleric
may not disclose without the confider's consent, apparently the confider has
the discretion to waive or insist on the privilege. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (1978); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(c) (1986). Third, if the statute
states only that clergy shall not be compelled to disclose, the cleric has the discretion to waive or insist on the privilege. See, e.g., MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984). Finally, if a statute says that a cleric shall not be compelled without the confider's consent,
then the confider and the cleric both must object to disclosure in order for the
privilege to apply. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/BobbsMerrill Supp. 1986). That these are significantly distinct positions may be illustrated with the following chart showing how the four versions would operate
in the four possible factual situations that might arise. The chart assumes
that, absent a claim of privilege, the cleric must disclose the information.
Cleric Willing
To Tell;
Confider
Willing, Too

Cleric Willing
To Tell;
Confider
Objects

Cleric Objects
To Telling,
Confider
Willing

Cleric Objects
To TellingConfider
Objects, Too

VERSION OF
PRIVILEGE:
clergy may not no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure no disclosure
disclose
clergy may not disclosure
no disclosure disclosure
no disclosure
disclose without confider's
consent
clergy may not disclosure
disclosure
no disclosure no disclosure
be compelled to
disclose
clergy may not disclosure
disclosure
disclosure
no disclosure
be compelled to
disclose without confider's
consent
182. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (1973); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(1)(c)
(1986); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 4505 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
183. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.505(3)(a)-(d) (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 2505 (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 19-13-18 (1979). These provisions derive from Rule 505 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
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The implication in these statutes is that the privilege belongs
entirely to the confider. 84 Other persons, including the cleric,
may claim the privilege, but only on the confider's behalf. If,
under this view, the confider waives the privilege, the cleric has
no remaining right to keep silent. This interpretation accords
with the law for other privileges that protect professional relationships: the physician-patient privilege, for example, belongs
to the patient 8 5 and the attorney-client privilege to the
8 6
client.
In contrast, some statutes seem to afford the cleric a privilege in his own right. Only California, however, does so
explicitly by providing two statutory privileges: one for the
"penitent" and one for the "clergyman.' 1 7 Additionally, some
other statutes point, albeit less clearly, to a cleric's independent
right to claim the privilege by, for example, framing the privilege in terms of a simple prohibition on compelling clergy to
disclose. 8 8
Virginia has enacted such a prohibition against compelling
clergy to disclose confidential communications, 8 9 and the
Fourth Circuit, in the recent case of Seidman v. FishburneHudgins EducationalFoundation,Inc., 90 interpreted that statute as vesting the privilege in the cleric instead of in the confider. The court cited three reasons for its interpretation.
First, Virginia framed its statute as a prohibition on compelling
clergy to disclose. 191 Second, Virginia's statute omitted a term,
common in other privilege statutes, prohibiting disclosure with184.

The issue of waiver is particularly problematic if the privilege covers

counseling sessions involving more than one counselee. After marital counseling, for example, does the power to claim or waive the privilege belong to one
or both spouses? The few statutes innovative in extending the privilege to such
situations do not agree. The District of Columbia statute, for example, forbids
examination of the cleric "without the consent of the spouse making the communication." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309(3) (1981). Alabama's statute, however,
might be read as permitting either spouse to prevent the cleric's disclosing
anything said during the counseling session. Yellin, supranote 57, at 138. See
ALA. CODE § 12-21-166(b) (1986). Cf.Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 94,
43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378-79 (1965) (ex-wife wanted rabbi to testify, ex-husband objected, court noted but failed to reach waiver issue).
185. See S. STONE & R. LIEBAAN, supra note 53, § 7.20.
186. Id. § 1.60.
187. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1030-1034 (West 1966). See also ALA. CODE § 1221-166(b) (1986) ("either such person or the clergyman shall have the
privilege").
188. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD.PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984).
189. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400 (1984).
190. 724 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1984).
191. Id at 415.
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out the consent of the confider.192 Third, Virginia's privilege
statutes for physicians and psychologists did contain such a consent provision. 193 Taken together, these facts led the court to
conclude that Virginia's statute "invests the priest with the
privilege and leaves it to his conscience to decide when disclosure is appropriate."'' 94 According to this interpretation, the
confider lacks standing to object to the cleric's decision either
195
way.
Other statutes simply declare that clergy are not competent to testify as to certain communications. 196 Statutes worded
as a rule of competency, rather than as a rule of privilege, suggest that no one has the choice to waive the privilege. 197 Missouri's statute takes this approach, 198 and a federal district
court recently interpreted such a statute to allow a cleric to
claim the privilege in his own right.199
Still other statutes offer little guidance on the issue of who
192. d. at 415-16.
193. Id. at 416 n.2.
194. Id. at 416.
195. Id. ("[Plaintiff] has no standing to object to the introduction of the
priest's deposition into evidence or its use during cross-examination.").
196. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-22 (Supp. 1986) ("[No such minister,
priest, or rabbi shall disclose... nor shall such minister, priest, or rabbi be
competent or compellable to testify."); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (Burns
1986) (clergy not "competent witnesses" as to confessions); MCH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986) ("[no cleric] shall be allowed to disclose"); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986) (cleric "incompetent to testify"). But see People
v. Lipsczinska, 212 Mich. 484, 493, 180 N.W. 617, 620-21 (1920) (suggesting waivable by confider).
An interesting question is whether a cleric who discloses despite the confider's objection, or despite a statute framed as a prohibition on disclosure of
certain communications, may be penalized for "violating" the privilege statute.
See Reese, supra note 57, at 79-80. Only Tennessee's statute provides a statutory penalty in such a case. Any cleric "violating the provisions of this section,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00)
and imprisoned in the county jail or workhouse not exceeding six (6) months."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(d) (1980). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060(3)
(1985) (reporting child abuse not deemed "violation" of privilege statutes). In
the absence of such a provision, criminal penalties surely could not be imposed. Reese, supra note 57, at 80. Success in a civil action by the confider
against the disclosing cleric also seems remote, especially in light of the difficulties of establishing a contract or a tort duty in the cleric-confider relationship. Id See also supra note 49 for literature on clergy malpractice.
197. On the other hand, even rules of incompetency may be waivable in the
sense that they are not recognized unless asserted. See McCORMICK, supra
note 94, §§ 73, 74.1.
198. Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(4) (1986).
199. Eckmann v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17, 106
F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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may claim or waive the clergy privilege and so leave room to
argue that a cleric's claim of privilege survives the confider's
waiver. As two commentators recently said: "It is questionable
whether a court would compel the clergyman to testify in violation of a religious duty to maintain confidentiality." 20 0 Several
good reasons support recognition of an independent claim of
privilege for the cleric not waivable by the confider. 201 If the
privilege rests on a desire to foster the clergy-penitent relationship because of the relationship's value to society,20 2 arguably,
the prospect of the government unveiling confidential discussions would deter a cleric from giving her most effective counsel. 20 3 Alternatively, if the privilege rests on a respect for
privacy, 20 4 one could argue that the cleric is a partner to the intimate relationship and shares an interest in privacy, an interest undiminished by being a function of the cleric's
profession. 20 5 Even apart from the psychological offense that
accompanies an invasion of privacy, the cleric may suffer harm
from the diminished effectiveness of his ministry. In addition,
if the confider alone may choose to claim or waive the privilege,
the confider can manipulate that power to unfair advantage in
litigation. 20 6 Finally, if the privilege is grounded in the free ex200. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.08, at 370.
201. See Yellin, supra note 57, at 137.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 219-37.
203. As just one example: pastoral counselors are sometimes encouraged
to share personal matters about themselves.
There are times when it is important for you to share things about
yourself .... The sharing of your own internal process is an important part of building a relationship. For therapists this process of selfdisclosure must be used judiciously, but it can contribute in important
ways to trust.
W. MILLER & K. JACKSON, PRACTICAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR PASTORS 1515 (1985).
See also D. SWITZER, THE MINISTER AS CRISIS COUNSELOR 75-76 (1974)
(stressing importance of genuineness and self-disclosure by counseling clergy).
204. See infra text accompanying notes 238-75.
205. See supra note 203.
206. Reese, supra note 57, discusses the potential for manipulation:
Statements in confessions could be inaccurate, and could be intended
to mislead, if an unscrupulous confessant thought the statements
could be used later in a trial. Due to the belief in the usual truthfulness of facts told during the confession, the testimony of a clergyman
concerning the confession might be given too much weight in reaching
a finding. Suppose that in a state where there is no privilege, two
men, Mr. Badd and Mr. Worse, plan to hold up a small store in a residential neighborhood. Badd pleads with Worse not to take a pistol
along, but to no avail. In the hold-up, Worse shoots the old storekeeper. Thereafter, Worse goes to confession and, instead of submitting to the priest his murder of the old man, confesses that he drove
the car to the holdup scene and, although he pleaded with Badd not to
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ercise of religion, 20 7 some privilege belongs to the cleric by constitutional right.
A recent opinion, Eckmann v. Board of Education of Hawthorn School DistrictNo. 17, interpreted Missouri's clergy privilege statute to give clergy the right to claim or waive the
privilege and also decided that, under federal common law, the
privilege belongs to the cleric.20 8 Acknowledging that federal
courts had not previously reached that conclusion, the court
nevertheless stated that federal courts look to state law for
"guidance and tradition" in developing the law of privilege, and
that most state statutes vest the privilege in the cleric. 20 9 Thus,
with little policy discussion, the court concluded that the privilege belongs to the cleric and cannot be waived by the confider.
Although the Eckmann court would have trouble substantiating its assertion that most state statutes vest the privilege in
the cleric, still, the opinion points the federal law of privilege in
an important new direction.

D.

RATIONALES FOR THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE

The clergy privilege is primarily a rule of evidence.2 10 Society, working through its courts, has a right to every person's evidence.2 11 More than three centuries of law resoundingly
confirm this claim, and against that background any privilege,
as Wigmore explained, is "distinctly exceptional. ' 212 Furthermore, most rules concerning admissibility of evidence serve to
kill the man, Badd nevertheless did it, and then Worse drove him
away from the scene. This confession and admission of guilt to being
an accessory before and after the fact, made as a means of shifting the
blame for the actual murder from himself to Badd, might be rather
potent evidence.
Id. at 82-83. In a later passage, Reese writes:
The waiver privilege could also be the instrument of abuse by a
scheming, wilful, and debased person. He could confess a number of
different versions to a number of different priests and then waive the
privilege for the one who best suited his purpose but not waive it for
the priests who would not serve his purpose.
Id. at 85.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 276-82, 385-496.
208. Eckmann v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorn School Dist. No. 17, 106
F.R.D. 70, 73 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
209. Id.
210. But see infra text accompanying notes 338-380.
211. 12 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 693 (1812) (quoted in J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2192); see also Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556,
559 n.2 (1961) ("Every citizen of course owes to his society the duty of giving
testimony to aid in the enforcement of the law.").
212. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2192, at 64.
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exclude irrelevant or unreliable evidence; they aim at educing
truth.2 1 3 Rules of privilege are, however, what Wigmore called
rules of "extrinsic policy [because] some consideration extrinsic
to the investigation of truth is regarded as more important and
overpowering. ' 214 Because in principle these rules of privilege
work at cross-purposes with the quest for truth in the individual case,2 15 the rules are and ought to be strictly construed and
a privilege recognized only where the extrinsic policy is both
216
important and necessarily implicated.
A survey of possible extrinsic policy rationales for the
clergy privilege should show the shape and strength of the privilege, as well as its weak spots where an exception might or
should break through. 2 17 The following discussion considers
three rationales for the privilege: society's interest in fostering
the clergy-confider relationship, privacy rights in that relation2 18
ship, and free exercise of religion.
213. See McCORM CK, supra note 94, § 72.
214. J. WIGmIORE, supra note 53, § 2175, at 3; see also McCORMICK, supra
note 94, § 72.
215. An exception is the attorney-client privilege, one purpose of which is
to encourage full disclosure to one's attorney so that the attorney can most effectively represent the client, so that, in turn, the adversarial system will work
best and truth will out. See J. WIGmIORE, supra note 53, § 2291.
216. See i&L §§ 2175, 2192. See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40,
50 (1980) (stating that exclusionary rules and privileges are contrary to the established principle that the public is entitled to every man's evidence); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974) ("Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor
expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth." Id
at 710.); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("Certain exemptions
from attending or, having attended, giving testimony are recognized by all
courts. But every such exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through centuries of experience, to outweigh the
public interest in the search for truth."). These commonly encountered assertions rest on the state's long-established interest in securing all available evidence for trials. The state does not have a similarly long-established interest
in its citizens submitting reports of suspected abuse.

217. See generally Reese, supra note 57, at 60-61 and Yellin, supra note 57,
at 108-14 (discussing rationales for clergy privilege).
218. Another very practical reason for the clergy privilege may be the simple recognition that many clergy would refuse to divulge confidential communications regardless of the existence of a privilege. See Cimijotti v. Paulsen,
219 F. Supp. 621, 626 (N.D. Iowa 1963) ("priests would be subjected to infamy
and disgrace if they disclosed communications which they have sworn to keep
secret"); Reese, supra note 57, at 60, 68-69, 81 ("Not only is church policy and
doctrine clear, but the statements of individual clergy are uniform, adamant
and audacious-the same throughout the western world. They will not testify!" Id. at 69.); Regan, supra note 60, at 3 (elaboration on Roman Catholic
position); Southard, A Response, 39 J. PASTORAL CARE 101, 106 (1985) (responding to Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 149, and discussing Biblical au-
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Fostering the Clergy-Confider Relationship

The most commonly offered rationale for the clergy privilege is society's desire to foster the clergy-confider relationship.
Several evidentiary privileges, including the physician-patient
privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the marital communication privilege, are thought to foster special relationships between persons by shielding communications within those
relationships. 21 9 The law has determined that, in the long run,
society gains more by fostering such relationships than it gains
from disclosure of communications within those relationships.220 Those who rely on this utilitarian or instrumental rationale frequently have recourse to Wigmore's famous four
prerequisites for recognizing an evidentiary privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
than the benefit thereby gained
the communications must be greater
2 21
for the correct disposal of litigation.

The first requirement is met by the very definition of the
clergy privilege. Communications not intended to be confidenthority for confession and various denominations' historical positions on
secrecy); Yellin, supra note 57, at 110-11 ("Another reason for according ministers the privilege is that we are, in fact, recognizing the inevitable, that ministers will refuse to testify, despite the potential punitive sanctions the court
may impose." Id. at 110.). Although not all clergy are bound to secrecy by
church discipline or personal conscience, and although disclosure requirements
might serve a teaching function even if all clergy refused to comply, still, solicitude for those clergy who would refuse to disclose is surely part of the reason
for the privilege. This explanation should not, however, be elevated to a justification, because it rests at bottom on the awkward assertion that the law
should not impose a requirement on persons who will not comply. What is important is why some clergy would not comply and the strength of their
reasons.
219. See MCCORMICK, supra note 94, § 72.
220. It has been said that the benefit from the privilege "overbalances the
possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper." Mullen v. United States,
263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring).
221. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2285 (emphasis in original). See, e.g., In
re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d
411, 417 (Alaska 1976); State v. Driscoll, 53 Wis. 2d 699, 706, 193 N.W.2d 851,
856 (1972); W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 110-11; Weisberg & Wald,
Confidentiality Laws and State Efforts to Protect Abused or Neglected Children: The Need for Statutory Reform, 18 FAM. L.Q. 143, 183-93 (1984). Wigmore concluded that the clergy privilege meets all four requirements and
therefore should be recognized. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2369.
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tial simply do not fall within the privilege. 222
Wigmore's second requirement, that confidentiality be crucial to the "full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation"
between cleric and confider, is seldom questioned. The common assumption is that a threat of disclosure would seriously
impair the quality, if not also the quantity, of troubled persons'
communications with clergy.223 Even when church rules require confession or other consultation with clergy, one would
expect a lack of confidentiality to inhibit seriously such
consultation.
Some critics might see a weakness in the lack of empirical
data to verify the assumption that the absence of confidentiality
would inhibit consultation. Robert Weisberg and Michael
Wald, for example, have criticized the string of unsubstantiated
assumptions underlying Wigmore's "instrumental" rationale for
privileges:
Measuring the instrumental argument for privileges ...

would seem

to call for empirical research, but such research has rarely been attempted. Rather, the [law of privilege has] evolved, or stumbled
along, as legislatures and courts have made fairly crude general
guesses about social behavior, and have responded to an uncertain
mixture of unsupported instrumental assertions and the politics of
professionalism. 2 2 4
222. See supra notes 157-67 and accompanying text.
223. The conclusion that confidentiality is essential to the clergy-confider
relation is frequently assumed and widely promoted.
And it is the common judgment of moralists and ethicians that individuals in [distress of soul or mind or body] would be restrained from
seeking... assistance-with incalculable harm to society-if they had
no assurance that their confidences would not be betrayed by those
persons to whom they might appeal for help.
Regan, supra note 60, at 4. See also People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess.
1813), reprinted in 1 CATH.LAW. 199, 207 (1955), abstractedin 1 WESTERN L.J.
109, 112 (1843) (secrecy is "of the essence of penance"); Reese, supra note 57,
at 81 ("If the privilege were taken away.., the work of the church would be
greatly hampered and a purely secular society would be well on its way.");
Smith, supra note 57, at 1-2 (need for privilege "self-evident"); Comment,
Clergy Malpractice: Bad News supra note 49, at 229-30 ("a vital prerequisite
for successful counseling"). The Code of Professional Ethics of the American
Association of Pastoral Counselors states: "One has an obligation to safeguard
information about an individual that has been obtained in the course of the
counseling process." Augspurger, Legal Concerns of the Pastoral Counselor, 29
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY 109, 110 (1980). Cf Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at
358 ("Protecting the communications of therapy [is the] sine qua non for successful therapy.").
224. Wiesberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 185. See also McCormick, supra
note 94, § 76.2 (questioning whether secrecy encourages disclosure at least
when disclosures are required by church); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege:
Fixed Rules, Balancing,and ConstitutionalEntitlemen4 91 HARV. L. REV. 464,
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Weisberg and Wald cited an empirical study that raised
doubt about whether the existence of a psychotherapist privilege actually encouraged more persons to engage in psychotherapy or enhanced that therapy's effectiveness. 225 From this
study, Weisberg and Wald concluded that "patients do not directly rely on privilege laws in deciding whether to seek psychotherapy or to be candid with their therapists. ' 226 Because in
these authors' view the Wigmore rationale for the psychotherapist privilege rests on mere speculation, they concluded that
the psychotherapist privilege ought to yield more readily to
courts' and administrative agencies' superior need for psychotherapists' information regarding child abuse. Weisberg and
Wald were addressing the psychotherapist privilege rather than
the clergy privilege in the context of a concrete state investigation of abuse rather than in the reporting context. Nevertheless, their discussion raises a question whether Wigmore's
second prerequisite for a privilege might be a weak link in the
chain of assumptions justifying a privilege on the Wigmore
rationale.
On the other hand, this criticism assumes a burden on advocates of a privilege to supply empirical data to support their
assumptions. For the clergy privilege, the burden would seem
more appropriately placed on those who argue counterintuitively that secrecy is not essential to clergy-confider relationships. Such an argument is difficult to support, especially
because the clergy-leading participants in these relationships-have repeatedly insisted on the necessity of confidential470-73 (1977) (questioning effect of attorney-client privilege on client disclo-

sures) [hereinafter Note, The Attorney Client Privilege]; Note, Pillow Talk,
Grimgribbersand Connubial Bliss: The Marital CommunicationPrivilege, 56
IND. L.J. 121, 136 (1980) (criticizing lack of data to support claim that the marital communications privilege encourages confidences between spouses) [hereinafter Note, Pillow Talk].
225. Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 186-91. See Shuman & Weiner,
The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege,60 N.C.L. REV. 893, 894 (1982) (testing empirical basis for privilege resting only on "untested hunches"). See also the empirical studies
discussed in Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effect of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165 (1978) (professional implications of psychotherapist's liability to third persons), and Note,
FunctionalOverlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:Its Implications for PrivilegedCommunicationsDoctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226 (1962) (survey of professionals suggesting privilege enjoyed in attorney-client relationship
be extended to other professional relationships).
226. Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 187.
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ity.2 27 It would be difficult to test how many people fail to
come forward for help because they fear disclosure. 228 Furthermore, at issue is not just the number of persons who consult
clergy or the number of consultations, but the healing quality
of those consultations. Such judgments are especially difficult
and inappropriate for religious relationships, which may aim at
religious as well as secular values. Perhaps the most salient
conclusion from the surge of recent literature on clergy malpractice is that courts are in fact unqualified and in principle
disqualified from establishing criteria to assess the quality of
clergy-confider consultations. 229 Thus, even in the absence of
supporting empirical data, Wigmore's second requirement appears to be satisfied.
Perhaps a more troublesome question, posed by Wigmore's
third prerequisite for recognizing an evidentiary privilege, is
whether the community believes that the clergy-confider relation deserves special solicitude. Wigmore hinted that a lack of
this requirement partly explains English law's long failure to
recognize a clergy privilege. 230 In the United States today, however, this requirement seems to be met. It is arguable that the
requisite "opinion of the community" is furnished by the free
exercise clause, which applies to the states as well as the federal government, and by state constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. Such provisions bespeak the community's desire
to protect clergy-confider relationships as an aspect of many
persons' religious practice. One could also note, without begging the question, that almost every state and the federal government now recognize a clergy privilege on policy grounds,
even while apparently believing that it is not constitutionally
required. These recognitions impliedly manifest community desire to protect relationships with clergy. However one gauges
community opinion, the conclusion seems secure for now that
the clergy-confider relation is indeed one which "in the opinion
231
of the community ought to be sedulously fostered."
227. See supra note 223.
228. People v. Bullard, 75 Cal. App. 3d 764, 769-70, 142 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476
(1978) (mother refused medical treatment for child because afraid of getting in
trouble for abusing child); cf.Fleming & Maximov, The Patientor His Victim
The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1039 (1974) ("A healthy profession.. . is not proof that patients are not being deterred.").
229. See malpractice literature cited supra note 49.
230. J. WIGA1ORE, supra note 53, § 2396. This would be especially true in
England, he noted, when confession was primarily associated with the disfavored Roman Catholic church. Id.
231. But see Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 149, at 297-98 (arguing that
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The Wigmore rationale does not dictate any particular reasons for a community's desire to foster clergy-confider relationships.2 32 One of the community's reasons might be the desire to
accommodate religious practices, which accommodation inures
many clergy's lack of counseling training and experience suggest community
should not sedulously foster counseling relationships with unqualified clergy).
232. Although the reasons for the community's desire to foster relationships with clergy are immaterial under Wigmore's test, those reasons do become relevant under constitutional scrutiny. If the law of clergy privilege
rests simply on popular desire to promote a religious relationship, the privilege
might violate the establishment clause. See infra notes 283-328 and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, the privilege is an accommodation of religious practice, arguably it is compelled by the free exercise clause. See infra
notes 385-496 and accompanying text.
It is possible also that the clergy privilege falls between the two religion
clauses. In the space between, where the privilege is commonly thought to reside (neither constitutionally forbidden nor constitutionally compelled), a state
may decide on policy grounds whether and how far to accommodate a religious
relationship. Such a location for the privilege, in the zone of "permissible accommodation," is, however, somewhat insecure for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court's free exercise and establishment cases have continually
shifted the boundaries of that zone. See Estate of Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S.
703 (1985) (absolute statutory right not to work on one's Sabbath violates establishment clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (state-paid chaplain opening legislative sessions not violative of establishment clause); Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (conscientious objection statute constitutional); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding constitutionality
of property tax exemptions for church property); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952) (release of students during school hours for religious instruction
neither establishes nor infringes on free exercise of religion). Compare, e.g.,
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding, in effect, Minnesota's income
tax deduction for parents incurring expenses of private schools) with Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (invalidating New York's income tax deduction for parents of students in nonpublic schools).
Second, in that space between the religion clauses, the privilege is vulnerable to cultural winds. Much has been written concerning the secularization
of American culture. See, e.g., H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY (1984)
(examining recent resurgence of traditional religion); H. Cox, THE SECULAR
CITY DEBATE (D. Callahan ed. 1966) (collection of opinions and criticisms of
The Secular City); H. Cox, THE SECULAR CITY (1965) (influential examination
of secularization); A. GREELEY, UNSECULAR MAN-THE PERSISTENCE OF RELIGION (1972) (religious questions becoming "more critical" in modern society);
Lyon, Rethinking Secularization: Retrospect and Prospec 26 REV. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 228 (1985) (appraising meaning of secularization of society).
Whether secularization is an inexorable and already mature process in this
country, as some have thought, or simply one direction that the wind has
blown, it is a process that could threaten the clergy privilege, as indeed it
could threaten any "merely permissible" accommodation of religious practice.
This is simply to say that the Wigmore rationale for the clergy privilege, unaccompanied by a constitutional right, yokes the privilege to popular opinion and
subjects it to the vicissitudes of popular confidence in the benefits of religion
and clergy.
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in the long run to the community's welfare. 233 A more commonly mentioned reason is the benefit the community derives
from the mental, emotional, and spiritual health of its members.2 34 One author has written that the privilege is important
to the health and stability of the whole society and that it enables people to deal with their problems with positive results. 2 3 5 The individual penitent or counselee may receive
forgiveness, absolution, advice, and comfort; from these may
flow spiritual, emotional, mental, and even physical health.
The community benefits from the health of its citizens, and for
many persons religion, including confidential consultations
with clergy, contributes significantly to that health.
Wigmore's fourth prerequisite for a privilege is that the injury caused to the relationship by disclosure of communications
must be greater than the benefit of evidence gained by disclosure. Although Wigmore expressly contemplated a balancing
of interests, he did not contemplate weighing clerics' and confiders' interests in confidentiality against specific litigants' interests in the outcome of their litigation. Rather, he
contemplated weighing society's interest in clergy-confider relationships generally against society's interest in access to full information in every litigation. Apparently, Wigmore also had in
mind a single conclusive balancing that would determine
whether, in the long run, society benefits more from nondisclosure than from disclosure. 236 If so, the privilege should be recognized; if not, the privilege should fail. Wigmore was not
advocating ad hoc judicial determinations following every individual claim of privilege. This all-or-nothing approach has been
criticized by some who prefer more ad hoc balancing. 237 Such
criticism may seem to carry special weight when the claim of
privilege would shield evidence of child abuse. A privilege that
233. See infra text accompanying notes 276-82.
234. See, for example, the preface to Mississippi's clergy privilege statute:
"Whereas, the emotional, mental and spiritual health of many of our citizens
depends upon the free and confidential access to their clergymen or spiritual
advisers.. . ." MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 note (Supp. 1986). See also Reese,
supra note 57, at 81-82 (therapeutic value of consulting clergy).
235. For a discussion of Dean Kellyey's Views, see W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH,
supra note 5, at 180-81.

236. See MCCORMICK, supra note 94, § 77.
237. See i&L; S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 1.01 (attorney-client
privilege); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege,supra note 224, at 464. Such an
ad hoc balancing approach is often used to determine whether to sustain a
claim of joumalist's privilege. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53,
§§ 8.09-.16.
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seems to be acceptable in general may appear less so when it
withholds crucial evidence of serious abuse of a helpless child.
One danger of the ad hoc approach to privileges, however, is its
tendency to focus on the palpable need for evidence in the individual case and to neglect more intangible and long-term interests. Even in ad hoc weighing, the balancer must take into
account the long-term effects of disclosure on the practice of
religion and the benefits the community derives from clergy's
contributions to the health of many citizens.
2.

Privacy

A few commentators have sought to justify evidentiary
privileges in terms of privacy interests.2 38 The privacy rationale rests the clergy privilege on each person's interest in the
dignity of privacy for his most intimate relationships. A confider who seeks out a member of the clergy for confession and
counsel draws on or establishes a soul-baring relationship as
deeply intimate as any among family members. There is general repugnance at the law's intrusion into such a relationship.
Weisberg and Wald are among the critics who have objected to resting the traditional evidentiary privileges solely on
Wigmore's utilitarian rationale: "Wigmore's instrumental concern has attracted some academic criticism, precisely because
he ascribes no independent legal significance to privacy....
Many commentators have argued that privacy, as an end and
not as a means to instrumental goals, is itself a ground of privilege." 2 39 Charles Black, for example, positing a privacy rationale instead of a utilitarian rationale for the marital
communications privilege, asked:
Is it so obvious that the effect of prior knowledge on conduct is the
one and only reason for respecting the privacies of human life? Is it
not the intrinsically private character of the relation, and the reciprocal indecency of invading that privacy, rather than the parties' knowl240
edge of the law of evidence, that chiefly justifies confidentiality?
238. See, e.g., R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 614-15 (1977); MCCORMICK, supra note 94, § 72; Black, The Marital and
PhysicianPrivileges-AReprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DUKE L.J.
45, 48-49; Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privilegesin Federal Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed FederalRules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85-94 (1973);
Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REV. 101, 110-11 (1956); Reese, supra note 57, at 60;
Saltzburg, Privilegesand Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L.
REV. 597, 614-15, 618-21 (1980); Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 191-93.
239. Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 191.
240. Black, supra note 238, at 49 (emphasis in original).
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Similarly, Black found the physician privilege grounded in "intrinsic decency," which ought not to give way "as soon as some'241
body files any kind of a non-demurrable complaint."
Unlike Wigmore's utilitarian rationale, the privacy rationale justifies the clergy privilege primarily in terms of the participants' interests and not society's benefit-except to the
extent that everyone benefits from living in a society in which
242
law does not intrude unnecessarily into people's private lives.
Whereas the Wigmore rationale seems to imply that society favors persons confiding in their clergy, the privacy rationale is
consistent with society's neutrality or even antipathy toward
such confidences. The privacy rationale protects the clergyconfider relationship because the confider, and not society generally, values that relationship. One advantage, then, of the
privacy rationale over the Wigmore rationale is that a privacy
rationale maintains the privilege even in the face of popular
loss of confidence in the clergy. A related advantage of the privacy rationale is that it does not depend on any showing that
disclosure of confidences would in fact deter or inhibit relationships with clergy. In other words, the privacy rationale eliminates the need to meet Wigmore's second and third
243
prerequisites for a privilege.
One disadvantage of the privacy rationale for the clergy
privilege is
that it might be cast in terms less sacrosanct than
"privacy." 244 For example, one author, writing of the marital
241. Id. at 50.
242. Reporting statutes can also infringe privacy rights of the reported
family. Vagueness of statutory criteria for reporting leads to overreporting,
and state investigations that do not substantiate the suspicion of abuse have
often seriously disrupted the family under investigation. See infra note 475
and accompanying text; Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at 354-55 (60% of child
abuse reports are unsubstantiated); id. at 362 (proposal to narrow and clarify
statutory definitions of child abuse); Note, ConstitutionalLimitations on the
Scope of State Child Neglect Statutes, 79 COLuMi. L. REV. 719, 721 (1979) (overbreadth of child neglect statutes).
243. But see Shuman & Weiner, supra note 225, at 899, 906-07 (arguing that
even privacy rationale for psychotherapy privilege has empirical components
because privilege is not absolute and may have to be balanced against other
interests).
244. Another disadvantage of the privacy rationale is that, whereas Wigmore's utilitarian rationale points to an absolute privilege, a privacy rationale
might be vulnerable to exceptions in cases where the need for the confidential
information is strong.
Traditional evidentiary privilege necessarily paints with a broad brush
since the achievement of utilitarian objectives requires privileges
which are essentially absolute in character. But . . . [if] the object
aimed at is not the inducement of conduct in certain relationships but
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communications privilege, characterized popular repugnance at
revealing confidences between spouses as "mere sentiment,"
"courtesy," and "feelings of delicacy. '245 Such terminology
paved the way for that author to discredit the privilege with
the mere quotation of Wigmore's declaration that the "high and
solemn duty of doing justice and of establishing the truth is not
to be obstructed by considerations of sentiment. '246 It was only
because the author could see a constitutionalbasis for the marital communications privilege that she thought the privilege
worth keeping at all.247
The clergy privilege similarly might be elevated to constitutional status. In 1965, the United States Supreme Court first
officially recognized a constitutional right of privacy. 248 The
use of the word "privacy" to identify this new doctrine suggests
the doctrine's possible application to confidences reposed in
clergy. Such confidences seem eminently "private" in the popular sense of that term. So far, however, the constitutional
right of privacy has mostly been confined to rights of autonomy
or decision making in such fundamentally personal areas as
marriage, procreation, abortion, sexual relations, child-rearing,
and medical treatment. 249 The cases provide little authority,
the protection of individual privacy from unnecessary or trivial intrusions, the implementation of the privilege is amenable to the finer
touch of the specific solution. Thus, a decision in the particular case
that sufficiently grave considerations demand disclosure will, to be
sure, impact adversely on the privilege holder, but no more extended
societal interest will be impaired.
McCORMICK, supra note 94, § 77, at 186-87. But see Note, Attorney-ClientPrivilege, supra note 224, at 480 (1977) (suggesting that a right-of-privacy rationale
for privilege makes it less vulnerable to "the corrosive effects of balancing").
See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
245. See Note, Pillow Talk, supra note 224, at 138.
246. Id. (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2228 at 228).
247. The author proceeded to argue that a limited marital comunications
privilege is compelled by the constitutional right of privacy. See id. at 139-47.
248. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Since the Griswold decision, commentators have extensively explored the nature and extent of the
constitutional right of privacy. See, e.g., Bazelon, ProbingPrivacy, 12 GONZ. L.
REV. 587 (1977); Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals
in the Constitution? 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445 (1983); Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Johnstone, The Right to Privacy: The Ethical Perspective, 29 Am. J. JURIS. 73 (1984); Lusky, Invasion of Privacy: A Clarificationof
Concepts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 693 (1972); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy
Have a Principle?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1974); Comment, A Taxonomy of
Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447
(1976).
249. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (remarriage); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contracep-
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however, for relying on the constitutional right of privacy to
keep private information secret.
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Paul v. Davis, 25 0 expressly
rejected the argument that the constitutional right of privacy
encompasses a right to the confidentiality of private information.251 The following year, however, two Supreme Court opin2 52
ions seemed to say expressly the opposite. In Whalen v. Roe,
the Court acknowledged that the privacy right has two facets:
the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters," and the individual "interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions. '2 53 Then, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,25 the Court quoted from
tion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (child custody); Stanley v. Georgia,

394 U.S. 557 (1969) (obscene materials in home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception).

250. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
251. Id In Davis, police had distributed to merchants in the Louisville
area flyers showing the pictures and names of persons recently arrested for
shoplifting in the area. Edward Davis appeared in the flyers, although he had
pleaded not guilty to a charge of shoplifting, the charge was not pursued, and
his guilt or innocence was never determined. Davis sued the police for redress
of constitutionally secured rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court
rejected the argument that his interests fell within constitutionally protected
zones of privacy:
His claim is based, not upon any challenge to the State's ability to restrict his freedom of action in a sphere contended to be "private," but
instead on a claim that the State may not publicize a record of an official act such as an arrest. None of our substantive privacy decisions
hold this or anything like this, and we decline to enlarge them in this
manner.
424 U.S. at 713 (emphasis added).
In Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), the court rejected an
unwed mother's argument that she had a constitutional right not to divulge to
welfare authorities the name of her child's father. The court held that, given
the state's right to "every man's evidence," "no man has any knowlege that is
rightly private." Id at 75 (quoting J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2192). According to the court, the only constitutional limit on the state's power to
gather evidence is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Id at 76. The court also distinguished the unwed mother's family relationships from the more "durable" ones honored in the Supreme Court's privacy
decisions. Id at 77.
252. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). At issue in Whalen was the constitutionality of
New York's centralized computer file containing names and addresses of persons who had obtained a physician's prescription for certain lawful drugs for
which an unlawful market also existed. The Court held that New York's computer file did not pose a sufficient threat to the constitutionally protected privacy interests of either patients or physicians. Id. at 603-04.
253. Id- at 599-600.
254. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). In Nixon, the Court held that former President
Nixon's "legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications"
did not suffice to prevent public archivists from hearing and editing tape re-
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Whalen to establish that "one element of privacy" is the interest in secrecy for personal matters. 255 The Court even found
this right to belong to a figure as public as the President of the
United States. Thus, both Whalen and Nixon extended the privacy right beyond autonomy to secrecy. On the other hand,
neither case elaborated on the right to secrecy, and neither acknowledged any conflict with Paul v. Davis. 256 Furthermore,
the privacy right did not prevail in either case. Rather, in both
cases the Court found that under the specific circumstances involved, adequate safeguards were in place to prevent serious
threats to privacy interests. 257 Thus, there is room to speculate
about the constitutional status of an argument for keeping pri258
vate information private.
cordings of his telephone conversations. Id. at 465. A federal statute authorized the archivists to examine millions of pages of presidential papers and hear
880 taped recordings made during Nixon's presidency. Nixon pointed out that
the tapes included some extremely private conversations with his family, attorney, and clergyman. Nevertheless, the Court found his privacy interest to
be even weaker than that involved in Whalen v. Roe. Id. at 458.
255. Id. at 457. The Court spoke partly in terms of privacy as an aspect of
the fourth amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Cf Note, ProtectingPrivacy Under the FourthAmendment, 91 YALE
L.J. 313 (1981) (private interest in secrecy and solitude should determine scope
of fourth amendment).
256. The concurrences in Whalen v. Roe justify hesitation in proclaiming a
new secrecy aspect of the constitutional privacy doctrine. Justice Brennan understood the Court to be recognizing a person's constitutional right to avoid
government's disclosure of personal matters, while finding that the right was
not "seriously invaded" in Whalen. 429 U.S. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring). On the other hand, Justice Stewart stated that he did not share Justice
Brennan's understanding of the holding and opined that a right of secrecy did
not follow from the Court's privacy precedents. 429 U.S. at 607-09 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
257. In Whalen, the Court found sufficient security against unwarranted
disclosure of the collected data. See 429 U.S. at 600-02, 605-06. Similarly, in
Nixon, the Court found no significant threat of exposure of personal communications. See 433 U.S. at 465. The Court in Nixon emphasized that the archivists had a record for discretion, and that public access regulations would be
sensitive to the exposure of private materials. Id. at 458-59, 465.
258. For example, an open question is whether the right to secrecy is infringed upon by government's obtaining the private information, or government's publicizing the information, or both. If the concern is with
government's acquisition of the information, there may be overlap with fourth
amendment law on search and seizure. See supra note 255. Another issue
open to speculation is whether the zones of secrecy are coextensive with the
zones of autonomy, or whether one has a right to keep certain intimate information confidential even if it does not pertain to marriage, procreation, sexual
conduct, or family. For a discussion of this issue, see Bazelon, supra note 248,
at 611-14; Kurkland, The PrivateI, U. CHI. MAG. 7, 8 (1976) (quoted in Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599); Project, Government Information and the Rights of
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Undaunted by the sparsity of precedent, a few commentators and courts recently have suggested that the doctrine of
privacy may afford a constitutional basis for a marital communications privilege, 259 a psychotherapist privilege, 260 a physi2 62
cian-patient privilege, 261 and even a parent-child privilege.
Citizens, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 971, 1225 (1975); Project, The Computerization of
Government Files: What Impact on the Individual?,15 UCLA L. REv. 1371,

1411-25 (1968); Note, The Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982); Note, Informational Privacy: Constitutional
Challenges to the Collection and Disseminationof PersonalInformation by
Government Agencies, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 229, 235 (1976); Comment, The
ConstitutionalRight to Withhold PrivateInformation, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 536,
540-41, 557 (1982).
259. E.g., Black, supra note 238, at 48-49; Note, Pillow Talk, supranote 224,
at 139-47.
260. E.g., In re B, 482 Pa. 471, 484, 394 A.2d 419, 425 (1978) ("an individual's
interest in preventing the disclosure of information revealed in the context of
a psychotherapist-patient relationship has deeper roots than the Pennsylvania
doctor-patient privilege statute"); Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 508
P.2d 309, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1973) (potential encroachment on constitutional
privacy rights required liberal construction of state's psychotherapist-patient
privilege statute); Smith, supra note 165, at 3-11; Weisberg & Wald, supra note
221, at 192; Note, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege Or
Right'? 3 CoNN. L. REV. 599 (1971); Comment, Duties in Conflict: Must Psychotherapists Report Child Abuse Inflicted By Clients and Confided in Therapy?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 645, 647-50 (1985). See also United States ex rel
Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("This strong subjective desire and pragmatic need for privacy in the psychotherapist-patient relationship is certain to give birth to intricate, far-reaching questions of
constitutional law.") (dictum), affd mem., 556 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1977); cf. In re
Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970) (psychiatrist argued, unsuccessfully, for absolute constitutional privacy right not to divulge
patient's confidence). In Lifschutz, the court implied a possible constitutional
privacy right in patients, but found the litigant-patient exception to the privilege constitutionally permissible. Accord Caesar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064
(9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). But see Bremer v. State, 18
Md. App. 291, 307 A.2d 503 (1973) (no state or federal constitutional psychiatrist privilege), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974).
261. E.g., Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Black, supra note 238, at 49-51; Gellman,
PrescribingPrivacy: The UncertainRole of the Physicianin the Protectionof
PatientPrivacy, 62 N.C.L. REv. 255 (1984). Cf. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 66 (1973) (privacy "extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the
hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy")
(dictum).
262. E.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1325-31 (D. Nev. 1983) (constitutional rights of family privacy dictate privilege for parent-child confidential
communications); People v. Fitzgerald, 101 Misc. 2d 712, 716, 422 N.Y.S.2d 309,
314 (1979) (parent-child testimonial privilege derived from state and federal
constitutional rights to family privacy); Stanton, Child-ParentPrivilege for
Confidential Communications: An Examination and Proposal, 16 FAM. L.Q.
1, 13-24 (1982); Comment, The Child-ParentPrivilege: A Proposal, 47 FoRDHAM L. REv. 771, 791-807 (1979); Comment, Parent-ChildTestimonial Privi-
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The arguments for the marital communications and parentchild privileges point out that the Supreme Court's leading
precedents on the right of privacy involved family-related matters. Those precedents, however, involved autonomy and not
secrecy in family matters. To bridge the gap between the
Supreme Court's decisions and the conclusion that the constitution requires evidentiary privileges for intrafamily communications, one must either argue that disclosure of intrafamily
confidences would somehow chill exercise of the right to make
fundamental family decisions or, alternatively, argue frankly
for a new direction for the right of privacy. 26 3 Similarly, the argument for a constitutional basis for the physician-patient privilege might point to precedent that already extends the right of
privacy to medical decision making. 26 Again, however, the argument must either show how secrecy protects autonomy or
call outright for extending the right of privacy to include some
aspects of secrecy.
Extending the privacy doctrine to psychotherapists and
clergy requires an even greater leap from precedents involving
autonomy. Nevertheless, several commentators and lower
courts have suggested that the intimacy of disclosures to psychotherapists justifies constitutional protection for the psycho2 65
therapist privilege.
In fact, the privacy concerns inherent in such professional relationships as the psychotherapist-patient relationship are in some ways
even stronger than those accorded constitutional weight, since in the
professional relationship the client discloses thoughts and feelings she
might well be unwilling or 2afraid
to disclose to her most intimate
66
friends and family members.

The argument that constitutional protection is warranted
in the psychotherapist-patient relationship because of the nalege: Preservingand Protectingthe FundamentalRight to Family Privacy, 52
U. CN. L. REv. 901 (1983); cf. Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913, 921
(E.D. Pa. 1973) (constitutional privacy right violated by questionnaires to
eighth-graders probing intimacies of parent-child relationship); In re A & M,
61 A.D.2d 426, 435, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375-81 (1978) (constitutional parent-child testimonial privilege in certain circumstances).
263. See Note, Pillow Talk, supra note 224, at 141-47. To tie together the
autonomy and secrecy aspects of privacy doctrine, one might argue either that
disclosure chills decision making or that essential autonomy includes the decisions whether, when, and to whom to reveal intimate information.
264. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (privacy right
includes right to choose discontinuance of life-support treatment), cert denied
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
265. See supra note 260.
266. Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 192.
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ture of the disclosures applies as well to confidential communications to clergy. If the privacy doctrine encompasses any
rights to secrecy, communications to clergy ought to be at the
head of the line of privileges accorded constitutional status.
Such communications are characteristically intimate, made
with the expectation of secrecy, important to health and wellbeing, closely tied to the making of fundamental personal decisions, and time-honored. 26 7 Furthermore-and this point is
more than a makeweight-it is difficult to talk for long about
privacy as a noninstrumental value without using religious
terms like "sacred," "sanctity," and "sanctuary." 268
A cleric may encounter difficulty, however, arguing that he
personally has a constitutional privacy right, apart from
the confider's right, to refrain from disclosing confidences. In
In re Lifschutz, 2 69 for example, the California Supreme Court
stated its belief that a psychotherapist's patients possess a privacy interest which "draws sustenance from our constitutional
heritage." 2 70 The court had trouble, however, seeing any independent privacy right of the psychotherapist:
It is the depth and intimacy of the patients' revelations that give rise
to the concern over compelled disclosure; the psychotherapist, though
undoubtedly deeply involved in the communicative treatment, does
not exert a significant privacy interest separate from his patient. We
cannot accept petitioner's reliance on the Griswold decision as establishing broad constitutional privacy rights of psychotherapists. 2 7 1

The Lifschutz court reached this conclusion despite its acknowledgment of a growing consensus that "an environment of
confidentiality of treatment is vitally important to the successful operation of psychotherapy. ' 272 Similarly, in Whalen v.
Roe,273 the United States Supreme Court rejected an argument
by physicians that their privacy rights were infringed upon by
267. In one respect, however, communications to psychotherapists may
have a stronger claim to privilege: a greater stigma now probably is associated
with consulting a psychotherapist than with consulting a cleric.
268. See, e.g., Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 192.
269. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970). Lifschutz held that
California's litigant-patient exception to its psychotherapist privilege did not
violate the constitutional privacy rights of either psychotherapists or patients.
270. Id. at 431, 467 P.2d at 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 839. The court held, however, that the litigant-patient exception to the psychotherapist privilege was
carefully tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in ascertaining the
truth in litigation and thus was constitutional. Id. at 432-33, 467 P.2d at 568, 85
Cal. Rptr. at 840.
271. Id. at 424, 467 P.2d at 562, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 834 (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted).
272. Id. at 422, 467 P.2d at 560-61, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
273. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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New York's practice of maintaining a computer file on persons
with prescriptions for certain drugs. The Court reasoned that
"[t]o the extent that their claim has reference to the possibility
that the patients' concern about disclosure may induce them to
refuse needed medication, the doctors' claim is derivative from,
and therefore no stronger than, the patients'." 274 Thus, a
cleric's privacy claim unallied with the confider's claim might
not be accorded constitutional weight.2 75
3.

Free Exercise of Religion

A third rationale for the clergy privilege is accommodation
of religious practice. Although this rationale is little discussed,
it almost certainly underlies the privilege.2 7 6 Bentham, who
'27 7
justiWigmore called "the greatest opponent of privileges,
2 78
toleration.
religious
fied the clergy privilege on grounds of
Wigmore himself wrote that the penitential relation deserves
recognition "[i]n a State where toleration of religions exists by
law, and where a substantial part of the community professes a
religion practicing a confessional system. ' 279 Furthermore, the
first case in the United States to recognize the clergy privilege
grounded that privilege in religious liberty. 28 0 Although the accommodation of religion reflected in the clergy privilege may
be partly an accommodation of the religious practices of confiders, surely it is also an accommodation of clergy's religious objections to disclosure. Many clergy feel bound by church rule or
personal conscience not to betray professional confidences.
274. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
275. If the Court held that the constitutional right of privacy included the
clergy privilege, a state could not require disclosure of confidential communications to clergy unless it could demonstrate a compelling state interest and
the necessity of disclosure to sustain that interest. Caesar v. Mountanos, 542
F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lift
schutz; 2 Cal. 3d at 432-33, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840. See Smith,
supra note 165, at 4-11, 32-41 (discussing test in detail as applied to psychotherapist privilege). See also infra text accompanying notes 442-483 (discussing
whether a state statute meets this test, which also applies to the cleric's free
exercise claim).
276. See McCoRMICK, supra note 94, § 76.2. A few statutes, for example,
recognize the privilege when disclosure would violate a "sacred or moral
trust." See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1984).
277. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2396.
278. See 4 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JuDIcIAL EVIDENCE 588 (Hunt &
Clark ed. 1827).
279. J. WIGMORE, supra note 53, § 2396.
280. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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Clergy are taught deep respect for the information they receive from
their parishioners. Catholic priests are under threat of excommunication if they reveal information obtained from the confessional.
Although Jewish and Protestant clergy do not perform the sacramental equivalent of a confession, they hold the religious communications
28 1
of their parishioners in high confidence.

Although this third rationale for the privilege can be
framed simply as a policy rationale, it also can be framed in
terms of a constitutional right. This Article later takes up the
argument that the clergy privilege is not simply a statutory law
with various policy rationales, but is also a constitutional right
28
of clergy.

E.

2

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRIVILEGE UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The establishment clause of the first amendment states:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion .... " 2 8 3 Despite its reference to Congress, the establishment clause prohibition constrains the states as well as the

federal government, 28 4 and all branches of government. The
Supreme Court has interpreted the establishment clause to prohibit much more than an official national church. 2

5

The Court

has broadly applied the clause in two ways that unsettle the
current law of clergy privilege. First, the Supreme Court has
consistently read the clause as prohibiting governmental favoritism for or discrimination against particular religions. 2 6 Second, less consistently and more controversially, the Court has
stated that the establishment clause outlaws state aid or benefit
281. Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 149, at 293.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 385-496.
283. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
284. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49-50 (1985) (fourteenth amendment
imposes same substantive limits, including limit on establishing religion, on
the state's legislative powers as the first amendment imposes on Congress);
Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8, 15 (1947) (first case to hold
that the fourteenth amendment embraces the establishment clause); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (dictum suggesting fourteenth amendment extends to establishment clause); Stoyles, supra note 150, at 28 ("Doubt
no longer exists that fourteenth amendment requires states to afford the protections of the fundamental principles of the religion clauses.").
285. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1982) (establishment clause "extends beyond prohibition of a state church").
286. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) ("The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 ("Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can pass laws which.., prefer one religion
over another.").
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to religion even in general. 28 7 Although the Supreme Court has
never ruled directly on the constitutionality of the clergy privithe constitulege, 288 in light of the Court's establishment cases,
28 9
tionality of the privilege seems open to question.
The Supreme Court has recently expressed its "unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area," 290 and there is fresh disagreement among the
Justices as to the merit of the Court's traditional lines of inquiry in establishment cases.2 91 Nevertheless, the Court has
prescribed two tests for applying the establishment clause. The
Larson strict-scrutiny test applies to laws that discriminate on
their face among religious denominations. 292 The Lemon tripartite test applies in other establishment cases. 293 Either test
287. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17
(1963) (the Supreme Court "has rejected unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion
over another"); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (federal and state governments may
not pass laws that aid one religion or all religions).
288. Cf.Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875) (secrets of confessional should be protected) (dictum).
289. See McCoRMIcK, supra note 94, § 76.2, at 184 (constitutionality of
clergy privilege is an "open question"); Reese, supra note 57, at 87-88 (questioning whether priest-penitent statutes violate the establishment clause). See
also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 429, 467 P.2d 557, 566, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 838
(1970) (declining to comment on the "potentially difficult constitutional question" of constitutionality of clergy privilege). See generally Stoyles, supra note
150 (arguing the priest-penitent privilege as typically applied is unconstitutional).
290. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
291. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 62-114 (1985) (concurring and
dissenting opinions).
292. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny
when a state law grants a denominational preference).
293. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). In a footnote to Larson v. Valente, the Supreme Court distinguished between (1) a state law that
is facially neutral but has a disparate impact on different religious organizations and (2) a state law that "makes explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations." 456 U.S. 228, 246 n.23 (1982). The
latter law is unconstitutional unless, under the Larson test, its distinctions are
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id at 247. The former is unconstitutional unless the State can demonstrate its secular purpose and effect.
Id. at 246 n.23. In other words, apparently the former type of statute must
meet the Lemon tripartite test, 403 U.S. at 612-13, while the latter must meet
the Larson strict-scrutiny test. It is not at all clear which category encompasses a clergy privilege statute that seems to grant the privilege, in effect,
only to one or a few religious sects. In Larson the Court struck down Minnesota's charitable solicitations act because it exempted from registration and reporting requirements only those religious organizations that received more
than half their contributions from members. 456 U.S. at 251, 255. Such a statutory distinction, according to Larson, effectively discriminated against new

CLERGY PRIVILEGE
might be brought to bear on the law of clergy privilege.
1.

Discrimination Among Religions

Government may not favor one or some religions over
others. 2 94 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this "principle of denominational neutrality" in Larson v. Valente,295 and
articulated the test for determining whether a discriminatory
law violates the establishment clause. The Court will consider
such a law suspect and apply strict scrutiny.29 6 Strict scrutiny
requires the state to justify its discrimination with a "compelling governmental interest" and to show that its law is "closely
297
fitted to further that interest."
Many versions of the clergy privilege are not denominationally neutral. For example, statutes limiting the privilege to
a "priest" 298 or "priest or minister of the gospel" 2 99 exhibit obvious favoritism. Less obviously, but more typically, statutes
limiting the privilege to churches whose "discipline enjoins"
their members to make confessions to a cleric effectively limit
the privilege to Roman Catholics. 300 Similarly, many statutes
seem to limit the privilege to well-established churches. 30 ' Less
narrow, but also discriminatory, are versions of the clergy privilege in which the "discipline enjoined" requirement refers to
church discipline enjoining its clergy to hear, rather than its
churches or churches that in principle favor public solicitation of funds. Id at
253-55.
294. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
295. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).

296. IL
297. I at 247.
298. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 857 (1967).
299. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973).
300. Reese, supra note 57, at 61 n.22, 62 (citing statutes from 22 states that
include some form of the wording "in the course of discipline enjoined by the
Church") (citations omitted). See Stoyles, supra note 150, at 59 (arguing that
effectively limiting the privilege to Roman Catholics makes the privilege unconstitutional); supra text accompanying notes 172-77. Forcing revelation of
intimate confidences that a person's religion specifically required him to make
might be particularly offensive. States, however, do not seem to have a compelling interest in distinguishing between that offense and the offense in forcing revelation of other intimate information confided in a cleric for purposes
of obtaining forgiveness, consolation, or religious counsel.
301. See Smith, supra note 57, at 9 ("Some [states] have placed restrictive
definitions of clergy and legitimate denominations in their privilege rules in
apparent attempts to keep frauds and fly-by-nights from claiming privilege
under the acts."); supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
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members to make, confession. 30 2 Such statutory line-drawing
groups seems to call for application of Larson
among religious
30 3
strict scrutiny.
Under the Larson analysis the state must demonstrate a
compelling reason not only for recognizing clergy privilege, but
specifically for extending the privilege to some but not all religions. 30 4 It is difficult to imagine a compelling reason necessitating most statutory discrimination. The state could hardly
judge constitutionally, for example, that some denominations'
clergy are better counselors than others'. Some courts, sensitive to potential constitutional problems, have interpreted
facially discriminatory statutes more broadly than the statutory
language seems to warrant. 30 5 Arguably, the clergy privilege
should extend to clergy of all religions.
2.

Favoring Religion In General

Even if the clergy privilege were expanded to include the
clergy of all religious groups, the question remains whether a
state may favor religion in general by granting special benefits,
even to all religions. Laws that seem to favor religion over
nonreligion are subject to the Lemon test, an inquiry first expressly articulated in the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in
302. Reese, supra note 57, at 67-73 (comparing "discipline enjoined" statutes) (quoting ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-606 (1947)).

303. A state might constitutionally distinguish between clergy who believe
disclosure violates a sacred trust and clergy not encumbered by such a belief.
California's statute, for example, limits the privilege to communications to a
cleric who "under the discipline or tenets of his church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep such communications secret." CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 1032 (West 1966). The rationale for such a distinction would be the accommodation of free exercise of religion, unquestionably a compelling state interest. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).
State privilege statutes draw many other distinctions that do not on their
face discriminate among religious groups and therefore do not call for strict
scrutiny under Larson. For example, the distinction between confessions and
nonpenitential communications, although it may be unwisely artificial, would
not compel Larson scrutiny. Similarly, applying the privilege to communications by members of the cleric's church, but not to communications by nonmembers, seems unduly restrictive yet is not discrimination against some
religious groups.
304. See Larson, 456 U.S. at 244-46 (stating a "principle of denominational
neutrality"); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-51 (1971) (conscientious
objector provision of Selective Service Act does not violate establishment
clause because it does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation.).
305. See, e.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 603-04, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931)
(rejecting narrow meaning of "confession" that would apply only to Roman
Catholic Church in favor of broader meaning that would apply to any
religion).
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Lemon v. Kurtzman.306 Despite some Justices' recent murmurings of dissatisfaction with the Lemon test, 30 7 the Supreme
Court has invoked that test in almost every establishment case
since 1971.308 To be constitutional under the Lemon test, the
clergy privilege must (1) have a "secular legislative purpose,"
(2) have a primary effect that "neither advances nor inhibits
religion," and (3) not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 309 Thus, to be constitutional under
the Lemon test, the clergy privilege must first have a secular
purpose. The state's purpose need not be exclusively secular. 3 10
It is not enough, however, for the state to articulate some secular purpose if the stated purpose is pretextual. 311
At this point, the rationale for the clergy privilege becomes
constitutionally significant. If the Constitution compels a religious exemption, such as the clergy's exemption from the general duty to report certain information, the exemption cannot
violate the establishment clause. 312 If, however, the Constitu306. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
307. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 62-114 (1985) (concurring and
dissenting opinions).
308. Except for Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982), Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), stands alone among the Supreme Court's establishment clause cases as a post-Lemon case not applying the Lemon test. Marsh,
463 U.S. at 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court makes no pretense
of subjecting Nebraska's practice of legislative prayer to any of the formal
'tests' that have traditionally structured our inquiry under the Establishment
Clause."). In Marsh, the Court upheld the Nebraska legislature's practice of
hiring and paying a chaplain to begin each legislative session with prayer. Idat 795. Although the Eighth Circuit had held that Nebraska's practice failed
all three parts of the Lemon test, id. at 786, the Supreme Court, surprisingly,
did not even acknowledge the test. Id at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Instead, the Court considered the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer as "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country" and
followed by federal and state legislatures since colonial times. Id at 786.
Thus, the Court concluded, legislative prayer presents "no real threat to the
Establishment Clause .... " Id. at 791.
309. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
310. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 ("For even though a statute that is motivated
in part by a religious purpose may satisfy the first criterion, the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is entirely motivated by a
purpose to advance religion." (citation omitted)).
311. Id.; Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (finding state's asserted
purpose pretextual).
312. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719-20
(1981) (allowing Jehovah's Witness to receive unemployment compensation
when he refused to work in production of weapons was not violation of establishment clause); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (allowing Seventh-Day Adventist to exercise her religion was not a violation of the
establishment clause). So if, as this Article argues, the free exercise clause
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tion does not require an exemption, the state must be careful
how it frames its purpose for the privilege. If the state's purpose is to "sedulously foster" relationships with clergy, 313 arguably its purpose is the unconstitutionally religious one of
endorsing religion. If, however, the state only seeks to accommodate some persons' religious practices, its purpose should be
upheld as constitutional. 314 The Supreme Court has not clariof religious practice
fied whether and when the accommodation
31 5
is a legitimate secular interest.
To avoid this thicket, a state might seek to justify its clergy
privilege by other legitimate secular interests, such as its interest in the health of its citizens or in protecting the privacy of
intimate relationships. 3 16 The Lemon test does not expressly
incorporate an inquiry into the overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness of a state's law. Thus, these state interests in the
clergy privilege would probably be acceptable despite the state's
failure to extend a similar privilege to other counselors, such as
or school counselors, or to other intimate
psychotherapists
3 17
relationships.
compels recognition of some clergy privilege, that privilege does not violate
the establishment clause. See infra text accompanying notes 385-496.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 230-35.
314. The California Supreme Court has held that no violation of equal protection exists when the psychotherapist privilege statute has a litigant-patient
exception not contained in the clergy privilege statute. The permissible reason
for the distinction, according to that court, is the accommodation of religious
practice. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 429, 467 P.2d 557, 565, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829,
837 (1970). See also Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 237 (2d Cir. 1985) (purpose
of the constitutionally valid army chaplaincy program is to make religious activities available to military personnel where they would otherwise be unavailable). See infra text accompanying notes 326-28.
315. See supra note 232.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35. If a state's primary rationale for the clergy privilege is the mental and emotional health of its citizens,
the state might wish to extend the privilege only to clergy with certain credentials for counseling. Such a distinction would, however, raise serious questions
of state entanglement with organized religion and of infringement of free exercise of religion. But cf. Comment, C/ergy Malpractice: Bad News, supra
note 49, at 224-26 (arguing that although some have contended that a judicially-enforced pastoral counseling standard would constitute excessive entanglement because it would require secular authorities to monitor religious
activity, the government's interest in redressing mental and physical injury
may be overriding).
317. A striking overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness might raise a suspicion that the asserted state interest is pretextual. Most states, however, do afford a privilege for communications to physicians and psychotherapists. See
Shuman & Weiner, supra note 225, at 907-11 n.100 (table of physician, psychiatrist, psychologist, and psychotherapist privileges by state). Some also recognize privileges for other mental health workers, for social workers, or for

1987]

CLERGY PRIVILEGE

The second part of the Lemon test for constitutionality requires a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. "[N]ot every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or
'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." 318 In pursuing this inquiry, the Supreme
Court has been primarily concerned about direct financial subsidies to religious organizations, 319 or about direct governmental messages of endorsement of religion.3 20 A state's provision
of a special privilege for religious leaders might seem to communicate endorsement of religion. 321 On the other hand, the
Court has tended not to find a primary religious effect when
the benefit to religious persons or groups is shared with other
similarly situated persons or groups, if they are similarly situated with regard to legitimate secular criteria. 32 2 Thus, a state's
mental health information generally. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note
53, §§ 7.03-7.06.
318. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 771 (1973) quoted in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
319.

Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs for the Blind, 106 S. Ct. 748, 752-

53 (1986) (financial aid to blind person who chose to use aid to support his religious education was not a direct subsidy and was constitutional); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-402 (1982) (primary effect of statute making school expenses deductible was not to advance religion).
320. Witters, 106 S. Ct. at 753 (no "message of state endorsement of religion" is conveyed merely because petitioner chose "to use neutrally available
state aid to help pay for his religious education"); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1982) ("[T]he mere appearance of a joint exercise of
legislative authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion."). Delegation of legislative powers to religious groups can also
run afoul of the second part of the Lemon test. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 122-23
(zoning law delegating to churches power to prevent issuance of liquor licenses
within specified radius of churches violates the establishment clause).
Although the Supreme Court has maintained a strict separationist position in its cases involving religion in public schools, see, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 42-61 (holding Alabama statute authorizing a daily period of silence for
meditation or voluntary prayer unconstitutional), it has recently taken a more
accommodationist position in other establishment cases. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687
(declining to impose a "crabbed" reading of the establishment clause); Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 393 (1982) (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742
(1973) and announcing its "consistent rejection of the argument that 'any program which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation' violates the Establishment Clause").
321. "The Court might be persuaded that a state, in granting the priestpenitent privilege, unconstitutionally furnishes use of a court room, funds,
judges and other court personnel, prestige, and power to religion or a sect or
sects through the intermediaries of clergy and church members." Stoyles,
supra note 150, at 46 (citations deleted). See also id. at 47 (asking whether
privilege helps churches acquire or retain members).
322. See, e.g., Witters, 106 S. Ct. at 753 (financial aid to blind students for
education or training in various trades and professions including ministry);
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concurrent recognition of privileges for other healing or intimate relationships probably negates any message of special endorsement of religion in particular.
The third Lemon inquiry looks for excessive entanglement
between government and religion. The Court has found excessive entanglement, for example, when government must monitor public funds to religious institutions to ensure that the
funds serve primarily secular purposes 32 3 or when religious organizations become involved in the exercise of governmental
authority. 324 The clergy privilege does not seem to present any
325
impermissible entanglement.
The Second Circuit recently affirmed the constitutionality
of the Army's chaplaincy program. 326 The court held that the
program passed all three parts of the Lemon test, which, the
court cautioned, must be applied flexibly and in context rather
than woodenly. 327 According to the Second Circuit, making
clergy available to persons who choose to consult them is a legitimate secular purpose and does not have the primary effect
of advancing religion. 3 28 If government's paying for, approving,
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397 (income tax deduction for parents with certain schoolrelated expenses including expenses for parochial schools). But cf, Larkin,
459 U.S. at 117, 125-26 (primary effect of zoning laws to protect churches and
schools was advancement of religion).
323. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 254 (1977) (funding of field
trips for nonpublic schools impermissibly entangled state with religion because
state supervision of nonpublic teachers would be required); Lemon, 403 U.S. at
611-25 (salary supplement to teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools impermissibly entangled state with religion because extensive
state surveillance would be required).
324. See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 126-27 (zoning law vesting governmental authority in churches impermissibly entangles church and state).
325. A court, however, may still have to determine who is clergy and what
is a church. See supra notes 106-30 and accompanying text; see also Note,
Catholic Sisters, IrregularlyOrdained Women and the C7ergy-Penitent Privilege, 9 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 523, 538-47 (1976) (arguing "clergy" should be redefined to include "sisters and irregularly ordained women"). Although some
might find an excessive entanglement in such inquiries, see, e.g., Stoyles, supra
note 150, at 34, 55, there seems to be no more entanglement here than in many
of the cases in which a state must define clergy, church, or religion for purposes of accommodating religion. If, however, the court must delve into
church discipline to determine what it requires, arguably such interpretation
amounts to excessive entanglement beyond judicial competence. See supra
note 177.
326. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 1985). The court remanded
the case, however, for a determination whether chaplains were necessary in
large urban areas where civilian clergy were readily available. Id.
327. Id. at 232-34.
328. Id. at 234, 237. The court suggested the free exercise and establish-
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and supervising clergy, so that some persons may consult them,
is constitutional, government's merely respecting the confidentiality of communications to clergy, for similar reasons, should
be constitutional as well.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS AND THE CLERGY
PRIVILEGE
Statutes impose child abuse reporting requirements; the
clergy privilege is thought to rest on statute. Thus, resolving
any tension between the two is, at first instance, a process of
statutory construction. This process involves three inquiries,
the answers to which will vary from state to state. First, do
child abuse reporting requirements apply to clergy? If not,
there is, of course, no tension between reporting requirements
and the clergy privilege. If, however, clergy are subject to reporting requirements, the second question arises: does the
clergy privilege extend to the context of a reporting requirement? If it does, the conflict between the two is palpable, and
the third question is then imperative: how should the conflict
between the two statutes be resolved? The remainder of this
Article examines these three questions.
A.

WHETHER REPORTING REQUIREMENTS APPLY TO CLERGY

Four types of provisions in state reporting statutes arguably apply to clergy. First, a few statutes specifically require
clergy to report.3 29 Second, many statutes require Christian
Science practitioners or "religious healers" to report. 330 Because such healers might also be considered clergy for purposes
of the clergy privilege, 331 information confided to them in their
dual role as healer-clergy would seem to raise the conflict between privilege and duty to report. Third, a cleric can also
function as a teacher, school administrator, social worker, or
other professional required to report. Tension with the clergy
privilege is, however, less likely in these contexts. The clergy
privilege applies only to communications confided to a cleric in
ment clauses may compel the Army to provide clergy of a person's own denomination in areas where they are not otherwise available. Id at 234.
329. See supra note 31.
330. See supra note 30.
331. About one-quarter of the clergy privilege statutes mention Christian
Science practitioners. S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 6.05.
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her professional capacity as cleric.3 3 2 Thus, the conflict between the reporting requirement and the clergy privilege arises
only if a communication is confided to the cleric as cleric and
the reporting requirement applies regardless of the source of
the cleric's information.
Finally, approximately half of the statutes contain general
"catch-all" provisions 333 that would, in the absence of an express exclusion, seem to include clergy. Where "any person"
who suspects abuse must report, clergy are obviously included. 334 Clergy also might be included under a duty imposed
on "any public or private official,"3 35 "any persons who, in the
course of their employment, occupation, or practice of their
profession come into contact with children, 3 3 6 or "any other
person having responsibility for the care or treatment of
'337
children.
Thus, even setting aside the more specialized second and
third types of provisions, it appears that more than half the reporting statutes apply, at least at first blush, to clergy. If, in jurisdictions with such statutes, the clergy privilege extends to
reporting requirements, the cleric's dilemma is complete.
B.

WHETHER THE CLERGY PRIVILEGE APPLIES IN THE
CONTEXT OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

There has been surprisingly little discussion of the range of
the so-called evidentiary privileges. 338 The paradigmatic claim
of privilege is that of a witness in court invoking the privilege
as he declines to testify. The privilege protects against his being held in contempt of court. Most discussion concerning privileges in general, and the clergy privilege in particular, assumes
the context of a criminal or civil trial in a court.3 39 If the clergy
332. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (discussing limitation of
privileged communication to cleric's professional role).
333. See supra note 32.
334. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 at 1559 (Aug. 5, 1985) (construing
"catch-all" statute to include clergy).
335. Op. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1985).
336. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2204(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
337. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3620(A) (Supp. 1986).
338. For a discussion of the evidentiary privilege, see Reese, supra note 57,
at 73-74; Smith, supra note 57, at 14, 17-18; Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221,
at 158-59; Yellin, supra note 57, at 138-39 n.191; cf Note, Confidential Relationships: Does the Law Require Silence Outside the Courtroom?, 6 UTAH L. REV.
380 (1959) (surveying privileged communications outside the courtroom).
339. See, e.g., S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 7.01, at 378-79 (stating that privileges are usually limited to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
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privilege is limited to a trial context, it obviously does not conflict with reporting requirements.
Recognition of evidentiary privileges has not, however,
been confined to trials. Privileges are generally also recognized
in grand jury proceedings,3 40 for example, and before administrative tribunals.3 41 It is not clear, however, whether privileges
extend far enough from trial-like settings to serve as an excuse
for failure to comply with a statutorily mandated duty to report.3 42 This issue would arise in a criminal or civil action
against the cleric for failure to report.343 To resolve this question, this section examines the language of the clergy privilege
statutes, the rationales for the privilege and their application to
reporting, and specific references to privileges in the abuse-reporting statutes.
1.

The Language of the Privilege Statutes

To discover whether the clergy privilege would apply to a
reporting requirement, the starting place should be the language of the privilege statutes themselves. Unfortunately, most
clergy privilege statutes do not state the range of their application, and those that do fail to address the specific context of reporting requirements. Apparently, the drafters of the privilege
statutes did not have in mind any potential for tension between
the privilege and reporting requirements. Given the relative
newness of reporting requirements and the paucity of case law
addressing the tension, this oversight is not surprising.
Some clergy privilege statutes do straightforwardly set out
but that statutes broaden the application of privileges to other types of
disclosure).
340. In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see W. TIEMANN
& J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 183-87 ("Case law is currently averse to the claim
of privilege in grand jury inquiries." Id. at 185.).
341. McCORMICK, supra note 94, § 356; cf. Mogel, The Effect of a Claim of
Privilege Upon the Subpoena Power of an Administrative Law Judge, 28

DRAKE L. REv. 67 (1978-79) (advocating restraint of administrative law judge's
subpoena power when a claim of privilege is asserted).
342. See Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 156-82 (discussing law's confusion concerning scope of privilege and other nondisclosure statutes); cf.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (discussing psychotherapist privilege as potential bar to psycho-

therapist's duty to warn foreseeable victims of patient's violence); Commonwealth v. Jones, 501 Pa. 162, 460 A.2d 739, 742 (1983) (spousal testimonial
privilege limited to adjudicative proceedings and does not extend to wife's giving police information that leads to husband's arrest).
343. See supranotes 45-49 and accompanying text (addressing criminal and
civil liability for failure to report).
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the contexts in which claiming the privilege is proper. A few of
these statutes are worded so narrowly as to suggest that the
privilege would not shield the cleric from reporting requirements. For example, Rhode Island's statute limits the privilege
to "the trial of every cause, both civil and criminal," 344 and
Tennessee's statute covers "testimony as a witness in any litigation."34 5 Only a Pickwickian reading of such language could
apply these statutes to mandated reports that may or may not
result in a trial. West Virginia's statute is most severely lim346
ited: to testimony in divorce actions.
Other privilege statutes state their applications more
broadly, yet still do not clearly include the reporting context.
Such statutes provide, for example, that the privilege applies in
any "civil or criminal proceedings," 347 or "any legal proceeding" 348 or even "any civil or criminal case or proceedings preliminary thereto."349 The reach of these statutes depends on
the reach of the word "proceeding." One could argue that a report of child abuse initiates, and thus is part of, a "proceeding"
for the investigation of the abuse. 350 By comparison, Pennsylvania's statute strains a little less to cover the reporting context. It extends its privilege to disclosures "in any legal
proceeding, trial or investigation before any government
unit."'351 Only Illinois, however, words its statute to fit easily
the reporting context; its statute applies to state compulsion "to
disclose in any court, or to any administrative board or agency,
or to any public officer. '35 2 Thus, even among the minority of
privilege statutes purporting to state their scope, only a few
seem to extend the clergy privilege to state-mandated reports.
Most clergy privilege statutes do not even attempt to state
the range of their application. One might, however, draw modest inferences from the statutes' language. Laws that state, for
344.

R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-17-23 (1985) (emphasis added).

345. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-206(a)(1) (1980) (emphasis added).
346. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-10a (1986) (emphasis added).
347. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (1981) (broad statute with no clear
application to reporting); see also ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1986) ("[a]ny
proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court").
348. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1982).
349. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146(b) (1985) (emphasis added); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 421.210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
350. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985) (assuming this
point).
351. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon 1982) (emphasis added).
352. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 8-803 (Smith-Hurd 1984) (emphasis added).
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example, that a cleric shall not be examined 353 or examined as

a witness, 354 or that otherwise speak in terms of testimony3 5 5 or
competence to testify,356 arguably limit the privilege to contexts

in which there are witnesses, examination, and testimony, for
example, to trials and trial-related or trial-like proceedings.
Although the breadth of words like "examine" and "testify" is
certainly debatable, such terminology seems to be at least inappropriate as applied to a person's tip to the authorities, especially because the tip may never result in a trial.
The location of many clergy privilege statutes in a code of
evidence might imply a range for the privilege coextensive with
that of rules of evidence generally. 3 57 Unfortunately, that
range is often also unclear. 358 Furthermore, many clergy privilege statutes appear not in a code of evidence but among provisions regarding professionals' conduct and licensure.
One must conclude that the clergy privilege statutes mostly
fail to state or even imply whether the privilege could be properly invoked to excuse a failure to report abuse.
2. The Rationales for the Clergy Privilege
Every major rationale for the clergy privilege applies to the
context of mandatory reports to the state. 359 If the rationale
for the privilege is a concern that disclosure of confidential

§

353. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(3) (1985 & Supp. 1986).
354. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT.
13-90-107 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 9-203(3) (1979 & Supp. 1986).

355. IOWA CODE § 622.10 (1984).
356. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1986).
357. See Reese, supra note 57, at 74 (arguing that failure of state evidence
code to mention administrative hearings limits applicability of clergy privilege
in those proceedings); Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 159 n.54 (arguing
that privileges found in evidence codes might apply only to court proceedings);
Yellin, supra note 57, at 139 n.191 ("Since the privilege statutes are invariably
in the parts of the code dealing with evidence, presumptively the privilege
would have as broad or narrow an application as the evidence code does.").
358. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence are not limited to proceedings before United States courts. 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5013, at 120 (1977). Application to federal agencies or other tribunals, however, is dependent on statutory requirements often
qualified by phrases capable of broad interpretation, such as "so far as practicable." Id Operating under this standard, federal agencies may be subject to
less restrictive evidence standards than the rules themselves suggest. See MCCORMICK, supra note 94, § 351 (discussing relaxation of evidence rules for federal agencies). In addition, most states have freed their administrative
agencies from rules of evidence. Id § 351, at 1008.
359. See Smith, supra note 57, at 14, 17-18 (arguing that it is senseless not
to extend clergy privilege to informal state investigations).
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communications will defeat the cleric-confider relationship, 360
it matters little whether disclosure is to a court during trial or
to a public official to trigger an investigation. That states may
take some steps to prevent public access to reported information 361 will do little to reassure hesitant confiders because the
information may ultimately become available for a civil or
criminal trial and, meanwhile, many state officials may have
shared the contents of the report. Similarly, a cleric's ability to
report anonymously 3 62 might protect the clergy-confider counseling relationship in the short run because the confider, and
potential confiders, would not know that the cleric might be reporting confided information. If the law requires clerics to report, however, in the long run people will know, and the
cleric's ability to minister might be impaired. If the rationale
for the privilege is the concern with privacy for intimate relationships, 363 that privacy is shattered by compelled disclosures
in the form of a report as much as by compelled disclosures in a
courtroom. Finally, to the extent that the privilege is grounded
in free exercise of religion, 364 the privilege should extend to
any state requirement of disclosure that offends religious
principles.
3. References to Privileges in Abuse Reporting Statutes
Despite a lack of precedent for extending privileges as far
outside the courtroom as to reports, the abuse-reporting statutes themselves manifest widespread concern that such an extension is expectable. All but six reporting statutes contain
some provision to abrogate or reaffirm some privileges. 365
Many of these provisions abrogate privileges only for "proceedings" or "judicial proceedings" resulting from or related to a re360. See supra notes 219-37 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of protecting clergy-confider relationships).
361. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 62-63 (listing confidentiality status of
state laws).
362. See supra note 40 (statutory allowance for anonymous reporting).
363. See supra notes 238-75 and accompanying text (discussing privacy
rationale).
364. See supra text accompanying notes 276-82 (discussing religion rationale); infra notes 385-496 and accompanying text (analyzing clergy's free exercise rights).
365. See supra note 50 (chart and discussion of state abrogation provisions).
Many of these abrogation provisions are unclear and illogical. See also Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 162-65 (identifying flaws in abrogation statutes
and their exceptions).
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port.366 Such statutes do not directly address whether a person
367
may claim a privilege to avoid reporting in the first place.

Many other statutes, however, explicitly state that certain privileges shall not excuse mandatory reporting.368 Typical of these
statutes is Florida's, which states that various professional privileges "shall not apply to any situation involving known or suspected child abuse or neglect and shall not constitute grounds
369

for failure to report as required ....

,,

Six reporting statutes expressly abrogate the clergy privilege.37 0 Most of these statutes abrogate the privilege for any

"proceeding" regarding child abuse, failing to indicate whether
the privilege is still available to justify a cleric's failure to report abuse in the first place. A seventh statute, Washington's,
is oddly worded.37 1 It states that neither mandatory nor permissive reporting of child abuse will violate the clergy privilege,
so that a cleric who reports is not liable to any confider for violation of the privilege statute.3 72 The statute, however, only implies the correlative point that the clergy privilege statute
373
affords no refuge from the duty to report.
In addition to the statutes expressly abrogating the clergy
privilege, about half of the reporting statutes seem to include
the clergy privilege in their general abrogation of all professional privileges, or all except the attorney-client privilege.
North Dakota's statute is typical:
Any privilege of communication between husband and wife or between any professional person and his patient or client, except between attorney and client, is abrogated and does not constitute
grounds for preventing a report to be made or for excluding evidence
366. E.g., ALA. CODE § 26-14-10 (1986) ("judicial proceeding"); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 350-5 (1985) (same).
367. Cf.Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985) (assuming that statutory abrogation of clergy privilege for "any proceeding" applies also to
reporting).
368. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-11-8 (Burns Supp. 1986) (husband-wife and
health-care provider privileges not grounds for failure to report); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 199.335(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986) (husband-wife and
professional-client privileges not grounds for failure to report but attorney-client and clergy-penitent specifically excluded).
369. FLA. STAT. § 415.512 (1985) (emphasis added).
370. See supra note 54 (listing statutes that abrogate the clergy privilege).
371. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.060(3) (1985).
372. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.030(1), (2) (1985) (mandatory and
permissive reporting requirements) with § 26.44.060(3) (1985) (reporting not
violation of privilege). Cf supra note 196 (other state statutes excluding clerics from testifying).
373. See State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 735-37, 539 P.2d 86, 90-91 (1975)
(reporting statute overrides physician and psychotherapist privileges).
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in any proceeding regarding child
abuse or neglect resulting from a
374
report made under this chapter.

Whereas North Dakota abrogates privileges as grounds for refusing to report, the Texas statute is typical of the general abrogations of privileges that do not mention the reporting
context: "In any proceedingregardingthe abuse or neglect of a
child or the cause of any abuse or neglect, evidence may not be
excluded on the ground of privileged communication except in
the case of communications between attorney and client."3 75 A
1985 Texas attorney general's opinion interpreted this language
as abrogating the clergy privilege.3 76 Furthermore, the opinion
assumed that the statute applied to reporting,37 7 although by its
terms the statute applies only to "proceedings."
In contrast, reporting statutes in Kentucky, Oregon, and
South Carolina expressly reaffirm the clergy privilege in the
face of the reporting requirement.3 7 8 These states have confronted head-on the conflict between reporting requirements
and the clergy privilege and have expressly resolved the tension in favor of the privilege.
In addition, many reporting statutes do not state but imply
that the clergy privilege is not abrogated for reports of abuse.
These are the statutes that expressly abrogate some named
privileges and fail to mention the clergy privilege.3 7 9 Such statutes suggest the familiar principle of statutory construction
that the mention of one or more members of a class implies exclusion of unmentioned members of the same class. 38 0 By specifically abrogating some evidentiary privileges but not the
clergy privilege, these statutes imply that the clergy privilege
remains in effect.
Thus, many reporting statutes imply that evidentiary privileges are in principle applicable in the reporting context. Many
of those statutes proceed to abrogate or affirm certain privileges in the reporting context. Seven laws expressly abrogate
374. N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-10 (1982).
375. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.04 (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added).
376. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 at 1560 (Aug. 5, 1985).
377. Id. at 1559-61.
378. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986);
OR. REV. STAT. § 418.750 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-550 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
379. E.g., MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. § 722.631 (West Supp. 1986) (abrogating
all privileges except the attorney-client privilege); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.110 (1982) (husband-wife and professional-client privileges exempted, with attorney-client privilege excepted from exemption).
380. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234-35 (1975).
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the clergy privilege, and three expressly reaffirm it. The remaining statutes leave the resolution of the tension between
the reporting requirement and clergy privilege to inference or
amendment.

C.

RESOLVING THE CONFLICT

Assessing the legality of a cleric's refusal to report child
abuse involves difficult statutory questions. Only a few jurisdictions have confronted and resolved the conflict between statutory reporting requirements and the clergy privilege, and they
reach different results.3 8 ' Most jurisdictions, however, apparently have not confronted the conflict.38 2 Those jurisdictions
with no ready answer when a cleric invokes the clergy privilege
to excuse a failure to report must resort to principles of statutory reconciliation or seek a legislative amendment to resolve
the conflict. In doing so, they somehow balance the weighty
policies at stake.
Unless a state has determined that clergy need not report
abuses, it must address an overriding concern: whether a cleric
has a constitutional right to maintain confidentiality in the face
of a statutory reporting requirement. If such a right exists, the
inquiry alters dramatically. Legislatures contemplating statutory amendments and courts construing statutes must still balance the reasons for reports 38 3 against the cleric's reasons for
refusing to report.38 4 That balancing, however, must comport
with first amendment principles.
IV.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

It is amazing that there has been so little discussion on the
possible constitutional basis for the clergy privilege.3 8 5 The free
381. See supra notes 54 (statutes abrogating the clergy privilege) & 378
(statutes affirming the clergy privilege). See also Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM342 at 1559-60 (Aug. 5, 1985) (clergy privilege statute yields to later statute abrogating privileges generally for child abuse proceedings).
382. Two authors recently concluded that "it would seem to be a fairly uncontroversial matter of statutory interpretation that an unequivocal reporting
law preempts an evidence privilege." Weisberg & Wald, supranote 221, at 160.
383. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing reasons for reporting).
384. See supra text accompanying notes 210-75 (discussing rationale supporting clergy privilege); infra text accompanying notes 427-31 (addressing
possible objections by clerics to disclosure).
385. But see Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 at 1560-61 (Aug. 5, 1985) (superficial discussion and rejection of free exercise claim). For additional references to the free exercise argument, see W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5,
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exercise clause of the first amendment, 38 6 which applies to the
states as well as to the federal government,38 7 protects individuals from governmental compulsion of conduct offensive to their
religious beliefs. 388 The free exercise clause also cautions government to tread lightly on practices deemed by church members to be central to their religion. 38 9 Thus, the clause seems to
be directly applicable when a state compels disclosure of confidences over the clergy's religious objections.
Many clergy object to compelled disclosure of communications confided in them.390 Some clergy's church rules forbid
disclosure. Other clergy conscientiously oppose betraying confidences because they believe that disclosure is a breach of the
sacred trust of their office, will destroy existing counseling relationships, and will deter people from seeking religious counsel or from trusting clergy sufficiently for effective
ministration. Many clergy are concerned about the long-term
at 79, 116, 179, 186; Alexander, supra note 149, at 304-06; Reese, supra note 57,
at 60; Smith, supra note 57, at 15; Yellin, supra note 57, at 112-13. For cases
involving free exercise claims, see authorities cited infra notes 396, 409-11.
386. "Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
387. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
388. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding that when religious beliefs unduly interfere with an overriding governmental interest, the
government's interest prevails); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that if a state's interests would not be adversely affected, a state must
grant an exception to a compulsory school-attendance law that endangers free
exercise of religion).
To be distinguished from the free exercise argument against reporting
child abuse is the free exercise argument against the state's requiring speech
that indicates the speaker's particular belief. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (a state may not compel school children to recite
pledge of allegiance); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (a state may not
compel objecting Jehovah's Witnesses to display motto "Live Free or Die" on
license plates). Because the latter argument against compelled expression objects to an association of a speaker with a particular belief, it involves free
speech values (the right not to express a belief) and establishment clause values (no state promotion of particular religious beliefs). See generally Gaebler,
FirstAmendment ProtectionAgainst Government Compelled Expression and
Association, 23 B.C.L. REV. 995 (1982) (arguing that the first amendment protects the right not to speak or associate).
389. See Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (finding that compulsory school-attendance "contravenes the basic religious tenets" of the Amish); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that the distribution of religious material
by Jehovah's Witnesses is a form of evangelism entitled to the same protection
afforded to "more conventional exercises of religion").
390. See supra note 218 (explaining the rationale behind the clergy
privilege).
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effects of disclosure on the continued practical availability of
religious ministries to the distressed.
The free exercise issue is unlikely to arise until the law
forces disclosure, and attorneys and courts have been reluctant
to compel disclosure. Few cases involve the clergy privilege itself, and only a handful of them discuss free exercise issues.
The recently publicized conflict between the clergy privilege
and child abuse reporting requirements, however, calls for careful attention to the free exercise argument. Clergy who appear
to be shielding child abusers seem to need more than a statutory privilege to protect their silence. If the privilege rests
solely on statute, a state is free to alter or revoke the privilege
and state that the privilege yields to reporting requirements. If,
however, the free exercise clause backstops a claim of privilege,
the state must weigh the privilege against the state's interests
in mandatory reporting of child abuse, and do so, as free exercise analysis requires, with its thumb on the scale on the side of
the privilege.
One does encounter formidable obstacles to arguing that
the free exercise clause provides the basis for the clergy privilege. Precedent for such a proposition is slender 91 and commentators who address the question usually conclude that no
such constitutional basis exists.392 In addition, even if the free
exercise clause supports some degree of privilege, the privilege
it supports is probably not coextensive with the privileges defined in most state statutes. Thus, the free exercise clause adds
an overlay to privilege issues. For example, the question
"whose free exercise right?" is not the same question as "whose
privilege?" 39 3 Courts might naturally balk at the complexities
of recognizing a constitutional privilege distinct from a statutory privilege. Nevertheless, the constitutional argument grows
391. See infra notes 395-410 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., Stoyles, supra note 150, at 51-52; cf.Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972) (suggesting that the only testimonial privilege rooted in
the federal constitution is the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination) (dictum); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
644 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (suggesting that freedoms of speech and
religion are subject to compulsion to give evidence in court).
393. The jurisdictions do not agree concerning who may claim the statutory
privilege. See supra text accompanying notes 181-209. The distinguishable
question of who may claim a free exercise right not to disclose confidential information depends upon whose religion is offended by a disclosure requirement. This Article addresses only the cleric's free exercise right to refuse to
break confidences. It does not consider whether mandatory reports by clergy
might also infringe the free exercise rights of a confider, for example, by chilling the right to confess to or seek counsel from clergy.
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naturally from the Supreme Court's free exercise decisions and
accords with the momentous shared value of religious liberty.
As one author has well stated, "[T]he priest-penitent privilege
should not be viewed as the circumference but as the visible
and recognized center of a broader First Amendment shield for
church workers. ' 394 This Part explores the argument that despite some nettlesome problems the free exercise clause does
afford constitutional status to some clergy privilege.
A.

PRECEDENT

Case law provides little support for a free exercise grounding for the clergy privilege. The case most cited for such a
grounding is People v. Phillips, the nation's first reported case
to recognize a clergy privilege. 395 The question in Phillipswas
whether a Catholic priest must reveal information received in
confession, thereby violating conscience, clerical duty, and
church canons, and consequently suffer the church's sanctions.39 6 After a lengthy discussion of several common law objections to compelling disclosure, the court upped the stakes:
But this is a great constitutional question, which must not be
solely decided by the maxims of the common law but by the principles of our government: We have considered it in restricted shape, let
us now look at it upon more elevated ground; upon the ground of the
of the social compact, and of civil and religious
constitution,
397
liberty.

In 1813 the common law of England did not recognize a clergy
privilege and no American state had recognized the privilege by
statute or case law.3 98 Furthermore, the free exercise clause of
the United States Constitution had not yet been applied to the
394. Kelley, Beyond the Priest-PenitentPrivilege: The Church, The FBI
and Privacy,38 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 28 (1978) (emphasis in original).
395. See Note, supra note 76, at 200 (reprinting People v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct.
Gen. Sess. 1813) from the records of a participating attorney); cf.1 WESTERN
L.J. 109 (1843) (abstracting Phillipsfrom the attorney's records and containing
material not found in the Note reprint); see also supra text accompanying
notes 76-79.
396. The court in Phillips asked
[w]hether a Roman Catholic priest shall be compelled to disclose what
he has received in confession-in violation of his conscience, of his
clerical engagements, and of the canons of his church, and with a certainty of being stripped of his sacred functions, and cut off from religious communion and social intercourse with the denomination to
which he belongs.
Note, supra note 76, at 200.
397. Id. at 206.
398. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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states.3 99 So the court's options were to deny the privilege, recognize the privilege by an original bend in the common law of
New York, or recognize the privilege as grounded in New
York's constitution. The court took the third course, 400 relying
on the state's constitutional protection of "the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrim401
ination, or preference."
Phillips directly supports an argument for basing a clergy
privilege on state constitutional protections of religious freedom. Indirectly, Phillips also bolsters the argument for
grounding the privilege in the federal Constitution's free exercise clause. 40 2 New York's constitutional language relied on in
Phillips resembles the free exercise clause. Furthermore, the
court's arguments in Phillips for recognizing a clergy privilege
would be at home in a modern free exercise opinion. For example, the court noted the centrality of the sacrament of penance
to the Roman Catholic religion. 4 03 Additionally, the court emphasized the "troubling predicament" imposed on the priest:
[I]f he prevaricates he violates his judicial oath,-if he tells the truth,
he violates his ecclesiastical oath. Whether he lies, or whether he
tells the truth, he is wicked; and it is impossible for him to act without acting against the laws of rectitude and conscience. The only
404
course is, for the court to declare that he shall not act at all.

Finally, the court applied a balancing test and required a clear
showing of threat to the public peace or safety as a prerequisite
to violation of the priest's right to keep silent.40 5 These features of the Phillips opinion accord with modem free exercise

analysis.
Since 1940, the Supreme Court has applied the free exercise clause of the federal Constitution to the states 40 6 and has
developed an expansive jurisprudence of free exercise protec399. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (holding that
the free exercise clause is applicable to the states).
400. Note, supra note 76, at 206-07.

401. N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777).
402. Note, supra note 76, at 206-07. Apparently, the priest's attorney
played on anti-British sentiment to persuade DeWitt Clinton of Mayor's Court
that this country should not take the British position on clergy privilege. See
Callahan, supra note 58, at 333-36 (discussing Phillips and the attorney who
reported the case).
403. See Note supra note 76, at 200.
404. 1 WESTERN L.J. 107, 112 (1843).
405. See Note supra note 76, at 208-09.
406. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (holding that the
free exercise of religion is part of the fundamental concept of liberty embodied
in the fourteenth amendment).
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tion.40 7 Courts have not, however, developed the free exercise
argument incipient in Phillips. Although occasionally claimants have asserted free exercise arguments for refusal to testify
at a trial or grand jury proceeding, courts have usually brushed
off the argument, either because the court did not believe the
argument to be grounded in religion 4 8 or because the court
thought that the statutory clergy privilege amply protected religious rights. 40 9 A few courts have pursued the free exercise arguments far enough to assert that the government has a strong
interest in hearing every person's evidence and that this inter407. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707
(1981) (holding that state unemployment compensation regulations that pressure adherents to compromise religious beliefs violate free exercise clause);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that a state may not compel
school attendance when so doing endangers the free exercise of religion);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that a state may not condition
unemployment benefits on acceptance of employment that is contrary to the
applicant's religious beliefs).
408. The court in In re Murtha held that a Roman Catholic nun in a teaching order could claim neither the clergy privilege nor free exercise of religion
to excuse her from testifying to a grand jury concerning communications confided to her by a former student. 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889 (1971), cert
denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1971). In rejecting Sister Margaret's free exercise argument, the court sharply distinguished between the exercise of religion and the exercise of conscience. Id at 389-90, 279 A.2d at 893-94. Because
Sister Margaret's teaching order did not require her to keep confidences, the
court concluded that her claim was one of individual conscience. Id Moreover,
because Sister Margaret had previously signed a police statement disclosing
the matters she later claimed were confidential, the court found that she failed
to demonstrate the "compelling voice of conscience" necessary to invoke free
exercise protection. Id at 389-90, 279 A.2d at 894.
A federal district court also rejected a free exercise claim of confidentiality in In re Wood, 430 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In that case, church personnel claimed that grand jury subpoenas chilled their free exercise right. The
court, however, found that the claimants were not priests and that the work
they performed, "while perhaps performed under spiritual auspices, [was] primarily in the nature of social work." Id at 46. Thus, the court recognized no
burden on free exercise of religion.
409. See Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 390 N.E.2d 1151 (1979). In Keenan, the court rejected a Catholic priest's free exercise objection to testifying
before a grand jury investigating improprieties in New York City government.
Id at 167-68, 390 N.E.2d at 1154-55. Although the priest had served as a city
councilman during the period under investigation, id at 163, 390 N.E.2d at
1152, the court rejected his claim of privilege because the inquiry did not concern confidential priestly communications. Id at 166-67, 390 N.E.2d at 1154.
The court also rejected the priest's free exercise argument, stating that his
right to minister bestowed no protection beyond that already afforded by New
York's privilege statute. Id. at 168, 390 N.E.2d at 1155. See also In re Williams,
269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967) (holding that no free exercise privilege exists
apart from statute), cert. denied 388 U.S. 918 (1967).
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est outweighs even a free exercise objection to testifying.4 10
These latter precedents are few, however, and most are dated
or equivocal. They apparently have not dislodged the prevailing opinion that the clergy privilege rests only on statute.

B. THE CLERIC'S FREE EXERCISE RIGHT
A cleric facing punishment for failure to disclose a confidential communication involving child abuse might argue for a
free exercise right to maintain confidentiality. Relying on the
Supreme Court's free exercise precedents, a court would test
the cleric's argument by inquiring into the following issues.
1.

Religious Belief

The cleric must show that the government is infringing on
the exercise of religion.411 Secular beliefs and practices do not
qualify for free exercise protection. 412 Whether a belief or
practice is religious or secular in some cases may be a troubling
threshold inquiry. As the Supreme Court said in Wisconsin v.

Yoder:
Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice
entitled to a constitutional protection may present a most delicate
410. The closest precedent is People v. Woodruff, 26 A.D. 236, 272 N.Y.S.2d
786 (1966), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159, 288 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968). In
Woodruff, a grand jury investigating adultery, disorder, and use of narcotics at
a particular house subpoenaed a resident of that house. The resident claimed
that testifying would harm others and thus offend her religion, an unnamed
religion she described as akin to Hinduism. The court acknowledged that her
belief was both sincere and religious, but concluded that the grand jury's paramount need for all pertinent evidence outweighed her free exercise objection
to testimony. Id. at 238-39, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 789-90.
In Smilow v. United States, the Second Circuit rejected a seventeen-yearold student's free exercise objection to answering a grand jury's questions. 465
F.2d 802 (2d Cir.), judgment vacated, 409 U.S. 944 (1972). The youth claimed
that "as an 'observant and committed Jew' he must refuse to answer the grand
jury questions or else suffer '[d]ivine punishment and ostracism from the Jewish community.'" Id. at 804. The court found his claim to be novel although
"its precise religious basis [was]... not clear from the record." Id. Even assuming arguendo, however, that Jewish law contained such a tenet, and that
the claimant sincerely believed it, the court held that the youth's free exercise
right was outweighed by the state's compelling interest in obtaining every person's testimony. Id. at 805. The court also found that the grand jury's questioning was narrowly drawn to elicit only relevant testimony. Id.
For a case suggesting that compelling clergy testimony in a slander action
would raise "grave" first amendment questions, see Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F.
Supp. 621, 629 (N.D. Iowa), appeal dismissed, 323 F.2d 716 (8th Cir. 1963), on
remand, 230 F. Supp. 539 (1964), affd 340 F.2d 613 (1965).
411. Thomas v. Review Bd.of Ind.Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
412. Id. at 713-14 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
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question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every
of conduct in which soperson to make his own standards on matters
41 3
ciety as a whole has important interests.

This initial requirement may present a snag for clergy of novel
religious groups or even secular humanist counselors who wish
to claim a privilege. Such claimants must contend with the prevailing confusion about the definition of religion for free exer414
cise purposes.
Even clergy of "mainline" denominations may have trouble
characterizing as religious their objections to disclosure. This
conclusion draws support from several other cases in which the
Supreme Court extended free exercise protection to individuals
whose religious beliefs were personal. If a concededly religious
group has an official rule or policy against its clergy's disclosure
of confidential communications, adherence to that rule or policy should count as free exercise of religion. Most denominations, however, have no official rule or policy concerning
confidentiality. 415 Other denominations require confidentiality
but allow exceptions for situations involving harm to third persons generally or child abuse specifically. If a cleric of such a
church nevertheless claims a religious objection to disclosure,
the cleric may have difficulty characterizing the objection as
religious.
Some free exercise precedent seems to suggest the impor-

tance of group backing in determining whether a belief is religious. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,4 16 for prominent example, the
Supreme Court took pains to distinguish religious beliefs from
' 417
The free exerbeliefs merely "philosophical and personal.
4 18
Yoder inlatter.
the
not
but
former
the
protects
cise clause

volved three Amish parents' free exercise objections to sending
413. 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (footnote omitted).
414. See, e.g., Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classiication Problem, 11 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1977); Choper, Defining "Religion" in
the FirstAmendmen4 3 U. ILL. L. REV. 579 (1982); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978).
415. See W. TIEMANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 20-24; see also Reese,
supra note 57, at 68-70 (noting that many denominations have no precise rules
regarding confidential communications); Yellin, supra note 57, at 146-48 (discussing differences among denominations respecting confidential communications); Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News, supra note 49, at 232-33
(noting that many denominations lack expressly defined rules regarding confidential communications).
416. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
417. Id. at 216.
418. Id.
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their children to school beyond eighth grade. 419 In support of
its characterization of the Amish parents' claim as religious, the
Court repeatedly noted that the parents' claim was firmly
grounded in three centuries of group practice and belief.420 Indeed, the Court was conspicuously unconcerned with the specific beliefs of the individual parents who were parties to the
lawsuit. Instead, the Court skipped immediately to an exploration of the nature of beliefs and practices of the Amish community generally.
Yet it would be a mistake to read Yoder as saying that the
free exercise clause protects only shared or institutionalized beliefs. Rather, the determinative distinction seems to have been
between religious and philosophical beliefs and not a distinction
between shared and personal beliefs. 421 Indeed, the Court has
since declared that "the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect. ' 422 Thus, a cleric of a concededly religious
organization who cannot fall back on denominational rules of
confidentiality is not precluded from arguing that her maintenance of secrecy is grounded in religious belief.
A cleric lacking church backing may, however, have more
difficulty convincing a court that the asserted belief in secrecy
is religious. 423 The cleric's difficulty will derive partly from the
419. I& at 207.
420. Id. at 219, 235.
421. This conclusion draws support from several other cases in which the
Supreme Court extended free exercise protection to individuals whose religious beliefs were personal. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.Empl. Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (holding that the free exercise clause protects religious beliefs even if they are not shared by all members of the sect); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (holding that the free exercise clause
prohibits courts from questioning the truth of religious views); cf. Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that those who object to participation in a "particular" war are not exempt, even if the objection is religious in
character). In Gillette, the Court noted that:
In the draft area for 30 years the exempting provision has focused on
individual conscientious belief, not on sectarian affiliation.... And
while the objection [to war] must have roots in conscience and personality that are "religious" in nature, this requirement has never been
construed to elevate conventional piety or religiosity of any kind
above the imperatives of a personal faith.
Id at 454; cf.Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) (following the
test established in Seeger); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965)
(holding that courts must decide whether beliefs are religious within the registrant's "own scheme of things").
422. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
423. See, e.g., In re Murtha, 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889 (holding that
the privilege asserted by a nun is based on individual conscience because the
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Court's failure to define religion. Except for the group-focused
inquiry in Yoder, the Court's only modern consideration of
what counts as religion came in the conscientious objection
cases of the Viet Nam draft era.424 Although those cases involved statutory rather than direct constitutional interpretation, they are commonly read as suggesting the Court's
willingness to interpret religion broadly to include practices
rooted in a "sincere and meaningful [belief that] occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the or' '425
thodox belief in God.
Without knowing the nature of a particular cleric's objections to disclosure, one cannot decide whether these personal
objections are religious. The cleric may believe it is sinful for
any person to violate a confidence. 426 The cleric may also believe that anything confessed to her in her professional capacity
is, metaphysically, confessed only to God and that the cleric is
merely a nonhearing conduit. 427 If, however, the cleric's claim
rests on a concern that disclosure will diminish the effectiveness of her ministry, her claim is peculiar. It then rests on a
Catholic denomination does not require nuns to keep confidences), cert denied, 59 N.J. 239, 281 A.2d 278 (1981); see also supra note 408 (additional discussion of In re Murtha). For this reason, church groups may be wise to adopt
some official policy regarding the secrecy of confidential communications to
their clergy. Augspurger, supra note 223, at 114-15. On the other hand, adopting such a policy might make a cleric who discloses in violation of that policy
more vulnerable to a malpractice suit. Smith, supra note 57, at 18.
424. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (holding that conscientious objector status applies to seriously held religious beliefs even if beliefs
are nontraditional); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (holding that
the test for exemption is whether beliefs are religious within the objector's
"own scheme of things").
425. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 166.
426. See Cooper, Confidentiality,59 ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REV. 20, 27-30
(1977) (discussing concept of confidentiality among Christians as broader than
confidentiality between clergy and parishioners).
427. "A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things, not as man but as
God's minister .... " THoMAS AQUINAs, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-I, q.70, art. 1,
at 266 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1918). This belief is
expressed similarly in other religious writings:
[Tihe priest in the confessional takes the place of Christ. The revelations made by the penitent are not made to the confessor as man but
in his vicarious capacity as the representative of Christ. Therefore
the confessor has no dominion over, no really human knowledge of,
what has been confessed in the Sacrament ....
And if the confessor
does wrongfully reveal the knowledge acquired in the Sacrament he
adds to his crime of sacrilege the guilt of falsehood by asserting something of which he is not, humanly speaking, aware.
Confession, Seal of, 4 NEW CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA 134 (1967).
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professional and not merely personal belief that she should not
disclose. The cleric's argument is that her official role in her
religious group imposes on her special obligations of secrecy. In
other words, she argues that her religion includes her special
ministry and that maintaining certain confidences enhances the
effectiveness of that ministry.
The Supreme Court has stated that "the right to the free
exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to
preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister...."428 Courts have
not, however, developed a specialized jurisprudence of free exercise for professional clergy. 42 9 A court might look somewhat
askance at a cleric's claim that a belief about ministerial effectiveness is a religious belief when the church in which the
cleric is an officer does not share that belief.43 0 A court should,
428. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
429. Several of the Supreme Court's free exercise cases have involved
clergy. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986) (holding that
an Air Force regulation preventing a Rabbi from wearing a yarmulke does not
violate the free exercise clause); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976) (interfering with ecclesiastical decisions made by church
authorities violates free exercise clause); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944) (holding that free exercise clause prohibits courts from questioning the
truth of religious views); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (holding that Congress may condition naturalization on a promise to bear arms). In
only one of these cases, however, was the claimant's clerical office material. In
fcDaniel, the Court held unconstitutional Tennessee's ban on clergy serving
as delegates to a state constitutional convention. 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978). In
McDaniel, however, the minister did not claim that his office entitled him to a
special accommodation. Rather, the minister challenged the state's contention
that his clerical office imposed on him a special disability. I&L at 626-27.
The issue of free exercise protection for church officials' work is largely
unexplored. In a sense, the right to effective clergy might be a right of the
religious group or, ultimately, of that group's members who choose to practice
their religion in organized groups and through the ministrations of clergy and
other officers. See Yellin, supra note 57, at 113 (arguing that the privilege aids
religious institutions in fulfilling their mission).
430. See supra note 408 (discussing In re Murtha). In Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589 (1977), physicians argued that New York's data bank of names and
addresses of persons with prescriptions for certain legal drugs impaired their
right to practice medicine freely. I&L at 604. The Court rejected this argument,
concluding that "[t]o the extent that their claim has reference to the possibility that the patients' concern about disclosure may induce them to refuse
needed medication, the doctors' claim is derivative from, and therefore no
stronger than, the patients'." Md The Court had already found that any discouragement of patients seeking prescriptions was insufficient either to deprive those patients of access to the drugs or to deprive them of their
independent right to decide whether to take the drugs. Id at 603. The Court's
position that a doctor's right to treat a patient is no greater than the patient's
right to receive that care, id at 604-05 & n.33, does not carry over precisely to

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:723

however, be reluctant to be drawn into the question whether it
is the church group or the individual cleric who defines the
cleric's ministry. Courts should recognize as religious a claim
to secrecy asserted by those who believe that they are called to
minister and that confidentiality is essential to the effectiveness
of that ministry.
2.

Sincerity

In addition to showing that his belief is religious, the cleric
must also demonstrate the sincerity of his belief. A cleric's refusal to disclose confidential information must be rooted in religious beliefs held honestly and in good faith.431 Although
inquiring into sincerity of a belief carries some danger of spilling into impermissible judgments about the truth or falsity of
that belief,432 the elimination of a sincerity requirement might

encourage spurious claims contrived to avoid a general legal obligation such as the obligation to report child abuse. In any
event, although courts do not require the religious belief to be
true, well-articulated, or even consistent, 433 they do require
that the belief be sincerely held.
3. Burden on Religious Belief or Practice
The cleric must show a burden imposed by the government
on free exercise of religion. Reporting requirements backed by
criminal or civil sanctions unquestionably directly burden the
clergy, who may indeed have independent constitutional rights (not derivative
from other persons' rights to seek their counsel) to practice an effective
ministry.
431. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
432. Id. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that issues of truth and
sincerity are inseparable). Here again, the distinction between individual belief and institutional rule complicates the issue. Consider a cleric who personally believes he should report confided information concerning abuse of a
child, but who also, as a minister of a religious organization, professes loyalty
to that organization's rules forbidding disclosure. Where precisely should the
sincerity inquiry be brought to bear? On the belief of those who adopted the
organization's rule? On the cleric's belief that he should be obedient to that
rule? The problem stems from the tendency of free exercise jurisprudence to
focus on the characteristics of beliefs (true or false, sincere or spurious, theistic or atheistic) rather than on practices or office. There is little guidance for
determining whether and when a religious practice receives free exercise protection based on its grounding in official church rule or policy. Apparently,
such grounding makes it easier to prove that a belief is religious, see supra text
accompanying notes 415-30, and that the belief is sincere. Beyond that, much is
unclear.
433. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981);
Ballard,322 U.S. at 85-88.
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4
religious liberty of a cleric whose religion forbids disclosure. 3
Although the Supreme Court has never made this an official part of the free exercise test, the seriousness of the burden
5
on religious liberty might also enter into the analysis. 43 In Gil4 35
lette v. United States, for example, the Court stated that denying certain conscientious objectors an exemption from the
4 37
draft imposed only "incidental burdens" on their religion.
The Court also has permitted some burdening of religious liberty in the form of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on religious speech.4 38 In Yoder, however, the Court
concluded that requiring Amish parents to send their children
to school for two years beyond eighth grade was overly burdensome and carried "a very real threat of undermining the Amish
community. '439 The Court in Yoder noted this threat as part of
its finding that the parents had a free exercise claim in the first
place, before it balanced that claim against the state's
440
interests.
Because courts have not focused much attention on the degree of burden on free exercise, there is room to speculate
about the weight to be accorded this factor. The question is
raised whether a court is free to evaluate the importance or
centrality of a religious practice either to the individual claimant, as in Gillette, or to the claimant's religious community, as
in Yoder. Such a judicial inquiry threatens to entangle courts
in religious questions that they are practically and constitutionally incompetent to address. Yet a court is surely entitled to
determine whether the claimed infringement on religion is
more than de minirnis before requiring a compelling state inter-

434. Before Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court was reluctant to invalidate, on free exercise grounds, indirect burdens such as the economic pressures exerted by "blue laws" on business persons with Saturday
sabbaths. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 336 U.S. 599 (1961). Since 1963, however,
the Court has clearly held that even indirect burdens on religious practice can
justify a free exercise argument. Sherbert 374 U.S. at 403-04. See also Thomas,
450 U.S. at 717-18 (noting that an indirect burden may be substantial); McDaniel 435 U.S. at 626-29 (holding that disqualifying clergy from the right to seek
office violates the free exercise clause).
435. Cf. supra note 388.
436. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
437. Id at 462.
438. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981). See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (holding that Jehovah's Witnesses' right to a parade license is subject to time, place,
and manner restrictions).
439. 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
440. I& at 213-19.
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est to justify the infringement. In most cases, the cleric who
objects to disclosing confidential communications can meet such
a threshold test by stressing the importance of confidentiality
to confessions and counseling, and the deep importance of confessions and counseling to religious beliefs." 1 A court probing
the religious importance of these practices should be prepared
for answers framed in such religious terms as absolution, salvation, and the welfare of souls.
C.

BALANCING AGAINST STATE INTERESTS

Once a cleric has shown that a child abuse reporting requirement burdens his sincere religious belief in, or his denomination's requirement of, confidentiality, the state must justify
its reporting requirement with a compelling state interest. 442

Despite the absolute language of the first amendment, the
Supreme Court has recognized the necessity for some government interference with religious practices. When challenged,
however, the government's burden is substantial: "Only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. ' ' " 3 Accordingly, the state has the dual burden of justifying both its end and its means. 4 "
441. "If, for a moment, the idea could be entertained that the confessor
might make use of any information he received in confession, or mention even
the smallest sin confessed to him, the usefulness, sanctity, and benefits of the
sacrament would be rendered absolutely null and void." F., BELTON, A MANUAL FOR CONFESSORS 89 (rev. ed. 1931). "If the privilege were taken away and
the confidential nature of the penitential communications violated and disregarded, the work of the church would be greatly hampered and a purely secular society would be well on its way." Reese, supra note 57, at 81.
442. Free exercise cases have long distinguished between freedom to believe and freedom to act. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27 (1978)
(holding that Tennessee's disqualification statute is aimed at conduct, not belief); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963) (noting that the free exercise clause does not protect overt religious acts that threaten public safety);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that the first
amendment allows regulation of religious practices). Freedom to believe is absolute. It is not subject to balancing with state interests. See, e.g., Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding that a state may not for any reason require its public officials to profess belief in God). If, however, a law burdens
religious conduct, the state can defend its law by showing that it is necessary
to some compelling state interest. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. Reporting requirements fall into this second category: they punish a cleric for the "act" of
refusing to speak.
443. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added); see also
Sherber4 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
444. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981) (a "state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is
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Formulating and Weighing the State Interest

To meet this high burden, a state will assert its obvious and
unquestionably important interest in the safety of children. 445
The aim of reporting requirements in every state is to bring to
light more cases of abuse so that the state can protect children.446 As parens patriae, the state has the high duty to safeguard its children. 447 Its interest in doing so is surely
compelling. Here, however, one must avoid the temptation to
slide into a facile balancing of clergy's religious rights with children's safety. The appropriate balancing test is and should be
more complicated than that. First, much depends on how one
formulates the interests to be balanced. Second, the free exercise test looks beyond the legitimacy and weight of the state interest and inquires also into the necessity of the means chosen
to pursue that interest. Popular oversimplification of the clergy
the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest"); see
also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (a "state may justify a
limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an

overriding governmental interest").
445. Some courts have characterized as compelling a state's interest in the
availability of all relevant evidence for a trial or grand jury investigation. See,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 685-88 (1972) (grand jury may require
testimony by news reporter even when such testimony threatens confidentiality of sources); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972) (ability to
compel testimony is an essential power of government); Smilow v. United
States, 465 F.2d 802 (2d Cir.) (state interest overrides free exercise argument
for nondisclosure), vacated, 409 U.S. 944 (1972); People v. Woodruff, 26 A.D.2d
236, 272 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966) (same), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 848, 236 N.E.2d 159, 288
N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1968). As Smith, supra note 165 at 8 n.48, 32, notes, however,
the need for all relevant evidence is not, of itself, compelling in every case. If
it were, no claim of privilege would ever prevail. In any event, these precedents deal with the state's need for evidence in a trial or grand jury proceeding, and not with the state's need for an initial report. The weight of the
state's interest in reports of child abuse should depend on the necessity of
those reports to some other compelling state interest, for example, the state's
interest in protecting children.
446. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
447. The doctrine of parens patriae (parent of the country) holds that the
state is "parent" to its dependent citizens. This doctrine is the basis for state
intervention to protect children. See generally Areen, Intervention Between
Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and
Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 894-99 (1975) (discussing the history of the
parens patriae doctrine). See also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(the right of free exercise of religion does not include freedom to threaten the
health or safety of children).
The state may also have other goals, such as rehabilitating or punishing
the abuser, or keeping the family together. These interests, however, are all
part of the state's interest in protecting children. A state seldom articulates an
independent interest in helping a child abuser for the abuser's own sake.
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privilege issue often results from failure to acknowledge these
complications.
The free exercise test is a balancing test in the sense that it
calls for a state interest sufficiently important to override a free
exercise claim. Balancing tests are inherently slippery. One
reason is the unavoidable subjectivity of any judgment that one
interest "outweighs" another.448 In addition, much depends on
how one characterizes the interests to be balanced. 449 The balancer must be careful, for example, to formulate the opposing
interests at the appropriate "level of generality."45 0 One can
load the issue by tinkering with the formulation of the interests. 451 For example, one could characterize the interest on the
cleric's side as a cleric's right to keep secrets, a cleric's right to
an effective ministry, a cleric's right to save souls, a cleric's
right to the free exercise of religion, or society's interest in the
free exercise of religion. Similarly, one could characterize the
state's interest as an interest in clergy reports for additional
sources of information on child abuse, an interest in locating
cases of child abuse, an interest in intervening on behalf of
abused children, or an interest in protecting abused children.
To formulate the issue as a balancing of the cleric's right to
keep secrets against the state's interest in protecting children is
4 52
misleading and inflammatory.
448. See Pepper, The Case of the Human Sacrifice, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 897,
927 (1981) (article about a remarkable hypothetical case set in the year 2383
A.D. which explores the nature and limits of free exercise balancing).
449. See id.; Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 208-09.
450. See Pepper, supra note 448, at 928.
451. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). Tarasoff held that psychotherapists may have a duty
to warn, or take reasonable steps to protect, foreseeable victims of their patients' violence. The court characterized the issue as one of weighing the public interest in treatment for the mentally ill against public "safety from violent
assault." Id at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26. The dissent, on the
other hand, stated the issue as "whether effective treatment for the mentally
ill should be sacrificed to a system of warnings." Id at 452, 551 P.2d at 355, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 35 (Clark, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
452. In each of these lists the move from the first option to the second is a
step that assumes the effectiveness of means to ends. The free exercise test
requires the state to demonstrate that its means (compelled clergy reports) is
necessary to its end (locating and protecting abused children). "[T]he mere reporting of child abuse offers no protection to children." Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 49, at 151. Indeed, for the state this list represents not just a
list of alternative characterizations of its interests, but a list of necessary links
in its chain of argument. The free exercise test, however, does not require the
cleric to show even a rational connection between means (keeping secrets) and
any end. The cleric simply must show that the burdened means (keeping
secrets) is a sincere exercise of religion.
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A related trouble here is with the image of the free exercise test as a weighing of competing interests on scales, with the
"heavier" interest prevailing. That image is misleadingly simplistic in that it fails to explain what "items" are being
weighed. A claimant who shows a more-than-minimal state-imposed burden on her exercise of religion should be entitled to
place upon the scales the full weight of the free exercise of religion. That interest is heavy and can be outbalanced only by a
compelling state interest. The state, on the other hand, can
place on the scales only those interests that it first shows are
45 3
necessarily served by its burden on the claimant's religion.
453. This Article does not consider whether, if a child's safety is clearly at
stake, free exercise interests might nevertheless outweigh the state's interest
in protecting the child. Some persons might argue that even when a child's
safety is threatened free exercise interests ought to prevail, particularly when
the free exercise claimant perceives those interests in terms of ultimates such
as salvation or damnation. Apparently, however, the law has already decided
that issue. In situations involving a parent's religious objections to medical
treatment for a child, for example, courts have always authorized state intervention to provide necessary medical treatment to save the child's life or to
protect the child from imminent and extremely serious physical harm. Note,
In re Hofbauer: May Parents Choose Unorthodox Medical Care for Their
Child?, 44 ALB. L. REv. 818, 822 n.15 (1980). Courts have authorized intervention despite a parent's claim that the treatment would jeopardize the parent's
or child's eternal salvation and despite the combination of the parent's free exercise right with a constitutional right to make child-rearing decisions. See,
e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (holding that state intervention is appropriate for
health and welfare purposes despite child's participation in objecting religion),
affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); People
ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 625-26, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74 (temporarily depriving parents of custody of minor child to administer transfusion did
not violate parental or religious rights), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 500-02, 320 A.2d 518, 520-21
(1974) (government action may transgress religious beliefs where goal is general health of community); Mitchell v. Davis, 205 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947). Unlike most reporting statutes, however, these cases have generally drawn a line between serious threats to a child's life or health and less
serious threats. See Goldstein, Medical Carefor the Child at Risk. On State
Supervention of ParentalAutonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645, 651-61 (1977); Note, In
re Hofbauer, supra note 454 at 822 n.15, 823 n.16; Note, JudicialLimitations
on ParentalAutonomy in the Medical Treatment of Minors, 59 NEB. L. REv.
1093, 1113-14 (1980); Note, Choosing For Children: Adjudicating Medical Care
Disputes Between Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 163-66 (1983).
To be sure, some cases suggest that concern for even lesser threats to a child's
well-being might outweigh free exercise interests. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (state's power to regulate child labor overrides free exercise claim); In re Sampson, 65 Misc. 2d 658, 665-69, 317 N.Y.S.2d
641, 649-52 (Fam. Ct. 1970) (child's need for cosmetic surgery to reduce severity of facial deformity overrides parents' religious opposition to blood transfusions), affd, 37 A.D.2d 668, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1971), af'd, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 278
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In other words, the free exercise inquiry into the weight of the
state's interest presupposes the inquiry into the necessity of the
means chosen to pursue that interest.
2.

Necessary Means

A state therefore cannot rest upon a showing that its reporting requirement aims at the paramount state interest of
protecting children from abuse, but must also show that its
means are necessary to its end.454 Thus, a state must show that
its reporting requirement is a necessary means to protecting
children from abuse. In fact, although this point is less clear, a
state must show the necessity not just of some reporting requirement, but specifically of applying that requirement to
clergy who have free exercise objections. 455 To place on the
scales the full weight of its interest in protecting children, the
state must first prove that clergy reports are necessary for locating more abused children, that locating the children is necesN.E.2d 918, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1972). Arguably, these cases gave insufficient
weight to the parents' free exercise rights. In any event, all of these cases
clearly implicated the child's welfare. They presented little question concerning the means by which the state sought to protect the child. It is, however,
the long-term effectiveness of clergy reports as a means of protecting children
that this Article questions.
454. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div. 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see
also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (holding Tennessee's disqualification
of cleric as delegate to constitutional convention unconstitutional for failure of
means to accomplish asserted state ends).
455. In Yoder, for example, the state of Wisconsin needed more than a general argument that its compulsory education statute was necessary to achieve
its paramount goal of securing an education for its children. Wisconsin needed
to argue more specifically that denying an exemption to the Amish was necessary to its goal. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 205 (1972). The Court found
that Wisconsin could make no such specific showing, because the Amish provided its young people with an alternative educational experience that, for the
Amish youth, met the state's goals. Id.
Contrast the holding in Yoder with the Court's holding in United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982), denying to Amish employers an exemption
from paying Social Security tax for their employees. In Lee, the Court found
that for the Social Security system to be effective it must be compulsory. Id.
at 258-59. Exceptions for persons who could provide alternative income security for retirement would defeat the program. Id Thus, the Court in Lee distinguished Yoder: universal education is less threatened than is a universal
retirement insurance program by exceptions for people able to provide their
own alternative programs. Id. at 259-60. Although one might quarrel with the
results in Yoder and Lee, the Court in those cases does seem to draw a useful
distinction between justifying a state's general requirementand justifying the
specific applicationof that requirement to a free exercise objection. Accordingly, a state must show specifically that requiring objecting clergy to report
child abuse is necessary to protect children from abuse.

CLERGY PRIVILEGE
sary for the state's intervening, and that state intervention is
necessary for protecting children. None of the links in this argument should be weak if the state is to prevail.
The state can argue that clergy are often in a position to
observe families, that abusers, victims, and other persons affected by child abuse are likely to confide in clergy, and that
the cleric's unique role-as confidant, spiritual adviser, and perhaps bespeaker of God's forgiveness-attracts troubled persons
and will make clergy especially rich sources of tips on cases of
abuse. The state must argue further that it investigates reported cases and, when necessary, intervenes with appropriate
and effective procedures to protect the abused child.
A cleric has three directions of response. He might first argue that requiring clergy to report does not in fact significantly
further the state's goal of protecting children. Second, he
might argue that, even if requiring clergy to report results in
some additional reports of abuse, the state has alternative ways
of securing that information. Third, he might argue that undermining the confidential relationship between confiders and
clergy will defeat one valuable, nongovernmental means of
achieving the state's own goals of preventing and treating child
abuse. Stated differently, the cleric has three attacks on the
claim that requiring clergy reports is a necessary means of
preventing and treating abuse: (1) such reports are not in fact a
means to that end at all; (2) alternative means exist; and,
(3) such reports actually work against the desired end in many
cases.
a.

No Means At All

To argue that clergy reports are not an effective means to
the state's end of protecting children, the cleric might criticize
the state's follow-up to a report, as many commentators have
done. 456 If follow-up measures are ineffective in protecting
456. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 71 (1979); Adler, Child Abuse Victims: Are They Also Victims of an Adversarial and HierarchicalCourtSystem', 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
717, 730-34 (1978); Areen, supra note 447, at 928-30; Besharov, Child Protection:
Past Progress,PresentProblems,and FutureDirections,17 FAM. L.Q. 151, 16368 (1983); Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at 352-53; Weisberg & Wald, supra
note 221, at 147 n.20; Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 49, at 151. Cf Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1984) (no due process right to thorough investigation by state following report of child abuse), cert denied, 470
U.S. 1052 (1985); Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(state's failure to comply with statutory directive to follow up on report of
child abuse creates no duty to individuals harmed as result); Contemporary
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children, the state should not be entitled to claim as its compelling interest the protection of children. Furthermore, the state
of proving the effectiveness of its
should bear the 45burden
7
means to its end.

Even if a state's post-report procedures are effective, however, a cleric has a good argument that the state stands to gain
no additional information from requiring objecting clergy to report. Thus, requiring clergy to report is not only not a necessary means of preventing child abuse, it is no means at all. A
person who seeks out a cleric for consultation or confession
usually does so with the expectation that the cleric will hold his
communications confidential. Often that expectation is reinforced by church rules, the cleric's practice, and the cleric's express assurance. If, to comply with statutory reporting
requirements, clergy begin to disclose otherwise confidential information, the expectation of secrecy will be destroyed. In the
short run, confiders will feel betrayed; in the long run, they are
likely to stop confiding in the clergy. As a result, the clergy
will no longer be a source of tips on child abuse, and the reason
for requiring them to disclose in the first place will dissolve. In
the final analysis, by requiring clergy to report, a state will suctroubled by abuse
ceed only in deterring abusers and others
458
from seeking private help from clergy.
It may be difficult to prove that such a chain of events
would follow clergy disclosures, but clergy and psychotherapists have repeatedly voiced this claim. 459 Indeed, the likeliStudies Project, supra note 11, at 1337 (concluding that some reporters are reluctant to report because they believe state follow-up services are inadequate).
Many of these commentators criticize state interventions as not only ineffective, but also as counterproductive. See infra notes 473-75.

457. One author has described the similar constitutional privacy test as requiring the state to prove that its law "actually and significantly" advances its
asserted state interest. See Smith, supra note 165, at 36. "Without this limitation on the compelling state interest doctrine, governments might claim that
every state regulation furthered a compelling interest, even though it promoted that interest in only the most trivial or tenuous manner." Id.
458. See Kuhlmann, Communications to Cergymen- When Are They
Privileged?,2 VAL. U.L. REv. 265, 287 (1968).
459. See, e.g., supra note 223; Stoyles, supra note 150, at 49. Cf. Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 11, at 1337-38 (finding that medical reporters
are reluctant to report instances of child abuse for fear of deterring parents
from bringing the child for treatment); Smith, supra note 165, at 36-37 ("As
patients recognize that their confidences may be revealed, they can be expected to minimize the confidential information revealed in therapy, especially
if they have reason to believe that their therapy or confidences may become
the subjects of litigation.").
Smith and Meyer present a similar argument for psychotherapy:
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hood of such a scenario is a key premise of the Wigmore
rationale, the most commonly cited rationale for the clergy
privilege. 460 Personal and perhaps incriminating disclosures are
not likely to be disclosed to someone not trusted to keep them
confidential.
Despite some language in the Supreme Court's 1972 opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes,46 1 clergy should not need empirical
data to prove that their disclosures of confidential communications will deter further confiding. In Branzburg, the Supreme
Court held that a news reporter has no constitutional privilege
against testifying to a grand jury concerning confidential news
sources. 462 In response to the reporter's argument that forcing
disclosure would cause valuable sources of information to dry
up, the Court stated:
[We remain unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are
forced to testify before a grand jury. . . . T]he evidence fails to
demonstrate that there would be a significant constriction of the flow
of news to the public if this Court reaffirms the prior common law
and constitutional rule regarding the testimonial obligation of
463
newsmen.

Such language might appear to suggest that a court should require some empirical evidence to support a cleric's argument
that compelling him to disclose confidential communications
would deter persons from confiding in him. The issue in
Branzburg, however, is distinguishable from the clergy privilege issue. In Branzburg, the issue was whether to recognize a
first amendment privilege in the first place. The reporter's
proof that disclosure would deter his sources was necessary to
Abusers seeking (psychotherapeutic) treatment do not just run the
risk of having the fact of abuse disclosed to authorities in many states,
they can be certain of the release of that information if their therapists abide by the law... Therefore, abusers knowing of the reporting requirements may be discouraged from seeking treatment or from
describing their problems with child abuse if they enter treatment.
Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at 359.
Furthermore, "[a] professional who fears that she might have to disclose
confidential information in court might be inhibited from eliciting it from the
client." Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 184.
460. See supra text accompanying notes 223-29.
Furthermore, it would be anomalous for a state to argue that a cleric's disclosure of a confider's communications would not significantly inhibit such
communications to the cleric, when the state itself allows the cleric to anonymously report abuse, ostensibly to encourage more reports.
461. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
462. Id
463. Id. at 693.
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link his claim of privilege with an already recognized first
amendment right, such as the right of the public to receive information. 4 64 Without that link, the reporter's claim lacked
constitutional dimension: news reporters otherwise have no
news. 465
special first amendment right to be enabled to gather
The cleric, on the other hand, at this stage in her argument, has
already established a first amendment right to a privilege. She
has done so directly by showing governmental compulsion of
conduct her religion forbids. She now is attacking the state's
argument that forcing clergy to report will give the state any
466
At this stage, the
new information concerning child abuse.
burden should be on the state to supply evidence for its
counterintuitive proposition that a cleric's report would not dry
up the sources of her information.
As the dissenters in Branzburg stated:
[The Supreme Court has] never before required proof of the exact
number of people potentially affected by governmental action, who
would actually be dissuaded from engaging in First Amendment
activity.
Rather, on the basis of common sense, we have asked, often implicity, (1) whether there was a rational connection between the cause
(governmental action) and the effect (deterrence or impairment of
would occur
First Amendment activity) and (2) whether the effect
467
with some regularity, i.e., would not be de minimis.

The dissenters added that, although denying a news reporter's
privilege would not deter informants in every case, it would
likely deter informants in the most sensitive and controversial
relationships. 468 The dissent continued: "To require any
464. Id. at 680.
465. Id. at 681-82, 684-85.
466. The cleric's argument would be analogous to the news reporter's in
Branzburg if the only exercise of religion involved were the confider's act of
consulting clergy. In that event, Branzburg would point more clearly to the
need for the cleric to demonstrate that reporting requirements in fact deter
persons from exercising their first amendment right to consult clergy. In that
case, too, both Branzburg and Whalen, see supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text, would be discouraging precedent for the cleric's deterrence argument.
If, however, the cleric's right to silence is itself a first amendment right, as this
Article argues, these precedents are distinguishable.
467. 408 U.S. at 725, 733-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
"And, in making this determination, we have shown a special solicitude towards the 'indispensable liberties' protected by the First Amendment. . . for
'freedoms such as these are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal
attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.'" Id. at 734 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 523 (1960)) (citations omitted).
468. Id. at 735-36. As Justice Stewart noted in his Branzburg dissent, id. at
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greater burden of proof is to shirk our duty to protect values
securely embedded in the Constitution. We cannot await an
unequivocal-and therefore unattainable-imprimatur from
empirical studies. '469 Although the dissenters in Branzburg,
like the majority, were addressing the distinguishable issue of
whether the state's disclosure requirements infringed anyone's
first amendment rights, their caution concerning empirical
proof should apply a fortiori when the state has infringed a first
amendment right and is attempting to justify the infringement.
b. Alternative Means Available
The cleric's second argument might be that the state can
pursue other means of discovering child abuse. Other persons,
for example, are required to report suspected cases of child
abuse and can do so without offense to their religious beliefs.470
Many such persons are likely to obtain such information from
encounters unencumbered by an expectation of confidentiality.
The Supreme Court has stated that a state must justify its infringement on religious liberty by showing that "no alternative
forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infring'47
ing First Amendment rights." '
The appealing counterargument here is that child abuse is
a huge and terrible problem calling for every weapon in the
state's arsenal. One major obstacle to stopping abuse has been
the difficulty of discovering the abuse. If a cleric fails to report
a suspected case of abuse, someone else may or may not report
the same case. The state will argue that no alternate means exist to discover every case. This state's argument is stronger in
states whose statutes compel reports from any person who suspects abuse. Most states, however, limit the categories of persons required to report, and in those states the state's argument
is correspondingly weaker. By indicating that not every person's suspicion is worth pursuing, those states have already forfeited the argument that reports are required from every
735, the Court had previously found that forcing disclosure of the names of
NAACP members was likely to adversely affect the ability of NAACP members to advocate their beliefs or attract new members. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (compelled disclosure of organization's
membership held unconstitutional restraint on freedom of association).
469. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 736 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
470. Most reports come from nonprofessionals. See Fraser, supra note 11,
at 646 (stating that although reporting statutes have focused on professionals,
most reports come from nonprofessionals).
471. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
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472
possible source.

c.

CounterproductiveMeans

The cleric might also argue that compelling clergy to report works counter to the state's own goal of protecting children. This argument might take three forms. First, the cleric's
sharpest argument is that the state's procedures following a report are not only ineffective but actually harmful to the
child.47 3 Critics who have voiced this concern focus especially
on the vagueness of reporting standards which results in much
overreporting and in turn means that the state has unnecessarily invaded the privacy of many families to the detriment of all
474
Even if a state's investifamily members, including the child.
gation substantiates the suspicion of abuse, the state's conse475
Although
quent intervention may do more harm than good.
such criticisms of state intervention may or may not be warranted in a particular state, their assertion by many commentators indicates the feasibility of such an argument to defend a
cleric's free exercise claim.
Second, a cleric can concede the effectiveness of a state's
interventions and still argue that religious ministration is more
effective, at least in many cases. The strength of this argument
depends on the effectiveness of clergy counseling because the
argument is that what clergy can do to alleviate the situation
472. Most states' reporting statutes are not so broad as to require anyone
who suspects abuse to report. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 24-25. Furthermore, almost half the statutes expressly preserve the attorney-client privilege
despite expanding reporting requirements. See id. at 40-41. The rationale for
the attorney-client privilege is generally thought to be weak, however, and is
certainly no stronger than a free exercise right to claim a clergy privilege. See
S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, § 1.01.
473. In some cases the reporter fears that a report would provoke further
abuse of the child. See Contemporary Studies Project, supra note 11, at 133738.
474. See Bourne & Newberger, "FamilyAutonomy" or "CoerciveIntervention"? Ambiguity and Conflict in the Proposed Standardsfor Child Abuse
and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REV. 670, 696 (1977); Clements, Child Abuse: The Problem of Definition, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 729, 733-37 (1975); Smith & Meyer,
supra note 13, at 357. Arguably, when the state unnecessarily intrudes on
family, it infringes upon the family's constitutional privacy rights. Id. at 355
n.31. See also Note, supra note 242, at 731-33 (cautioning that statutes protecting children from abuse must be carefully drafted to minimize government intrusion into family life).
475. See Besharov, supra note 456, at 163-68; Smith & Meyer, supra note
13, at 359; Besharov, RepresentingAbused and Neglected Children: When Protecting Children Means Seeking the Dismissalof Court Proceedings,20 J. FAM.
L. 217, 231-34 (1981-82).
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may be better than what the state with its arsenal of interventions can accomplish.4 7 6 A similar argument has often been
made on behalf of psychotherapists. 4 77 The argument on behalf
of clergy, however, may strain the confidence people have in
clergy's counseling skills, especially in light of this nation's
wildly various religious groups and the wide divergence of their
clergy's training and religious objectives. 478 Thus, a state might
justify a distinction between clergy and licensed psychotherapists. Maine, for example, permits state-licensed mental health
professionals, but not clergy, to participate in the state's decision how to proceed following a report of abuse.47 9 Alternatively, a state might recognize a category of clergy who meet
certain standards of counseling, training, or skill and who
therefore perhaps have a stronger reason to refuse to report
abuse. 48 0 On the other hand, the effectiveness of even licensed
psychotherapists is often uneven, while many clergy are welltrained and competent counselors. Furthermore, for many persons, a religious response to their problems, framed in the relito them, may
gious categories that are most deeply meaningful
48 1
be more effective than secular interventions.
476. This argument is limited to counseling as treatment of abusiveness. It
is true, of course, that states have more weapons in their arsenal to combat the
problems of abuse. For example, if danger threatens, a state can physically remove a child from the abusive situation. Only some states authorize individuals to do likewise. See I. SLOAN, supra note 11, at 35. Moreover, a state may
prosecute the abuser. To the extent that these are effective helps to the child
and available only to the state, a cleric's claim to more effective counseling is
weakened. On the other hand, the cleric can still argue that, regardless of the
impressiveness of a state's arsenal against child abuse, in the long run, compelling clergy reports will not help the state to discover abuse and use that arsenal. See infra text accompanying note 482.
477. See, e.g., Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at 357-60; Smith, supra note
165, at 54.
478. See Knapp & VandeCreek, supra note 149.
479. See supra note 36.
480. See supra note 156 (discussing state designated "pastoral counselors"
in New Hampshire); see also Augspurger, supra note 223, at 115-18 (noting impact of state licensing on pastoral counseling).
481. See PastoralCounseling, in BAKER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY (D.
Benner ed. 1985).
The pastoral counselor has unique resources available for dealing
with human brokenness and guilt.... The authority inherent in the
symbolic role of the pastoral counselor makes him or her uniquely fitted for helping the counselee find forgiveness for true guilt and release from false guilt. Similarly the pastoral counselor has a unique
perspective to bring to the tragedies and sufferings of mankind.
Id. at 805. See also Lecomte, Relations Between the Subject and the "Minister"
in Confession and Psychoanalysis, 40 LUMEN VITAE 91 (1985) (comparing
Catholic penance with psychoanalysis).
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Even if the point concerning some clergy's lack of counseling skills is well taken, a cleric still has a third argument that
mandating clergy reports is counterproductive to the state's
goal of protecting children. If the prospect of disclosure will
deter people from approaching clergy for help, the choice is not
between help from the state and help from clergy, it is between
help from clergy and no help at all.482 By discouraging persons
from seeking private help, reporting requirements may preclude some troubled people from seeking any help at all.483
D.

IMPORTANCE OF THE FREE EXERCISE ARGUMENT

Without the free exercise claim, a cleric can make many of
the same arguments. He can urge society's interests in accommodating religious practice, in promoting the health that flows
from confessions to and counseling by clergy, and in respecting
the privacy of clergy-confider relationships. He can question
whether mandating clergy reports in fact contributes to the
state's protection of children. He can propose that under some
circumstances reports are counterproductive. These are all
sound arguments, even if not of constitutional status. Without
free exercise backing, however, more of a burden will rest on
the cleric to substantiate his arguments. In addition, the cleric
must contend with three lines of precedent that seem to cut
against his insistence on privilege in the face of a statutory
mandate to report, and that suggest the law's general antipathy
toward claims of the kind the cleric might make without the
backing of the free exercise clause.
The first harmful line of cases is that in which courts have
subordinated the psychotherapist's privilege to the psychother482. This point distinguishes the cases that have preferred secular medical
treatment by parents. See supra note 453.
483. "One of the purposes of child abuse laws is to encourage treatment for
the abuser to ensure that the abuse will stop and that the family can stay together. Anything that discourages voluntary treatment for abuse is counterproductive." Smith & Meyer, supra note 13, at 359. See also Smith, supra note
165, at 59 (similar argument for psychotherapists).
It should not be an adequate response to the counterproductivity argument for the state to indicate that some people still confide in clergy despite
some clergy's failure to keep confidences. Cf Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 439-40, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976) (rejecting claim that requiring therapists to warn their patients' potential victims
would adversely affect the practice of psychotherapy); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 426-27, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970) (practice of psychotherapy flourishing even though psychotherapist privilege not absolute).
That some people still confide does not mean that others have not been deterred from confiding or from confiding fully.
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apist's duty to warn of or help prevent harm to third persons
threatened by the therapist's patient. 48 4 The California
Supreme Court, in Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California,48 5 rocked the mental health community with its holding that a psychologist could be held liable for failing to warn
the foreseeable victim of his patient's violence. The American
Psychiatric Association requested a rehearing, and in Tarasoff
1I the California Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding: "When
a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious
danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger."48 6 The court acknowledged the "public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in protecting
the rights of patients to privacy, and the consequent public importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. ' 48 7 Nevertheless, it held that these
interests were outweighed by the "public interest in safety
484. See Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 397-98 (9th Cir. 1983)
(psychiatrists had duty to warn patient's girlfriend who was foreseeable victim
of patient's violent tendencies); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999,

1011-14 (D. Md. 1982) (psychiatrist should take reasonable action to warn specific or readily identifiable persons endangered by client); Leedy v. Hartnett,
510 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (in the absence of specific threats, hospital had no duty to warn anyone of patient's propensity toward violence when
intoxicated), affd, 676 F.2d 686 (3d Cir. 1982); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
497 F. Supp. 185, 192-93 (D. Neb. 1980) (psychiatric hospital has duty to protect
a class of persons if unreasonable risk to them is foreseeable); Hedlund v. Superior Ct., 34 Cal. 3d 695, 700-04, 669 P.2d 41, 43-46, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805, 807-10
(1983) (psychotherapists have duty to recognize when patients present serious
danger to others and warn identifiable potential victims); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438-39, 551 P.2d 334, 345-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14,
25-26 (1976) (psychotherapist has duty to exercise reasonable care both in predicting whether a patient poses a serious danger to others and in protecting
any foreseeable victims); Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Minn. 1982) (duty of
state to warn of patient's violent tendencies exists only when specific threat
made); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12
(1979) (psychotherapist has duty to take reasonable steps to protect potential
victims of patient). Cf Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 753-54,
614 P.2d 728, 734-35, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76-77 (1980) (county's liability). But see
Brady v. Hooper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983) (duty to warn arises
only when threats directed to identifiable victims), affd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th
Cir. 1984); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 429 671 P.2d 230, 237-38 (1983)
(benefits of privileged communication between psychiatrist and patient must
be balanced against public interest in full revelation of facts).
485. 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), affd, 17 Cal. 3d
425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
486. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
487. Id at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
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from violent assault. ' 48 8 Despite the considerable controversy
surrounding the psychotherapist's duty to warn,48 9 Tarasoffand
its progeny stand as precedent that the state's interest in encouraging therapy, even allied with privacy interests of the participants in therapy, should yield to the state interest in
490
protecting persons from violent attacks.
Further related but also distinguishable precedent involves
the tension between a state's reporting requirements and federal confidentiality statutes. For example, a federal statute
prohibits disclosure of information concerning patients at alcohol or drug abuse treatment programs funded, assisted, or authorized by the federal government. 491 In 1984, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that federal confidentiality statutes do not
preempt that state's abuse reporting statute, reasoning that
Congress could not have intended to render child abuse report492
ing requirements ineffective.
Finally, a line of precedent holds that rules of evidence
generally are relaxed for proceedings in which the welfare of a
child is at stake, including custody determinations as well as
child abuse or neglect proceedings. 493 In such proceedings, the
488. Id.
489. See Fleming & Maximov, The Patientor His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1025 (1974); Note, Tort Law-The PsychiatricDuty
to Warn: Cairl v. State, 6 HAMLINE L. REV. 513 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Tort
Law]; Note, Psychotherapistsand the Duty to Warn: An Attempt at Clarification, 19 N. ENG. L. REV. 597 (1984); see also Annotation, Liabilityof One Treat-

ing Mentally Afflicted PatientFor Failure to Warn or Protect Third Persons
Threatened by Patien 83 A.L.R.3d 1201 (1978).
490. The issue in these cases was whether psychotherapists had a common
law duty to warn. That no privilege applies means only that a therapist may,
not that he must, warn. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440 n.12, 551 P.2d at 347
n.12, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.12.
491. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (Supp. III 1985); 42
C.F.R. §§ 2.1 to 2.67-1 (1985). See also Gellman, supra note 261, at 275-77 (discussing the federal alcohol and drug confidentiality rules).
492. State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984) (addressing 42 U.S.C.
§ 4582 (1976) which provided for the confidentiality of patient records of alcohol abusers and is now classified at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-3 (Supp. III 1985) and
also addressing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (1976) which pertain to child abuse prevention and treatment (subsequently amended in part in Supp. III 1985)). But
see Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. No. 83-11-3 (1983) (concluding that Iowa's confidentiality statutes yield to state's abuse reporting requirements, but federal confidentiality law has supremacy over state reporting requirements).
493. See, e.g., State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836 (1985) (exception to
hearsay rule for child victim's out-of-court statement upheld against sixth
amendment confrontation clause challenge); In re Diane P., 110 A.D.2d 354,
494 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1985) (exclusionary rule not applicable in abuse proceeding
due to state's overwhelming interest in protecting minors). See also Note, Leg-
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law commonly hews out exceptions to both the marital communications and the physician-patient privileges. 4 94 In fact, one
court has held that recognition of the marital communications
privilege in a custody proceeding violates the child's due process right to have all material evidence before the court.4 95
These precedents lean against the cleric's claim of privilege
not to report suspected child abuse. Because the cases are variously distinguishable, however, especially on the ground that
they do not involve clergy and do not address free exercise496issues, the cleric's special arguments deserve direct attention.
islative Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Cases: The Hearsay Exception and
the Videotape Deposition, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 1021, 1041-43 (1985) (discussing
state statutes that allow admission of videotaped depositions of alleged child
abuse victims); John, supra note 11, § 33.
494. See S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, supra note 53, §§ 5.15, 7.27, 7.28. Cf.
Weisberg & Wald, supra note 221, at 210-11 n.215 (arguing that the need for
psychotherapist privilege is greater in child custody cases than in abuse or neglect cases).
495. M. v. K., 186 N.J. Super. 363, 452 A.2d 704 (1982). Accord, Fitzgibbon v.
Fitzgibbon, 197 N.J. Super. 63, 484 A.2d 46 (1984) (psychologist privilege). See
also McComI icK, supra note 94, § 74.2 (discussing other possible constitutional
limitations on privileges--compulsory process, confrontation, due process
clauses).
496. In Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. JM-342 (Aug. 5, 1985), the attorney general of
Texas gave direct attention to the relationship between the Texas reporting
statute, the clergy privilege, and the free exercise clause, but failed to address
the necessity of the means chosen by the Texas legislature to protect child
abuse victims. The question addressed was whether a minister is required to
report child abuse under the Texas reporting statute. The Texas statute mandates reports from "[aJny person having cause to believe" that a child is
abused. TEX. FAMi. CODE ANN. § 34.01 (Vernon 1986) (emphasis added). Texas,
however, also recognizes the following version of the clergy privilege:
Communications to Clergymen
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "clergyman" is a minister, priest, rabbi, accredited Christian Science Practitioner, or other similar functionary of a religious
organization or an individual reasonably believed so to be by the person consulting him.
(2) A communication is "confidential" if made privately and not
intended for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the purpose of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as
spiritual adviser.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by
the person, by his guardian or conservator, or by his personal representative if he is deceased. The person who was the clergyman at the
time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the
privilege but only on behalf of the communicant.
TEx. R. CRIM. EVID. 505. The attorney general acknowledged the apparent
tension between the two statutes, but found a resolution in chronology. Texas
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CONCLUSION

Resolution of the tension between abuse reporting requirements and the clergy privilege will vary from state to state with
variations in state policies and the effectiveness of the state
procedures that follow reports. More empirical data might be
helpful. This Article has attempted to clarify the true interests
at stake, offer a structure for analyzing those interests, and,
most important, assert that constitutional considerations of free
exercise of religion must be prominent in the debate.
It may sound harsh to argue that clergy have the right to
withhold their suspicion or knowledge of child abuse. Certainly, many clergy would not claim such a right. Those clergy
who do, however, and advocates of their right to do so, are
497
neither condoning child abuse nor slighting its horrors.
adopted its privilege statute in 1967. Subsequently, however, Texas added the
following provision to its reporting statute: "In any proceeding regarding the

abuse or neglect of a child or the cause of any abuse or neglect, evidence may
not be excluded on the ground of privileged communication except in the case
of communications between attorney and client." TEx. FAm. CODE ANN.
§ 34.04 (Vernon 1986). The attorney general invoked the principle that "[i]f
there is an irreconcilable conflict between statutes dealing with the same subject, the most recent controls as the latest expression of legislative intent."
Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-342 at 1559 (Aug. 5, 1985). Accordingly, without
any policy discussion, the attorney general concluded that the reporting statute prevails. Id. at 1560.
The opinion's discussion of the free exercise issue is astonishingly brief.
Having determined that mandatory reporting interferes with religious conduct
rather than with religious belief, the opinion simply concluded:
Government regulation of religious conduct is valid if it does not unduly burden the practice of religion, if the state's interest in enacting
the regulation is compelling, and if there are no alternative means
available which are less intrusive upon the practice. See Wisconsin v.
Yoder, see also Sherbert v. Verner. Each of these requirements is satisfied here. In Price v. Massachusetts, the United States Supreme
Court said "It]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the ...

child... to ill health or death....

."

See also

Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1. To conclude
that the application of [the Texas reporting statute] to clergymen
would violate the Free Exercise Clause would be to ignore this admonition. We therefore conclude that to require a clergyman to report
evidence of child abuse or neglect when confidentially disclosed to
him by a parishioner does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
Id at 1561 (citations omitted). That is the extent of the opinion's free exercise
analysis. The attorney general stated the correct free exercise test, but then
applied only part of that test. He omitted the crucial inquiry into the necessity
of clergy reports as the means to achieving the state's interest in protecting
children. Consequently, the opinion's incomplete and unsophisticated analysis
of both the statutory and the constitutional issues diminishes the persuasiveness of its authority on the issue of mandatory clergy reports.
497. Tiemann and Bush note that:
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When the harm that the report might have averted is tangible
and terrible, it is tempting to let go of the less tangible, more
long-term, but vital values served by respecting the privacy of
the confessional and the place of religious counsel. The common law has long declined to impose on persons a duty to rescue or warn those with whom they have no special
relationship. 498 As this archaism rightly succumbs to the legal
doctrinization of the interdependence of persons, the duty to
protect children should be at the vanguard. Compelling reports
from clergy, however, is a feeble and objectionable beginning.
Instead of imposing on objecting clergy an absolute duty to
report, a state could make reporting permissive rather than
mandatory for clergy with free exercise objections. 499 Alternatively, a state could at least narrow the scope of the duty to report generally, or clergy's duty specifically, to situations
involving serious threats to the child's life or health, or to
known, rather than suspected, cases of abuse.5 00
Unfortunately, [the clergy's defense of the privilege against child
abuse reporting requirements] may seem at first to put the clergy in a
position of seeking ways to protect child abusers. Upon reflection it is
clear that this is no more the case than the existence of the privilege
generally makes the clergy defenders of any other sinner. Case law is
filled with instances where clergy have been involved confidentially
with those who have or may have murdered, maimed, raped, and
robbed.... Existence of the privilege does not condone any criminal
act. The emotionally charged cause of child abuse is not different in
this regard.
W. TIENIANN & J. BUSH, supra note 5, at 178.
498. See Tarasoff,17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23
(1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1965); Note, Tort Law,
supra note 489, at 517-20. For cases discussing the duty to rescue or warn, see
authorities cited supra note 484.
499. Yellin, supra note 57, at 156, recommends that clergy privilege statutes include the following exception: "If the communication threatens harm
to any person, the Clergyman may, but is not required to disclose the communication to avoid occurrence of that harm." Accord, Comment, Reporting
Child Abuse and Neglect- Oregon's Legislation, 57 OR. L. REV. 444, 454 n.72
(1978).
Instead of a duty to report, a state could impose a duty to warn. See supra
text accompanying notes 484-90. For many clergy, however, even this duty is a
burden on the right to maintain confidentiality. Furthermore, a duty to warn
may help the victim little when the victim is a child and the parent or guardian, normally the person warned, is also the abuser.
500. Some current definitions of abuse are too vague for prospective reporters to know when a report is required. This is a fatal defect if the duty to
report is backed by criminal sanctions. Clements, supra note 474; Smith &
Meyer, supra note 13, at 356. See also State v. Ballard, 341 So. 2d 957, 960-62
(Ala. App.) (child abuse statute held unconstitutional because vagueness made
it impossible for accused to prepare adequate defense), cert dismissed, 341 So.
2d 962 (Ala. 1976); State v. Meinert, 225 Kan. 816, 820, 594 P.2d 232, 234 (1979)
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Another appropriate compromise might be a carefully limited exception to reporting requirements, patterned on Maine's
or Maryland's former statutory exceptions.5 0 ' The exception to
the reporting requirement could be limited, as was Maine's, to
situations in which there is "little threat of serious harm to the
child."'50 2 Alternatively, the exception could be limited, as was
Maryland's, to situations in which
[e]fforts are being made or will be made to alleviate the conditions or
circumstances which may cause the child to be considered a neglected
child [or where] reporting would inhibit the child, parent, guardian or
custodian from seeking assistance
in the future and thereby be detri5 03
mental to the child's welfare.

Finally, the exception could be limited to persons who have acquired their reportable information from professional counseling relationships, or limited even further to clergy who have so
acquired the information and have religious objections to
reporting.
The thesis of this Article is that resolving the tension between abuse reporting requirements and the clergy privilege
should not be simple. Given the momentous interests potentially at stake, the issue should be carefully analyzed. Currently, most states have not taken a clear position on the issue.
Clergy feel caught in a legal dilemma that only exacerbates any
moral or religious dilemma they face concerning disclosure of
suspected abuse. The resolvers of the legal dilemma must pro(statute defining crime of endangering child was unconstitutional due to
vagueness of phrase "unjustifiable physical pain"); State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d
967, 968 (Wyo. 1963) (statute making it illegal to endanger the health or welfare of minor child held unconstitutionally vague). But see People v. Jennings,
641 P.2d 276, 278 (Colo. 1982) (prohibition in child abuse statute against cruel
punishment held sufficiently precise to satisfy due process requirements);
Campbell v. State, 240 So. 2d 298, 299-300 (Fla.) (words "unnecessarily or excessively chastised" in statute prohibiting torture or unlawful punishment of
children not too indefinite to meet constitutional standards of due process), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936 (1970); Hunter v. States, 360 N.E.2d 588, 594-96
(Ind.App.) (statute prohibiting cruelty to children contains sufficient specificity for people of ordinary intelligence to determine proscribed conduct and is
not, therefore, unconstitutionally vague), cert denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977).
Smith and Meyer have argued for narrowing the definitions of reportable
abuse and neglect to meet three goals: limiting reports to serious injuries, limiting reports to injuries that state follow-up services can handle, and giving
prospective reporters guidance concerning when they must report. See Smith
& Meyer, supra note 13, at 362.
501. See supra note 36.
502. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011(1)(c) (1980) (deleted in 1985). For
a thorough discussion of Maine's former statute, see supra note 36.
503. MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 6(c) (1978) (deleted in 1983). Maryland's
deleted statute is discussed more fully supra note 36.
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ceed with informed concern for the children, with sensitivity to
the less perceptible values of free religious practice and the beneficence of effective ministries, and with appropriate humility
concerning anyone's abilities either to judge or to effect a
child's best interests.

